Patterns of Power

BRITISH BUGANDA

The anatomy of a redirect conquest — how the British took a self-running kingdom by capturing its own order, and what the taking cost. A landscape and twelve modules.

thomas J. Bryan *with* Claude (Anthropic)

held as tested, not revealed

Patterns of Power · British Buganda

PREFACE AND OUTLINE

Front matter · how this study was made, the disciplines it holds itself to, and a map of its thirteen parts

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The collaboration

This is a case study in the *Patterns of Power* series, applying the series' framework to the British conquest and administration of the kingdom of Buganda, from the arrival of the missions and the company in the 1880s and 1890s to the destruction of the kingdom in 1966. The framework is a lens for reading how any order of power is founded, dressed, and held: the floor of force beneath every order, the robe of doctrine laid over the floor, the settlement that divides the spoils, the cost column in which each subject prices defection, the default by which an elite coordinates without instruction, and — running through all of it — position-logic, the proposition that rulers in like positions converge on like solutions because a position poses a problem with only a few good answers. Buganda was chosen because it is the framework's cleanest case of one particular answer, the *redirect*: the capture of a native order that already runs itself, ruled through rather than replaced.

The study was built the way the series is built, one module at a time. The author brought the framework, the direction, and the judgement of the whole, and held the collaboration to its disciplines; Claude, Anthropic's model, did the research — verifying every load-bearing quotation, date, and figure by web search against a source reproducing the primary text before any

module was written — and produced the drafts, applying the framework module by module, each presented and confirmed before the next was begun. The framework's concepts are the series'; the Buganda application, and the refinements it yielded, are the work of the collaboration.

Its engine throughout is the method of information asymmetry. The study exists to show the gap between what was said at the metropole and what was done in the colony, and it works by setting the exact public words beside the exact words of the ground — the 1830-style pledge beside the massacre, the charter of rights beside the schedule of square miles, the civilising mission beside the machine-gun — laying out the arithmetic and leaving the sum to the reader. It does not preach the conclusion. It lays the two columns side by side and lets the distance between them speak.

The disciplines

Five rules govern every module.

Quotation. Public-domain primary sources — laws, treaties, agreements, despatches, memoirs, the vernacular press — are quoted exactly, at the length the argument needs, because in a legal fiction the precise wording *is* the evidence. Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased, briefly, and credited.

No fabrication. No quotation, date, attribution, or figure is ever invented or reconstructed from memory. What cannot be verified is dropped or flagged, never guessed; contested figures are given as ranges.

Gravity without partisanship. Suffering is held with gravity, and the study refuses both flattery and demonisation — it names the legal fiction as fiction and explains the order's logic without excusing it. Its recurring watchword is *legibility is not pardon*: to understand how a thing was done is not to forgive its being done.

Contribution. Every module returns a refinement to the framework, stated plainly in its closing section, rather than merely applying the framework to the case.

Held as tested, not revealed. The pattern is treated as something discovered and tested against the evidence, not handed down as doctrine — a lens laid over the record, a tendency and never a law.

What Buganda added to the framework

Because Buganda is the series' purest redirect, it was able to name features of the redirect that the settler and direct-rule cases obscure. Chief among the refinements the study contributed: that a redirect can be *solicited by its victim* (the king who sent for the missions); that its settlement works by *enfeoffment*, converting a native service-nobility into a landed one bolted to the Crown by freehold; that its robe can *take with the conquered*, uniquely, because it is the conquered's own old robe re-dyed; that it does not withhold formation but *calibrates* it, because forming the native admits him to a native order, not the metropole's; that it *delegates and disguises* its coercion as native custom, and so escapes both the ledger and the reformer; that it extracts through a *three-tier* structure with a middleman minority who takes the surplus and the blame; that it keeps its seam shut by *language*, walling the reality in a tongue the rulers never learned; that it *borrows* the native default to coordinate its elite cheaply — a loan callable by the lender; that it grants a plurality of *voice* precisely to foreclose plurality of *power*; and that its gentleness is not less cost but *displaced and deferred* cost, so that the preservation which spared the kingdom was the same act that made the kingdom unintegrable and, in the end, destroyed it. The redirect is the cheapest conquest and the gentlest, and its gentleness is the most refined technique of its taking.

The arc

A landscape opening and twelve modules, each with a framework function and its own evocative title.

Landscape — the two societies on the eve of conquest. **The King Who Sent For Them.** A self-running kingdom, itself a former conquest naturalised across five centuries, and the strangers its own king invited in — establishing that the redirect began as the apex's own reaching-out.

1 — The Floor of Force. **How We Fought Kabarega.** A founding that conquered not the conquered but selected their ruling faction (the Maxim at Mengo) and then leased their army to floor everyone else (the war on Bunyoro): the floor as arbiter and lever, manned by the conquered.

2 — The Settlement. **Eight Square Miles Each.** The 1900 Agreement and the *mailo* revolution — freehold granted as estates "already in possession," manufacturing a landed aristocracy: the settlement as enfeoffment, sorted by caste, with the peasant taxed twice.

3 — The Robe. **Christ's Generals.** The sacred kingship re-dyed Christian and the metropole told the Baganda were "the Japanese of Africa": the series' cleanest redirect, and the robe that takes because it is the old robe re-coloured.

4 — Formation. **The Sons of Chiefs.** Budo on the coronation hill; "adapted education" against the hunger for book-learning: the redirect dissolves the settler's dilemma — forming the native admits him to nothing the coloniser holds — and then calibrates.

5 — The Cost Column. **In Turns.** *Kasanvu* and *luwalo* — the labour cost delegated to the chief and disguised as custom, and so cheap to extract and slow to abolish: the cheapest hold is the one where the enforcer is the ruled's own chief.

6 — Extraction. **The Ginner's Cut.** Compelled cotton and rigged terms of trade in a colony without settlers — the mirror of Kenya's forbidden crop — extracted through three racial tiers, the Asian middleman taking the cut and the blame.

7 — Information and Suppression. **Untranslated.** The mission-press monopoly and the vernacular press: the seam kept shut by language, the reality speakable, even printed, but inaudible where it mattered — silenced not by a censor but by an absence of translation.

8 — Elite Coordination and the Default. **Through the Katikkiro.** The clipping of Kagwa in 1926: the redirect borrows the native default to rule cheaply, and thereby rules through a loyalty that is not, at bottom, to the ruler — a loan kept coincident by concession and metropolitan will.

9 — Plurality or Foreclosure. **Laid Down in the 1900 Agreement.** A thick civil society whose every channel struck the wall of the founding

settlement in the Kabaka's own mouth: high plurality of voice, near-total foreclosure of power — the voice permitted because it was a valve, not a lever.

10 — Change and Collapse. **Kabaka Yekka.** The 1953 deportation and triumphant return: the order fell not to the floor but to the emptying of the metropolitan will, when the borrowed default reverted to its owner and became, around the same throne, the force that ended the rule.

11 — The Grim Accounting. **The School and the Sleeping Sickness.** The fullest credit column in the series set against the catastrophe the same page omits — the epidemic dead, the halved population, ruined Bunyoro, the kingdom destroyed in 1966: the gentle conquest costs not less but elsewhere, earlier, lower, and later.

12 — Convergence and Divergence. **The Gentlest Taking.** Buganda placed among the conquests that co-opt rather than crush, its method chosen by its position; and the strongest defence of its gentleness, stated in full and answered without flinching — the gentlest taking is still a taking, and never more entirely a taking than when it is gentle.

Alongside the modules the collaboration produced one standalone paper, *The Clerk and the Priest*, generalising the redirect across unconnected conquests — Sasanian Persia, Ming China, Nahua Mexico, and Buganda — to show that separate conquerors keep the administrators of the orders they take and do one of a few things to the priests, converging without ever reading one another because the position, not the culture, dictates the move.

A note on sources. This front matter is descriptive and makes no primary-source claims of its own; every factual assertion about the case is established, with its sources, in the module it summarises. The framework it describes is the series'; the disciplines it lists are the ones the modules hold themselves to and document in their own closing notes.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

Patterns of Power · British Buganda — Landscape

THE KING WHO SENT FOR THEM

Landscape · the two societies on the eve of conquest — a kingdom that already ran itself, itself a former conquest naturalised across five centuries, and the strangers its own king invited in

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Two shores, and an inversion at the meeting

Most conquests in this collection begin with a floor — a sword laid across a population that did not consent, a founding act of force from which everything after it descends. The Buganda case begins differently, and the difference is the whole of why it is worth setting beside British Kenya, its neighbour and near-contemporary. In Kenya the incoming order met an acephalous people with no apex to buy or break, and so had to *forge* the chiefs it needed, manufacturing an authority that had not existed before. In Buganda it met the opposite: one of the most centralised states in the interior of the continent, a kingdom with a king, a council, a graded civil service of chiefs, a capital of tens of thousands, a standing tribute economy, and a sacred monarchy so thoroughly believed by its own subjects that it needed no daily force to hold them. The British did not build that floor. They found it already laid, already cheap, already running on the governed's own conviction — and their conquest, when it came, was not the construction of an order but the capture of one that worked. The sharpest fact of the whole study sits at the very start, and it is an inversion of the usual shape: the

strangers who would end Buganda's sovereignty came, in the first instance, because its own king sent for them.

This landscape sets the two shores that met on the northern coast of the lake the Baganda called Nnalubaale and the maps would call Victoria. On the one shore stands the kingdom — self-running, sacred, and, as this landscape will show, itself the naturalised residue of an older conquest, so that the British met not a timeless Africa but an earlier build that had taken. On the other stand the forces that would capture it: the ivory-and-slave traders who came first, the two rival Christian missions that came at the king's invitation, the chartered company that followed the missions, and the Crown that followed the company. The distance between what those forces said they were doing and what they did is the subject of every module that follows. The landscape's only task is to establish the two shores clearly enough that the reader can watch them meet.

The kingdom that ran itself

By the middle of the nineteenth century Buganda was a state in every functional sense the word carries. At its head stood the Kabaka, and the two titles his subjects gave him name the two halves of his power exactly: he was *ssaabasajja*, the head of all men, the father and source of all authority; and he was *ssaabataka*, the head of all the clan-heads, the final arbiter above every lineage. Beneath him sat the *Lukiiko*, the great council of chiefs, and beneath that a graded administration of territorial chiefs — the *bakungu*, who governed the counties (*ssaza*) as appointees of the crown, and the *batongole*, royal agents planted through the country to watch, tax, and levy. The kingdom was divided, by the late nineteenth century, into some ten to twelve counties, expanded from a much smaller core; its capital moved with each reign but by Mutesa I's time clustered on the hills that would become Kampala — Rubaga, Mengo, Kasubi — a royal enclosure of reed-and-thatch palaces, courts, and the tombs of dead kings, ringed by the compounds of the great chiefs and reached by broad, deliberately engineered roads. Its economy ran on barkcloth and iron, on plantain gardens worked by a peasantry (*bakopi*)

who owed labour and tribute upward, on a fleet of war-canoes that made the lake a Ganda highway, and on a long-distance trade in ivory and slaves that by the 1840s had drawn Zanzibari Arab caravans all the way to the king's court.

Two structural features of this order deserve marking now, because the whole study will turn on them. The first is that Ganda chieftaincy was, to a striking degree, *appointive rather than hereditary*. A series of kabakas across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had broken the power of the old hereditary clan-heads and replaced it with a service nobility that held office at the king's pleasure, could be promoted, demoted, and dismissed at his word, and could not securely pass its position to its sons. This was the native order's own answer to the problem that runs beneath every hierarchy — how a centre holds the capable men it needs without letting them become rivals — and it was a version of the answer the framework calls *prevent*: keep the coordinating class dependent, revocable, and unable to harden into a lineage that could displace the crown. The second feature reinforced the first: by Ganda rule the children of a Kabaka took the clan of their *mother*, not their father, so that no royal clan could form to monopolise the throne, and every one of the kingdom's clans might in principle mother a king. The effect was to bind all the clans to the monarchy at once while denying any of them a hereditary claim on it — a design that made the Kabakaship the single fixed point around which everything else turned. These are not incidental customs. They are the machinery of a state that had already, on its own, done much of the work of concentrating power at the apex and keeping it there — which is precisely why, two generations later, that apex would be so capturable whole.

Beneath the belief lay a floor, as it always does, and it was not gentle. Mutesa I, who reigned from 1856 to 1884, is remembered in Ganda tradition by the name *Mukaabya* — "the one who causes to weep" — earned in the killings that opened his reign; the European visitors who reached his court recorded casual executions, sacrificial killings, and a discipline maintained by the constant, credible nearness of death. But the point the framework insists on is that this floor had, over centuries, largely withdrawn to the margins, because the belief that made the Kabaka sacred had genuinely taken. The ordinary Muganda did not obey the king mainly from fear of the executioner;

he held the monarchy as the order of the world, policed its deferences himself, and would have found the thought of a Buganda without a Kabaka very nearly unthinkable. This is the self-running pole the collection's foundational statement describes — an order held up by its own subjects' conviction, the sword present but resting — and Buganda had reached it. That it had reached it is the single most important thing to hold about the near shore, because an order that runs on its subjects' belief is an order a conqueror can seize at the top without having to hold down the bottom.

A former conquest, naturalised

The order the British found looked, to its own subjects and very nearly to itself, like the permanent shape of the world. It was not. It was the naturalised residue of an earlier build, and saying so is not to debunk it but to locate it, for a built thing that becomes real is more durable than any lie and was authentically the Baganda's world exactly as the Kabakaship claimed.

Ganda tradition holds two founding stories, and the framework's counsel is to read a layered origin not as evidence of an invented founder but as the fossil record of continuous, deliberate architecture. In the older story the first Kabaka is *Kintu*, who came from outside, defeated a tyrant named Bemba, gathered the original clans under a single crown, and then vanished — a founder-conqueror in the plainest sense, the man who turned a scatter of lineages into a kingdom. In the competing tradition the founder is *Kimera*, a prince connected to the neighbouring and far older power of Bunyoro-Kitara and its Cwezi and Bito dynasts, so that Buganda begins as a breakaway shard of its great western rival. The two stories are not easily reconciled and this study does not try to reconcile them; what matters is what they share, which is a memory that the kingdom had a beginning, that it was made by a conqueror out of materials that pre-existed it, and that the making has been retold, elaborated, and amplified across every reign since. Modern scholarship (M. S. M. Kiwanuka, Christopher Wrigley, and others, whose reconstructions differ and are paraphrased here rather than quoted) places the kingdom's emergence somewhere in the region of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries and treats

the king-lists and origin-legends as sources to be read against the grain rather than as chronicle — the dates are contested and are given here as a range, not a fact.

What is not contested is the trajectory. Over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a compact, aggressive Buganda expanded at the expense of the sprawling, ageing Bunyoro-Kitara to its west, annexing county after county — Buddu, Singo, and others — until the offshoot had eclipsed the parent and become the dominant power on the northern lake. The conquest was still happening within living memory of the men the British would deal with; two of the counties Buganda held had been taken from Bunyoro, and Bunyoro's claim to them would fester for another seventy years. So the order the British met was not an aboriginal or timeless baseline against which the colonial disruption can be measured. It was itself a conquest state — one whose founding sword had been sheathed so long, and whose belief had been driven so deep by so many reigns of formation, that the arrangement had passed into what the collection calls the furniture of reality: Qur'anic North Africa was the seventh-century Arab conquest naturalised until it was simply the way the world was, Roman Gaul was Caesar's conquest naturalised until the Gauls were simply Romans, and Ganda kingship was Kintu's or Kimera's conquest naturalised until a Muganda could no more imagine choosing it than choosing the lake. Naming that origin is not to make the kingship a fraud or its defenders dupes. It is to say that Buganda had already travelled the whole road the framework describes — from a founding conquest, through generations of formation, to a self-running order held by its subjects' own conviction — and had arrived. The colonial order that was about to be laid over it would try to travel the same road and would never arrive, and the contrast between the two is much of what this study measures.

The lens that could not see a state

When the first Europeans reached this kingdom they carried a theory of Africa that the kingdom flatly contradicted, and the contradiction is worth dwelling on, because it is the first and cleanest instance of the information

asymmetry this whole study tracks — not yet a lie told to a distant public, but a lens that could not register what stood in front of it.

John Hanning Speke, who reached Mutesa's court in 1862, set out his theory in the introduction to his *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile* (1863), and it is a document of its moment, quoted here exactly because its precise words are the evidence. Africa's peoples, he wrote, were the cursed line of Ham — "our poor elder brother Ham was cursed by his father, and condemned to be the slave of both Shem and Japheth" — and their poverty was a poverty of government: the "negro is too lazy" to store against famine, he explained, "owing chiefly, as we shall see presently, to want of a strong protecting government." The remedy was obvious to him: "Could a government be formed for them like ours in India, they would be saved." Of the interior's religion he wrote that "the power held by the magician (Mganga)" was such that he "rules the minds of the kings as did the old popes of Europe." Here was a man whose theory required the African interior to be stateless, priest-ridden, and ungoverned — and who then walked into Buganda.

For Buganda was, on his own account, precisely the strong protecting government his theory said the region lacked. Speke's own text betrays the strain: of the peoples he expected to meet he wrote that they had "their district and their village chiefs, but, in the countries we are about to travel over, no kings such as we shall find that the Wahuma have." The disciplined monarchy he could not deny he explained away by race — the "Wahuma" or Hima hypothesis, the claim that Buganda's kings must descend from a lighter-skinned pastoralist aristocracy of quasi-Caucasian origin, because a state this ordered could not, in his theory, be the work of the people he saw building it. This is the Hamitic hypothesis in its African form, and it is worth naming plainly as the discredited racial theory it is: the real history of Ganda state-formation is a history of Bantu-speaking cultivators building, expanding, and naturalising a kingdom of their own, not of an alien race arriving to rule them. But the theory did structural work for the men who held it. Confronted with a former conquest that had reached the self-running pole — the very thing his own civilisation prized — Speke could not credit it to

Africans, and so he credited it to a phantom race of outside conquerors. The European misread a naturalised Bantu conquest as a racial infusion, exactly as a later European would misread the Baganda's evident competence as evidence they were, in Harry Johnston's coming phrase, a people apart. The lens saw a state and reported a puzzle; the puzzle was in the lens.

The king who sent for them

The redirect that would capture Buganda began, then, not with a British column but with an African king's calculation, and this is the inversion that gives the landscape its title. Mutesa I was no innocent awaiting rescue. He was a shrewd apex managing a widening world: he had welcomed Zanzibari Arabs and flirted seriously with Islam, learning to read Arabic and observing the Muslim Sabbath, using the new faith and its traders as a counterweight and a source of the guns his kingdom's power increasingly required. When Henry Morton Stanley arrived in 1875, Mutesa turned the same calculation toward the Christians. It was the Kabaka who had Stanley compose the famous appeal — an open letter to the philanthropic public of Britain and America, carried out of the interior in the boot of a murdered French emissary and published in the *Daily Telegraph* on 15 November 1875. Its words, as reproduced there and in Stanley's *Through the Dark Continent* (1878), are a recruiting poster with an invoice attached. "Here, gentlemen, is your opportunity — embrace it!" Stanley wrote, and then, to any who feared the expense: "You need not fear to spend money upon such a mission, as Mtesa is sole ruler, and will repay its cost tenfold with ivory, coffee, otter skins of a very fine quality, or even cattle, for the wealth of this country in all these products is immense." He put the kingdom's population at two million — "I estimate the number of his subjects at 2,000,000," a figure that is Stanley's own estimate and is given here as his, not as fact.

The letter is a small masterpiece of the seam this study will spend itself tracing, because it sells two different things to two audiences in one breath: salvation to the pious, and a tenfold commercial return to the practical. And it worked. The Church Missionary Society, Protestant, arrived in 1877; the

White Fathers, Catholic and French, arrived in 1879; and the two missions planted at Mutesa's court the rival confessional loyalties — *Bangereza*, the English party, and *Bafalansa*, the French — that would within a decade militarise into armed factions and tear the kingdom apart. Mutesa had sent for technicians and guns and got, instead, the seed of a religious civil war. Harry Johnston, the Special Commissioner who would later negotiate the settlement that ended Buganda's independence, understood exactly what the letter had set in motion, and wrote it down without flinching in *The Uganda Protectorate* (1902): "Truly Stanley's letter, the blood-stained sheet of paper found in the boot of the murdered de Bellefonds, was big with fateful results for the Kingdom of Uganda." The king had reached out to capture European power for his own position, in the ordinary way of a strong apex managing his materials; and the reaching-out became the hinge on which his kingdom's sovereignty turned.

Behind the missions stood a geopolitics the Baganda could not see the whole of. Buganda sat on the headwaters of the Nile, and the Nile ran to Egypt, and Egypt guarded the Suez road to India, so that the source of the river became, in the strategic imagination of London, a place that mattered out of all proportion to its trade. When the European powers came to divide the continent among themselves, the Anglo-German settlement of 1890 drew a line that placed Buganda in the British sphere without a single Muganda at the table. The redirect that had begun as a king's invitation would be completed by a bargain struck between two distant empires over the kingdom's head.

The eve

Mutesa I died in October 1884, and with him went the balancing hand that had kept the Arab, the Protestant, the Catholic, and the traditionalist factions in play without letting any consume the others. His son Mwanga II inherited the widening world without the father's touch, and read the new Christian loyalties — the young court pages who now professed an allegiance higher than the king's — as exactly the threat to the sacred monarchy that they were.

His reaction opened the era of blood the next modules will enter: the killing of the incoming Anglican bishop, James Hannington, on the eastern road in 1885; the burning and beheading of the young Christian converts at Namugongo in 1885 and 1886, a persecution whose Christian dead are counted variously and are given here as a range — some forty-odd named and later canonised, perhaps two hundred across the whole terror, following the killing of scores of Muslim converts under Mutesa a decade before. Out of that persecution the missions would make martyrs, and out of the martyrs a campaign to bind Britain to the kingdom; and the religious parties, arming themselves into the kingdom's first standing regiments, would within four years depose the Kabaka, install and depose his brothers, fight each other to exhaustion, and — at the decisive moment — call in the one external arbiter with a machine-gun. The kingdom that had run itself for five centuries was about to be captured at its seam, and the capture would be dressed, for the audiences that funded and manned it, in the language of rescue.

That is the threshold on which this landscape ends. On the near shore, a sacred, self-running kingdom that was itself a naturalised conquest, holding its people by their own conviction, its floor withdrawn to the margins. On the far shore, the traders, the missions, the company, and the Crown, arriving in that order, each following the last, the whole procession set in motion by the king's own letter. What follows is the account of how the far shore captured the near one — not by building a floor across two million people, which it never needed to do, but by seizing the apex of a machine that already ran, and pointing the belief of a whole kingdom at itself.

Reading the two societies against the framework

The Buganda landscape confirms the framework's central picture and sharpens it in four ways that the modules will develop and that are worth stating plainly at the outset.

First, it is the clean case of the native order as a *former conquest that reached the self-running pole* — and, unlike the collection's Kikuyu landscape,

a former conquest *with an apex*. The Kikuyu order was acephalous, a naturalised conquest that never curdled into a captured centre, which is why the British there had to forge chiefs from nothing. Buganda had done the curdling itself, centuries before: a founding conquest (Kintu or Kimera), a concentration of power at the throne, the deliberate breaking of hereditary rivals, and the driving-deep of belief across many reigns until the Kabakaship was the furniture of reality. This is the recursion the framework insists on — a conqueror never meets an innocent baseline, only an earlier build that took — and Buganda states it more crisply than any case yet in the collection, because the earlier conquest was recent enough to be remembered and the apex it produced was concrete enough to be captured whole.

Second, and following directly, the case predicts that the colonial provenance of the robe here will be *redirect*, not forge — the cheapest of the three ways to acquire the trusted-information leg, because someone else has already done the hard work of earning the trust. Where Kenya's British had to manufacture authority, Buganda's had only to get behind an authority the people already held and point it at themselves. This is indirect rule in its purest documented form, and the study will test it as such: the whole apparatus of the coming settlement will be an effort to capture the existing seam rather than to build a new floor.

Third, the case establishes at the outset that this is *the cheapest kind of conquest available* — the capture of a machine that already runs. Because Buganda's own order held its subjects by their conviction, the incoming power did not face the colonial floor's usual task of holding down a resentful majority by force and surveillance. It faced instead the far smaller task of capturing an apex and letting the apex's own naturalised authority continue to do the holding. The framework's rule that *surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took* predicts, then, a colony held with relatively little visible force at its core precisely because the belief that holds the core is not the conqueror's at all but the Kabaka's — borrowed, redirected, and left running. Where the surveillance and the force will concentrate instead is at the edges, on the peoples Buganda's chiefs are sent to conquer for the British, and on the day

the redirected belief and the alien power behind it are finally forced to reveal that they are two things and not one. Those are the study's later chapters.

Fourth, the case adds a genuine refinement to the framework's account of how a redirect begins, and the refinement is the landscape's title. The collection has treated the redirect as something a conqueror does *to* a trusted native channel — getting behind a chief or a church and capturing its earned trust. Buganda shows that a redirect can begin from the *other* end: with the apex itself reaching outward to capture the conqueror's power for its own position, inviting the strangers in as instruments, only to become the instrument in turn. Mutesa sent for guns, technicians, and a counterweight, in the ordinary logic of a strong king managing his materials; what he received was the seam of his own kingdom, prised open at the confessional line and handed to an external arbiter. The invitation was real and the capture was real, and the capture ran precisely through the door the invitation opened. That a redirect can be *solicited by its victim* — that the machine can send for the hand that will seize it — is the contribution this landscape offers to the framework, and the modules that follow are the working-out of what that solicitation cost.

Legibility is not pardon. To reconstruct the kingdom as a self-running former conquest, and its capture as the cheapest available because the belief was already installed and only wanted redirecting, is to explain how the thing was done and how cheaply, not to grant that it was rightly done. The king's calculation was a real calculation and the capture that followed was a real dispossession, and setting the one beside the other — the invitation beside the blood-stained sheet of paper it became — is meant not to pronounce the verdict but to show the mechanism plainly enough that a reader can do the arithmetic without being told the sum.

A note on sources. Primary quotation in this landscape is from public-domain nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century sources, given as the record reproduces them. John Hanning Speke's account of the "curse of Ham," the region's "want of a strong protecting government," the wish for "a government like ours in India," the magician who "rules the minds of the kings as did the old popes of Europe," and the observation that the region had "no kings such as we

shall find that the Wahuma have" are quoted from the introduction to his *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile* (Blackwood, 1863), verified against the Project Gutenberg text. Henry Morton Stanley's appeal ("Here, gentlemen, is your opportunity — embrace it!"; "as Mtesa is sole ruler, and will repay its cost tenfold with ivory, coffee, otter skins of a very fine quality, or even cattle"; "I estimate the number of his subjects at 2,000,000") is quoted as reproduced from the *Daily Telegraph* of 15 November 1875 and Stanley's *Through the Dark Continent* (1878); the population figure is Stanley's own estimate, given here as his and not as an established fact, and one variant clause of uncertain wording has been left out rather than guessed. Harry Johnston's "blood-stained sheet of paper" is quoted from *The Uganda Protectorate* (1902). Ganda titles and institutions (*Kabaka*, *ssaabasajja*, *ssaabataka*, *Lukiiko*, *bakungu*, *batongole*, *bakopi*, *ssaza*), the appointive character of Ganda chieftaincy, the mother's-clan rule, the Kintu and Kimera traditions, the expansion at Bunyoro-Kitara's expense, and Mutesa I's dates and the name *Mukaabya* rest on modern scholarship (M. S. M. Kiwanuka, *A History of Buganda*; Christopher Wrigley, *Kingship and State*; and the standard historiography of the East African lacustrine kingdoms), which is paraphrased and credited, not quoted. Contested matters — the kingdom's founding date (given as the fourteenth-to-sixteenth-century range), the reconciliation of the Kintu and Kimera traditions, the size of the martyr toll (given as a range) — are flagged as contested in the text. The Hamitic or "Wahuma" hypothesis is named as the discredited racial theory it is, not adopted. Every load-bearing quotation has been checked against a source reproducing the primary text; the settlement itself, and the exact terms of the capture, are reserved for Modules 1 and 2.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

Patterns of Power · British Buganda — Module 1

HOW WE FOUGHT KABAREGA

Module 1 · The Floor of Force — a founding conquest that did not conquer the conquered: one machine-gun to pick the ruling faction at the apex, and a rented native army to lay the floor on everyone else

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The floor that did not need laying

Every study in this collection begins with the floor of force, because force is the founding fact over which every later belief is laid. But the Buganda floor is the strangest in the corpus, because the conqueror did almost none of the conquering of the conquered. The Kabaka's order already held the two million Baganda by their own conviction, as the landscape established; the sacred monarchy was the furniture of their world, and a machine that runs itself does not need a foreign sword to hold its subjects down. So the incoming power faced not the usual colonial task of subduing a hostile population but a far smaller and cheaper one: to capture the apex of a working machine, and then to lend that machine's own force to the conquering of everyone else. The founding of British power in the lake kingdom was therefore two acts, not one, and neither was a subjugation of Buganda. The first was a single afternoon's work by a single machine-gun at the royal hill of Mengo, which did not conquer the Baganda but *selected which faction of them would rule* — and so which would become the client-oligarchy through which the British would govern. The second was a war of scorched-earth conquest against Buganda's ancient rival, Bunyoro, a war fought

overwhelmingly by Baganda soldiers under British command, whose own commander titled his memoir of it, without embarrassment, *an account of how we fought Kabarega*. This module reconstructs both acts, and the central fact to hold across them is that the colonial floor in Uganda was, from the first, a floor the conqueror largely did not man himself.

One machine-gun, one afternoon

The seam of the Ganda order had been prised open before any European army arrived, and it was prised open along the line the two missions had drawn. The court that Mutesa's invitation had filled with rival confessions split, after his death, into armed parties — the *Wa-Ingleza*, the English or Protestant party, and the *Wa-Fransa*, the French or Catholic party, with a Muslim faction beside them — and by 1888 these parties had done what no faction in Ganda history had done before: deposed a Kabaka, installed and unseated his brothers, and fought each other with the kingdom's first standing regiments of gun-armed men. Into this the Imperial British East Africa Company inserted itself. Captain Frederick Lugard reached Mengo in December 1890 with a small force and a two-year treaty, and though he wrote afterwards that he had tried to hold the balance, his materials decided him: the only party that would have him was the Protestant one, and in 1891 he armed it, issuing on the order of five hundred rifles to the Wa-Ingleza. When open war broke out at Mengo on 24 January 1892, the arithmetic of the battlefield was against the Protestants — the Catholic party was the larger — and it was reversed by a single instrument. Lugard turned his Maxim gun on the Wa-Fransa and broke them. The gun killed relatively few; its effect was not attritional but decisive, scattering the Catholic advance, and by the end of that day the Company, and through it the Protestant faction, held the field. Rubaga, the Catholic cathedral, and the Kabaka's palace were burned; Mwanga fled; and the character of the whole colonial order to come was set in an afternoon.

It is worth naming the force that did this, because it was small and its smallness is the point. Lugard commanded not a British army but a few

European officers, a corps of Sudanese soldiers — the *askari* left stranded in the interior by the collapse of Egypt's Equatoria province, whom Lugard had recruited on his march up and who would garrison the Company's forts — and the Maxims and Snider rifles that gave a few hundred men the firepower of thousands. This was the whole of the floor: a stockaded fort on Kampala hill, a garrison of foreign mercenary askari, two machine-guns, and the rifles handed to a native faction. It did not need to be larger, because it was never meant to hold down two million people. It was meant to decide which of their factions would hold them down for it. When Mwanga was brought back to Mengo on 30 March 1892 and bound by a fresh treaty on 11 April, the treaty wrote the capture into law in a single clause that this study will return to in Module 2: the king agreed that "the consent of the Resident shall be obtained, and his counsel taken by the king, before any war is undertaken, and in all grave and serious affairs and matters of the State, such as the appointment of chiefs to the higher offices, the assessment of taxes." The sacred monarchy remained; its every act of consequence now required a foreigner's counsel. The machine still ran, and a new hand had reached into it.

The narrative laid over the gun

The floor arrived, as floors do, wrapped in a story, and the story was cut for audiences far from the burning of Rubaga. Its first coat was the suppression of the slave-trade: Lugard's own account of the whole East African venture, published in 1893 as *The Rise of Our East African Empire*, opens its Uganda volumes on chapters titled for the slave-trade and the missions and the methods of its suppression, and the Company's charter and the Brussels Act under which it sailed made the ending of the Arab slave-traffic the moral warrant for the whole advance. The second coat was the ending of the very religious wars the Company's rifles had just intensified — the arrival of order among Christians who, as one member of Parliament asked acidly when the bill for it came due, needed the state's money spent "to prevent these very remarkable Christians from cutting each other's throats." And the third coat, the one that mattered most for what followed, was the principle Lugard set

down as the object of the whole administration: "to rule," he wrote, "through its own executive government." Here, at the founding, is the indirect-rule doctrine in its author's own words — the explicit intention not to replace the Ganda state but to keep it, capture it, and rule the country through it. Modules 3 and 8 will take the measure of that doctrine; the point to mark now is that it was a robe cut not for the Baganda, who were to go on obeying their own king, but for a metropole that needed the conquest of a kingdom to read as the protection of one.

The consent that robe required was duly produced, and it survives in Lugard's own pages in a form worth reading exactly, because it is the manufactured voice of the redirected apex. A letter went home over the Kabaka's name — "To my friend the Queen, our great sovereign" — thanking the Company "for sending the representatives of the Company in order to set my country to rights," and closing on the line that Speke's introduction had already put into the incoming imagination: "I and my Chiefs are under the English flag, as the people of India are under your flag. We desire very, very much that the English should arrange this country." Whether Mwanga, machine-gunned into a treaty and twice deposed, desired anything of the kind is not recoverable and is not the point. The point is that the redirect required the captured king to be shown *asking* for the capture, and the record was made to show it. The floor had been laid; the story said it had been requested.

How we fought Kabarega

The floor that fell hardest fell not on Buganda but on the kingdom to its west, and it is in Bunyoro that the colonial floor of force appears in its plainest, cruellest form — a war of conquest against a people who had issued no invitation and split into no convenient factions. Bunyoro-Kitara was the older and, until Buganda eclipsed it, the greater power of the region, and its Omukama, Chwa II Kabalega, had built a disciplined standing army and had no intention of submitting. The British, having captured Buganda cheaply, resolved to take Bunyoro dear. In December 1893 Colonel Henry Colvile advanced across the Kafu at the head of a force whose composition is the

whole of this module's argument: a handful of British officers, some four hundred and fifty Sudanese askari, and — the mass of it — an army of Baganda, numbered by the sources between fifteen and twenty thousand and by one account at thirty thousand all told, under the command of a Muganda general named Semei Kakungulu. Kabalega, outgunned, withdrew and fought a long war of manoeuvre; Colvile answered it as such wars are answered, by making war on the country itself — plundering the granaries, burning the settlements, and setting out to starve the population into a submission its king would not give. The war ground on for years. Its ending, in the modern reconstruction of the historian Shane Doyle, whose figures are paraphrased here and not quoted, was catastrophic: something close to two-thirds of Bunyoro's territory stripped away and handed to Buganda and to Toro, the kingdom's economy in ruins, and its remaining population reduced by war, famine, and disease to a fraction of what it had been. Where Buganda's belief was redirected, Bunyoro's people were, in the plainest sense, floored.

And the first payment for the war was made in Bunyoro's land. As early as 9 April 1894, at Mwanga's court, the counties south of the Kafu that Colvile's advance had detached from Bunyoro were parcelled out among the victorious Ganda factions — Buyaga and Bugangaizi and others handed over as spoils, two of which would fester for the next seventy years as the "Lost Counties," a grievance settled only by referendum in 1964 and reserved for this study's later modules. The floor, here, produced the settlement directly: the conquest of one kingdom became the estate of another's chiefs.

The general of the Waganda army

Return to the composition of Colvile's army, because it names the deepest feature of this founding and the one the framework must absorb. The floor that conquered Bunyoro, garrisoned the east, and captured the last resisting kings was, to a remarkable degree, not a British floor at all but a Baganda one, rented from the redirected apex and pointed outward. Its emblem is Semei Kakungulu, a commoner and migrant who had risen as a warrior in the

religious wars, thrown in his lot with the Protestant party and the British, and made himself indispensable as the general of the Ganda levies. It was Kakungulu's men who pursued Kabalega through the Budongo forest; it was Kakungulu, with a second Ganda general, Andereya Luwandagga, who ran the two fugitive kings to ground at last. For when Mwanga, having risen in a final revolt in 1897 as a Sudanese mutiny shook the young Protectorate, fled and joined his old enemy Kabalega in the north, it was Baganda soldiers who captured them both on 9 April 1899 — the two greatest kings of the lake region, Kabaka and Omukama, taken by the army of one of them and delivered to the British, who shipped them to exile in the Seychelles. Mwanga would die there in 1903; Kabalega would be allowed home only in 1923 and die on the road before he reached Bunyoro. On the throne of Buganda the British had already, in 1897, seated Mwanga's infant son Daudi Chwa, a Kabaka of about one year old, under a council of regents — the apex reduced, literally, to a child in the hands of the men who had captured it.

Kakungulu's career after the kings were taken is the sub-imperial floor made explicit. Between roughly 1899 and 1904 he led Baganda armies into the east and north-east of what was becoming Uganda — into Bukedi, Teso, Bugisu, Busoga — subduing peoples who had never been ruled by Buganda and incorporating tens of thousands of square miles into the Protectorate, and doing it, in the modern historian Michael Twaddle's phrase, which is paraphrased here, with scarcely a European soldier present. He would go on to govern Busoga for the British as a district administrator. The pattern is exact and it is the module's finding: the Protectorate was very largely conquered for Britain by Baganda, and administered at its edges by Baganda, so that the actual violence of the founding — the burning, the starving, the killing, the capturing — was performed disproportionately by the conquered kingdom's own men, upon peoples further out. Colvile's title says it without meaning to. His book is an account of how *we* fought Kabarega; the *we* was, for the most part, an army of Africans.

What could be left un-garrisoned

Set beside the collection's other foundings, the striking thing about the Buganda floor is how little of it pressed on the Baganda themselves. In Algeria the floor was a razzia that swept whole populations; in Kenya it was a railway driven through resistant peoples and a chain of punitive expeditions across the reserves. In Buganda the population at the core was scarcely garrisoned at all in the ordinary colonial way, because it did not need to be: the Kabaka's naturalised authority went on holding the Baganda, and the British had captured that authority whole. The men who were disarmed, removed, or destroyed were not the Ganda peasantry but the losing factions of the Ganda elite, relegated to smaller shares; the rival kingdom of Bunyoro, floored and dismembered; and the two kings who would not be redirected, carried off to an island in the Indian Ocean. The trap that held the colony was therefore not the usual one of garrisons and geography closing every exit on a subject people. It was a structural trap: a self-running native order captured at its head, its own chiefly army turned into the Protectorate's floor, so that the force which held the whole edifice was, to an unusual degree, the conquered's own — furnished by them, officered by them, and paid for, as the next modules will show, largely out of their own labour and land.

Reading the founding against the framework

Module 1 asks who held organised violence at the founding, and against whom, and Buganda returns an answer the corpus has not yet recorded, sharp enough to be worth stating as a refinement.

First, the founding of a conquest laid over a *centralised* native order that had already reached the self-running pole is not a subjugation of the population but a **selection plus a lease**. The framework has treated the founding floor as the act by which a conqueror disarms and holds a people. Here the conqueror did neither. A single machine-gun at Mengo did not defeat the Baganda; it chose, among their own armed factions, which one would rule — converting a native civil war's loser and winner into a colonial client-oligarchy and its rivals. Then the winner's army was leased outward to

lay the actual floor on everyone else. Name the two moves: the floor as **arbiter** (the Maxim that picks the ruling faction) and the floor as **lever** (the rented native army that conquers the periphery). Neither is the razzia or the punitive column of the collection's other foundings, and a study of any indirect-rule conquest over a pre-existing state should look for this shape rather than for a subjugation that did not occur.

Second, this is the cheapest founding the corpus has met, and its cheapness has a precise mechanism: **the conqueror did not man his own floor.** Because the Ganda order ran itself, the British paid for almost none of the force that held the core, and rented from that same order the force that took the periphery. The rule that a machine which runs itself is the cheapest to hold is confirmed here at the founding, one step earlier than usual — not after generations of formation drive the belief deep, but immediately, because the formation had already been done, five centuries before, by the Ganda state. The conqueror simply inherited a completed machine and pointed it.

Third, the floor was sorted by caste from the very first day, exactly as the colonial bend predicts. The believing Ganda core was held cheaply, through its own redirected apex, with little of the visible garrisoning and surveillance that betray a belief that never took — because the belief the British relied on was not theirs to install but the Kabaka's, already installed. The expensive floor — the burning, the starving, the standing garrison — fell outward, on Bunyoro and the eastern peoples, who had no place in the Ganda robe and whose submission had to be taken by force and held by the Baganda-manned column. The single colony ran two floors at once: a cheap, near-invisible one at the core, resting on captured conviction, and an expensive, brutal one at the edge, resting on rented arms. That split is the shape the rest of this study measures.

Legibility is not pardon. To show that the founding was cheap and clever — a machine-gun instead of an army, a captured king instead of a conquered people, a rented native army instead of a British one — is to explain the mechanism by which the thing was done so economically, not to soften what it did. The economy was an economy for the conqueror alone. It was paid for in full by Bunyoro, whose fields were burned and whose people were starved

so that a war could be won without a British army; by the two kings who ended on an island; and by the eastern peoples floored by an army of men who were themselves, at that same moment, being redirected rather than freed. That the conqueror spent so little is not a mitigation. It is the measure of how much of the cost he had contrived to make someone else bear.

A note on sources. Primary quotation is from public-domain sources given as the record reproduces them. Frederick Lugard's principle "to rule through its own executive government," the 1892 treaty clause ("the consent of the Resident shall be obtained, and his counsel taken by the king…"), and the letter sent over the Kabaka's name ("I and my Chiefs are under the English flag, as the people of India are under your flag. We desire very, very much that the English should arrange this country") are quoted from *The Rise of Our East African Empire* (Blackwood, 1893), vol. II, verified against the reproductions of that volume's pages; the slave-trade-and-missions framing follows Lugard's own chapter titles in the same work. Henry Colvile's *The Land of the Nile Springs; being chiefly an account of how we fought Kabarega* (Edward Arnold, 1895) is cited by its exact title. The parliamentary gibe about spending money "to prevent these very remarkable Christians from cutting each other's throats" is quoted as reproduced in the standard histories of the Uganda intervention. The composition of Colvile's force (roughly 450 Sudanese askari; a Baganda contingent variously given as fifteen to twenty thousand, and by one account thirty thousand all told), the date of the Mengo fighting (24 January 1892), the number of rifles issued to the Protestant party (on the order of 500), the sequence of the 1897 mutiny and Mwanga's revolt, and the capture of Mwanga and Kabalega on 9 April 1899 are given with contested figures as ranges and rest on the standard record. Modern and copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited, not quoted: Shane Doyle, *Crisis and Decline in Bunyoro* (2006), on the scale of Bunyoro's devastation and depopulation; Michael Twaddle, *Kakungulu and the Creation of Uganda* (1993), on the Baganda sub-imperial conquest of the east; and the general narrative in the histories of Kiwanuka, Karugire, and Low. Colvile's dispatch praising Kakungulu as "the general of the Waganda army" is referenced from its secondary reproduction of the 1894 parliamentary Blue Book and is used as a phrase, not reconstructed; where its exact wording could not be checked against the primary it has not been quoted at length. Every load-bearing quotation has been checked against a source reproducing the primary text; the settlement those foundings produced is the subject of Module 2.

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Patterns of Power · British Buganda — Module 2

EIGHT SQUARE MILES EACH

Module 2 · The Settlement — how a kingdom's land was cut into private estates measured in English miles, dressed as property its holders "already possessed," and used to buy a native aristocracy into being

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The truce written down

The framework's discipline for a settlement that runs through a legal instrument is to name that instrument, at once, as the floor's primary fiction — a monopolist of violence licensing a share of its own monopoly to a claimant in exchange for a cut or an alliance, Mancur Olson's stationary bandit writing his truce down — before hunting the more specific doctrine built on top of it. The Buganda settlement has such an instrument, and it is one of the most complete in the colonial record: the Uganda Agreement of March 1900, negotiated by Sir Harry Johnston and signed, on the native side, by three regents acting for a Kabaka who was about four years old. It has been called ever since, by admirers, "Buganda's Magna Carta" and "the Charter of Rights" — the robe naming itself, a truce that presents as a grant of liberties. Read as the framework reads it, it is the document by which the Crown, having captured the apex of the Ganda machine in the manner Module 1 described, converted that capture into a durable division of land, office, and revenue among the collaborating oligarchy — and did so in a form so favourable to that oligarchy that the oligarchy has defended the Agreement as its charter for a century since.

Its parties and its language announce the fiction in the first lines. It was made between Johnston, "on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, on the one part," and "the undermentioned Regents and chiefs of the Kingdom of Uganda on behalf of the Kabaka (King) of Uganda, and the chiefs and people of Uganda, on the other part." The people of Uganda were not consulted and could not read the thing agreed on their behalf, and the Agreement closes the loop on that with a clause of quiet finality: "In the interpretation of this Agreement the English text shall be the version which is binding on both parties." The truce that disposed of a kingdom's land and sovereignty was binding, by its own terms, in the language of only one of the parties to it — the party that wrote it.

Eight square miles each

The heart of the settlement is its land clause, and to see what it did one must first see what it undid. In the Ganda order land had been, above all, political. The Kabaka was *ssaabataka*, the head of all the clan-heads, and land was held of him and through him — allotted to chiefs as the estate of an office, held by clans as *butaka* under their *bataka*, worked by peasants who drew use-rights (*bibanja*) from the chief or clan above them. None of it was private freehold in the European sense; all of it was a web of office, clientage, and clan right through which the Kabaka bound men to himself by granting and revoking the use of the soil. It was, in the framework's terms, the wealth leg of the Ganda machine, and it was held as the floor and the robe were held — as a function of position, revocable, not as property.

Article 15 of the Agreement dissolved that web and replaced it with the surveyor's grid. It took the whole of Buganda, which it estimated at some nineteen thousand six hundred square miles, and divided it into private freehold estates measured, literally, in English square miles — so literally that the Luganda word coined for the new tenure, *mailo*, is simply the English word "mile" naturalised into the language, the settlement's foreign origin fossilised in the very name of the land. The schedule is worth reading as the ledger it is. To the Kabaka, his mother, and the royal family went estates of

hundreds of square miles; "to the Abamasaza (chiefs of counties), twenty in all," went eight square miles each as private property and eight more as the official estate of the office; the three regents took sixteen square miles each of private property and sixteen of official; ninety-two square miles went to the missionary societies; twenty-four to Mbogo, the Muslim chief, "for himself and his adherents." And then the clause that created a class:

> *"One thousand chiefs and private landowners will receive the estates of which they are already in possession, and which are computed at an average of 8 square miles per individual, making a total of 8,000 [square miles]."*

Read that clause for its fiction, because the fiction is the whole of it. It grants eight thousand square miles of *private freehold* to a thousand men, and it dresses the grant as the mere recognition of "the estates of which they are already in possession" — as though the freehold pre-existed the Agreement and the Crown were only confirming it. It did not pre-exist. Private freehold in land was not a Ganda institution; the thousand chiefs had held office-land and clan-land, revocable and relational, not estates they "possessed." The Agreement manufactured the possession and then recognised what it had manufactured, so that a revolution in tenure could present itself as the confirmation of custom. At a stroke it converted a service nobility — men who held land because they held office, at the Kabaka's pleasure — into a landed gentry who held office-land *and* private estates in perpetuity, heritable, alienable, theirs. A class that had never existed in the history of Buganda, the Ganda landed aristocracy, was written into being by a colonial surveyor's word "mile." The remainder of the kingdom, some nine thousand square miles classed as forest and "waste" and uncultivated land, was vested in the Crown.

Who got what, and who paid

Follow the ledger down and the settlement sorts by caste exactly as the colonial bend predicts, with the arithmetic printed on the page. The men at

the top received not only land but salary, for the first time in Ganda history: the Agreement's stipends set the Kabaka at four hundred pounds a year, each of the twenty county chiefs at two hundred, each of the three native ministers at three hundred, the Queen Mother at fifty, the regents at four hundred until the king came of age — a salaried, landed native aristocracy, paid out of the taxation of the people beneath it and holding heritable estates over their heads.

The people beneath it paid, and paid twice. The Agreement's taxation, Article 12, laid a flat "hut tax of three rupees, or 4s. per annum, on any house, hut or habitation used as a dwelling-place" and a "gun tax of three rupees, or 4s. per annum" on any who owned a firearm — the whole proceeds "handed over intact to Her Majesty's representative" and merged, under Article 4, into the general revenue of the Protectorate. A peasant with no coin could be made to pay "in produce or in labour"; he owed, besides, "obligations as regards military service, or the up-keep of main roads passing through the lands on which they dwell." That was the tax the Crown took. But the same peasant now stood on another man's *mailo* — the eight square miles of a chief who a year before had been merely his governor and was now his landlord in perpetuity — and to that landlord he owed rent (*busuulu*) and tribute in kind (*envujjo*), the customary dues of a client now hardening into the rent of a tenant on private property. The mailo settlement had interposed a landlord between the Crown and the peasant, so that the man at the bottom paid the colonial tax to the state and the rent-and-tribute to the chief, two extractions where the pre-colonial order had blurred them into one. This double burden would swell until the tenants' unrest of the 1920s forced the Busuulu and Envujjo Law of 1928 to cap it — a matter reserved for Module 6 — but its origin is here, in the clause that made the chief a proprietor.

And a third group paid by being written out. The clan-heads, the *bataka*, whose *butaka* land had been the custodial trust of the lineages, found the new freehold running to the office-chiefs and not to them; the men who held clan land by ancient custom were largely passed over in favour of the men who held counties by royal-and-colonial appointment, so that the settlement not only dispossessed the peasant of security but demoted the clan-head beneath

the bureaucrat. The grievance this planted would surface as the Bataka movement of the 1920s, and is reserved for Module 9; the point here is that the settlement's winners and losers were sorted not by race but by position within Ganda society — chief above clan-head, office above custom, collaborator above all.

So long as

The apex the settlement preserved was preserved as a hollow, and the hollowing is written in the Agreement's sixth article with a conditional that governs everything. "So long as the Kabaka, Chiefs, and people of Uganda shall conform to the laws and regulations instituted for their governance by Her Majesty's Government," it runs, "and shall co-operate loyally with Her Majesty's Government ... Her Majesty's Government agrees to recognize the Kabaka of Uganda as the native ruler of the province of Uganda under Her Majesty's protection and over-rule." The sacred kingship survives — indeed the Agreement gilds it, decreeing that "the King of Uganda shall henceforth be styled His Highness the Kabaka of Uganda" — but it survives on condition, and the condition is loyalty to the power that gilds it. The same article takes the succession: a new Kabaka is to be elected by the Lukiiko from among Mutesa's descendants, but "no person shall be recognized as Kabaka of Uganda whose election has not received the approval of Her Majesty's Government." The next article takes the ministers: the Kabaka may appoint his Katikkiro, his Chief Justice, and his Treasurer, but only "with the sanction and approval of Her Majesty's representative in Uganda (without whose sanction such appointments shall not be valid)." And Article 9 takes the chiefs: a county chief is "immediately responsible to Her Majesty's representative" for taxes, and on failure "Her Majesty's representative shall have the right to call upon the Kabaka to dismiss him."

Set those four clauses together and the redirect of Module 1 stands codified in law. The machine still runs — a Kabaka on his hill, a Katikkiro at his side, county chiefs in the provinces, a Lukiiko in council, all of it Ganda, all of it continuous with the kingdom Speke had seen. But every lever of it is

now pullable by the Crown: the king recognised only "so long as" he conforms, his heir approved from London, his ministers valid only with a foreigner's sanction, his chiefs dismissible at a foreigner's demand. This is why the colony at its core needed almost none of the surveillance that betrays a belief that never took: the Crown did not have to watch the Baganda, because it held the apex by contract, and the apex held the Baganda by its own uncaptured, still-genuine authority. The framework's rule that surveillance is the tell of a thin robe is confirmed by its near-absence here — the robe at the core was thick and old and not the Crown's, and the Crown had simply bought the right to pull its strings. When Daudi Chwa grew to manhood inside this arrangement he is said to have measured it precisely, complaining that his position had become such that he was no longer the direct ruler of his own people — the beneficiary of the gilding naming the hollow beneath it.

The marker of inside and out

Here the Buganda settlement diverges most sharply from its sibling in the collection, British Kenya, and the divergence is the module's central finding. In Kenya the boundary of the settlement was race, and race is an impermeable marker: the African could never cross into the settler's freehold Highlands, could never be formed into the propertied order, and so the Kenyan settlement stayed expensive and brittle, a wall that admitted no one and had therefore to be held by force forever. The Buganda settlement drew its boundary somewhere else entirely — not between coloniser and native, but *within* the native order, between the collaborating chiefly class and everyone below it. The line ran between chief and peasant, between office-holder and clan-head, and — beneath the surface of the Agreement's studied neutrality — between the confessions, for the settlement was the property-form of the Protestant ascendancy that Lugard's Maxim had installed. The regency itself encoded it: Apolo Kagwa the Protestant Katikkiro at the head, the Catholic Stanislas Mugwanya beside him, the Protestant Zakariya Kisingiri as Treasurer, the whole balanced by an Article-11 instruction that the Lukiiko show "a fair proportionate representation of all recognised expressions of

religious belief" — an admission, in the very clause meant to soothe it, that religion was the axis the offices were shared along.

The consequence is a settlement that does the opposite of the settler-colony's. Where Kenya's racial wall forecloses forming the native in — and so must hold him down forever from outside — Buganda's intra-native line forms the native *elite* in, as propertied, salaried partners with heritable estates and a genuine stake in the arrangement's survival, while forming the peasant and the clan-head out. The redirect required this. You cannot capture an apex and its coordinating class without paying that class in a currency it recognises, and the currency the Ganda chiefly class recognised was land and office; so the Crown paid it in land and office made permanent, converting revocable service into heritable property and thereby manufacturing, out of a service nobility, a landed aristocracy whose interests were now fused with the Crown's because the Crown had given it something to lose. And the boundary of that new propertied order was drawn, finally, around the collaborating kingdom against the resisting one: Article 1 fixed Buganda's frontier to include the counties torn from Bunyoro in the war of Module 1 — Buyaga and Bugangaizi among them — so that the land of the kingdom that had fought became the estate of the chiefs of the kingdom that had helped. The historian Mahmood Mamdani, whose phrase is paraphrased here, has called the incorporation of those "Lost Counties" one of the most explosive questions independent Uganda would inherit; it is reserved for this study's later modules. The settlement's marker of inside and out ran, in the end, straight through the body of Bunyoro.

Reading the settlement against the framework

Module 2 asks who got what, and by what fiction, and Buganda confirms the framework's account of the legal instrument as the floor's primary robe while adding one structural refinement the corpus should carry.

First, the Agreement is the clean case of the settlement-as-legal-fiction, and the fiction is unusually legible because the Agreement names it in its own text.

"The estates of which they are already in possession" is the stationary bandit's truce doing what such truces do — presenting a grant of the monopolist's wealth as the confirmation of a pre-existing right, so that a revolution in property can wear the face of custom. And "the English text shall be the version which is binding" is the same fiction's admission of whose truce it really is: a disposition of a kingdom, made binding in the one language the disposed could not read.

Second, and this is the refinement, the settlement of a redirect-colony is not, as in a settler-colony, the transfer of the conquered's wealth to the conqueror's own people. It is the **enfeoffment of the native elite** — the conversion of that elite's revocable office into heritable private property, licensed by the Crown, which manufactures a landed native aristocracy where none existed and fuses its interest to the conqueror's by giving it, for the first time, property to defend. Name it as a distinct settlement-form beside the racial wall: where the settler-colony's boundary is race and forms nobody in (Kenya), the redirect-colony's boundary is intra-native office-and-collaboration and forms the *elite* in while forming the peasant and the clan-head out (Buganda). The settler settlement is a wall; the redirect settlement is a hinge — it swings a slice of the conquered's own elite across to the conqueror's side and bolts it there with freehold.

Third, this enfeoffment sorts extraction by caste and writes the sorting into the schedule: square miles and salaries to the elite, rupees and rent and labour to the peasant, and — the mechanism's cruel efficiency — a *double* extraction on the man at the bottom, who now pays the colonial tax to the state and the rent-and-tribute to the chief the same Agreement made his landlord. The framework's "just enough" is here split between two extractors stacked on one back, a structure Module 6 will quantify.

Fourth, the three monopolies are fused, at the native level, in the collaborating oligarchy — it holds the wealth (mailo), officers the floor (the Baganda army of Module 1), and will hold the robe (the Protestant church, Module 3) — but the fusion is held as a *Crown franchise*, revocable under Article 6's "so long as." This is the distinctive structure the whole study turns on: capture is total at the native level, one coalition holding all three legs, and yet

contingent at the imperial level, every leg pullable from London. That combination — total native capture on a revocable imperial lease — is what Modules 8 and 9 will test, when the lease is finally called in and a Kabaka is deported for failing the "so long as."

Legibility is not pardon. To show the elegance of the enfeoffment — a kingdom's land used to buy the kingdom's elite, a service nobility turned landed aristocracy by a stroke of the surveyor's pen, a class manufactured to love the arrangement that made it — is to explain how the settlement bought a century of loyalty so cheaply, not to grant that it was just. The elegance was paid for, and the schedule names the payers: the peasant taxed twice, by the state above and the new landlord between; the clan-head demoted beneath the bureaucrat; and the kingdom of Bunyoro, whose torn-off counties became the estates of the men who had helped tear them. That the Crown spent none of its own land and manufactured its aristocracy out of the conquered's is not a mitigation of the settlement. It is the measure of how completely the cost was arranged to fall on those the settlement was drawn to exclude.

A note on sources. All quotation of the Uganda Agreement of 1900 is from the public-domain text, given as the standard reproductions (BlackPast; the African Archives; the text as reproduced in the historical and legal literature) render it, and cross-checked among them: the preamble ("on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India" / "the chiefs and people of Uganda"); Article 6 ("So long as the Kabaka, Chiefs, and people of Uganda shall conform ... and shall co-operate loyally"; "His Highness the Kabaka of Uganda"; the succession "must be limited to the ... descendants of King Mutesa" and requires "the approval of Her Majesty's Government"); Article 9 (the county chief "immediately responsible to Her Majesty's representative" and dismissible on his demand); Article 10 (ministers valid only "with the sanction and approval of Her Majesty's representative ... without whose sanction such appointments shall not be valid"); Article 11 ("a fair proportionate representation of all recognised expressions of religious belief"); Article 12 (the "hut tax of three rupees, or 4s." and "gun tax of three rupees, or 4s.," payment "in produce or in labour," and the obligations of "military service, or the up-keep of main roads"); the Article 15 land schedule (the estimate of some 19,600 square miles; the county chiefs, regents, royals, missions, and Mbogo's allocations; and the clause granting "one thousand chiefs and private landowners ... the estates of which they are already in possession ... computed at an average of 8 square miles per individual, making a total of 8,000," with roughly 9,000 square miles vested in the Crown); and Article 22 ("the English text shall be the version which is binding on both

parties"). Quoting the primary corrects a common secondary error that gives the hut tax as four rupees; the Agreement's own figure is three rupees, or four shillings. The stipulated salaries (Kabaka £400, county chiefs £200, ministers £300, Namasole £50, regents £400) are given as the Agreement's schedule of stipends. The derivation of *mailo* from the English "mile," the pre-colonial character of *butaka*, *bibanja*, *busuulu*, and *envujjo*, and the identities of the three regents (Apolo Kagwa, Stanislas Mugwanya, Zakariya Kisingiri) rest on the standard scholarship. Modern and copyrighted work is paraphrased and credited, not quoted: Mahmood Mamdani (*Citizen and Subject*, 1996) on the Lost Counties and on the decentralised-despotism of the chiefly settlement; Anthony Low and R. C. Pratt (*Buganda and British Overrule*, 1960) and Henry West (*The Mailo System in Buganda*, 1972) on the tenure revolution; John Mugambwa on the Agreement's legal aspects; and Semakula Kiwanuka's history for the pre-colonial baseline. Contested figures — the total acreage, the split between mailo and Crown land, the round "one thousand" chiefs — are the Agreement's own estimates and are given as such. Daudi Chwa's remark that he was "no longer the direct ruler" of his people is attributed to his later reflection on the Agreement and is used cautiously, pending verification of its exact wording, rather than reconstructed. Every load-bearing quotation has been checked against a source reproducing the primary text; the doctrine laid over this settlement is the subject of Module 3.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

Patterns of Power · British Buganda — Module 3

CHRIST'S GENERALS

Module 3 · The Robe — the cleanest redirect in the collection: a metropole's civilising doctrine pointed at a "superior" native, and a native sacred kingship re-dyed Christian until the conquered elite wore its own capture as its own triumph

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The robe that was already there

The framework's third question asks what doctrine dresses the floor — the account of why the ruling group should rule — and, above all, where that doctrine comes from: is it forged new, inherited from an older order, or redirected, an existing channel of trusted authority captured and turned? Most colonial robes in this collection are forged or reversed: a conqueror who has laid a new floor over a resistant people must manufacture a justification and address it, of necessity, to the metropole that funds and mans the conquest rather than to the conquered whose belief it does not need. Buganda is the collection's cleanest case of the third provenance, redirect, and it is clean because the conqueror did not have to make a robe at all. A thick, old, self-running robe was already in place — the sacred kingship the landscape described, the naturalised authority of a monarchy five centuries deep — and the whole art of the conquest was to capture that robe and re-dye it rather than to weave a new one. This module traces two redirects running at once: one that took the metropole's own civilising doctrine and pointed it at a native the metropole was told was uniquely worth civilising, and a deeper one that took the Baganda's own

sacred kingship and re-coloured it Christian and Protestant, until the collaborating elite wore its capture as its conversion and could not tell the two apart.

The Japanese of Africa

The outward-facing coat was cut, as the colonial bend predicts, for the audience whose belief paid for and manned the conquest — the Parliament that debated whether to keep Uganda, the Church Missionary Society whose subscribers financed the missions, the taxpaying public that had to be told the venture was a trust and not a speculation. And to that audience the robe made a claim that did a very particular kind of work: it declared the Baganda not savages to be civilised but a superior race already half-civilised, uniquely fit to be ruled through rather than over. Harry Johnston, who wrote the settlement, called them the black Japanese — "the Japanese of the dark continent," in the phrase reproduced from him and from Colonel Lambkin — and "the most naturally civilized, charming, kind, tactful, and courteous of black people." Lugard judged Buganda "probably the most civilised of any native state in Africa." Theodore Roosevelt, visiting in 1909, thought the Baganda stood "far above most" of the peoples of the continent "in their capacity for progress towards civilization." These characterisations are quoted as the standard record reproduces them, and their exact provenance is flagged in the note on sources; what matters is the ideological machine they drove. A doctrine that ranks the Baganda as the Japanese of Africa is not a licence to replace them — it is a licence to rule *through* them, to keep their kingship, their chiefs, their court, and to govern the country as their protector and improver. The reversed robe of Buganda, addressed to the metropole, converted the ordinary civilising mission — bring order to the savage — into its indirect-rule variant: elevate the superior native, and rule the country through the elevated. It flattered the funders that they were nurturing a civilisation, and it flattered, exactly, the chiefly elite it was about to enlist.

The kingship re-dyed

The deeper redirect worked not on the metropole but on the kingship itself, and to see it one must first see what was there to be redirected. The Ganda robe before the missions was a sacred kingship woven of the *lubaale* — the gods and their mediums — of royal shrines and the tombs of dead kings, of a priesthood and a calendar of sacrifice, the whole apparatus by which the Kabaka was not merely a ruler but the living centre of a cosmos. That old robe was already dying as the new one was cut, and we know it chiefly because the men who replaced it wrote it down as it went: the missionary-ethnographer John Roscoe, whose *The Baganda* (1911) set out to describe, in his own words, "the social and religious life of the Baganda in the old days before their country, Uganda, came under the influence of Europe," gathered his account of the old gods largely in the house of Sir Apolo Kagwa, the Christian prime minister, and noted that the old men who remembered the pre-Christian religion were few because "war and famine had killed most of them." The salvage of the old robe was itself the work of the men who wore the new one.

For the new robe was the old kingship re-dyed. The redirect did not abolish the sacred monarchy; it Christianised it. The Kabaka remained the sacred centre, but a Christian one; the court became a Christian court; the CMS cathedral rose on Namirembe hill where the old shrines had stood; and the young Christian converts burned by Mwanga at Namugongo in 1886 — among whom Ham Mukasa himself was maimed and left with a crippled leg — were made not a defeated sect but the founding martyrs of a Christian Buganda, its new sacred history. Kagwa, Buganda's first ethnographer, gave that history its text: his *Bassekabaka be Buganda*, the Kings of Buganda, took the ancient king-list — the naturalised evidence of the old conquest, as the landscape argued — and re-narrated it in the providential frame of a kingdom that had been moving all along towards the Christian light it had now reached, its wars of religion the birth-pangs of a Protestant nation. And the formation that had made chiefs was redirected with the rest: the old palace-page system, in which bright youths were sent to the Kabaka's court to be trained as the next generation of chiefs, was refounded by Kagwa and the

missionaries as a Christian boarding school, King's College Budo, to raise the sons of the nobility as Christian gentlemen — the same apprenticeship, re-dyed, a matter Module 4 will take up as formation. Nothing of the machinery was thrown away. The kingship, the histories, the schooling of chiefs, the sacred centre — all of it kept, all of it re-coloured, the trusted channel captured and turned.

Christ's Generals

The redirect's proof is that it took — that the collaborating elite did not experience itself as collaborating at all, but as triumphant. The men the Maxim had installed were Protestant war-leaders who understood their victory in the religious wars as the victory of the true faith, and who wore, sincerely, the robe of Christ's soldiers. Apolo Kagwa is the type of it: a court page baptised Anglican before 1885, a fighter in the religious wars, leader of the Protestant faction, the Muganda commander who stood with Lugard against the Muslims and led the Baganda army into Bunyoro; then Katikkiro, regent, negotiator of the Agreement that gave him one of its largest estates, and, in 1902, a knight of the realm, created at Edward VII's coronation. His secretary Ham Mukasa is the type refined: placed as a boy in Mutesa's palace, first taught by the Muslim teachers who then held sway at court, drawn afterwards to the Protestants and baptised Ham, maimed in the martyrdom of 1886, and grown into a Ganda Christian intellectual — author, his own title-page announced, of "A Luganda Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew," the new faith carried in the old tongue.

It was Mukasa who wrote the redirected robe's most revealing document, the travelogue of the journey he and Kagwa made to Edward VII's coronation, published in London in 1904 as *Uganda's Katikiro in England* — written in Luganda, translated by the Church Missionary Society's Ernest Millar, introduced by Sir Harry Johnston, printed off Paternoster Row. Read as an artefact of the redirect it is almost too perfect: a Ganda Christian, formed by the mission, escorted by the mission, publishing through the mission, touring the factories and cathedrals and dockyards of the imperial

centre and finding them not strange but admirable, "amazed," as he writes, "at the cleverness of the English," and pausing throughout for homilies on the virtue of working hard and being good, which he calls the two great English virtues. The book presents its authors as two things at once and sees no strain between them: loyal Christian subjects of the Empire, and Baganda patriots asserting their kingdom's dignity — Christ's generals and Ganda statesmen in one breath. That absence of strain is the whole achievement of the redirect. Kagwa could deliver his kingdom's sovereignty into British hands and experience the act as the triumph of his faith and the modernisation of his nation, because the robe he wore was not a foreign imposition he had to swallow but his own old kingship re-dyed in a colour he had chosen and bled for. A sharply critical modern reading has compared his knighthood to the knighting of the pirate Francis Drake — a predator honoured for delivering plunder, Drake bringing Spanish silver and Kagwa bringing Buganda's sovereignty. The comparison catches something real about what was delivered. But it mistakes the mechanism, and the mechanism is the point of this module: Kagwa was not a cynic trading a country he did not believe in. His faith was genuine, and its genuineness was exactly what made the redirect work. A robe worn in bad faith must be watched; a robe worn in good faith wears itself.

The robe exported

Because the redirected robe took, it could be exported, and its export shows how completely the new faith and the old ambition had fused. Kagwa, the Dictionary of African Christian Biography records, was instrumental in sending Christian Baganda teachers out to Koki, to Toro, to Bunyoro, to Ankole — and was, in the judgement paraphrased there, probably as concerned to extend Buganda's influence as to spread the Gospel. The two were now the same motion. The Ganda evangelist who carried the mission's catechism to the western kingdoms carried Ganda chieftaincy, the Luganda language, and Ganda over-rule with it, so that the redirected robe became the very vehicle of the sub-imperial expansion Module 1 tracked in arms. Where

the Baganda army had gone with the Maxim, the Baganda catechist now went with the book, and the peoples of the periphery received the Gospel and the Ganda chief as a single package — the robe imposed with the floor, on peoples whose own robes were being broken, not re-dyed. This is the sharp internal line of the whole colony: at the Ganda core the robe was redirected and took; at the conquered edge it was imposed and did not. The Gospel that a Muganda wore as the fulfilment of his own kingship, a Munyoro wore as the livery of his conqueror.

The gap, and the honest complication

Set the public words beside the ground, as this study does, and the Buganda robe presents a subtler asymmetry than Algeria's or Kenya's. There the gap was between a benevolent public doctrine and a brutal private practice, and the arithmetic was a matter of setting a pledge beside a massacre. Here the public doctrine — a superior race brought to Christ, a kingdom civilised through its own institutions — was not simply false. The Baganda did convert, in their hundreds of thousands and then their millions; the martyrs did die for their faith; Kagwa and Mukasa were Christians in a sense no cynicism can dissolve. The asymmetry is not between a true word and a false one. It is that a genuine religious conversion was, at the very same time and by the very same men, the instrument through which a foreign power captured a kingdom — and the redirected robe let both facts be true together, so seamlessly that the elite living inside it never had to choose between them. What was hidden was not a lie behind the faith; it was the machinery the faith was doing double duty as — the Maxim that had chosen which Christians would rule, the estates that rewarded them, the sovereignty signed away in the same years the cathedral went up. The robe did not conceal a massacre. It concealed a capture, by making the captured party its most sincere celebrant.

Reading the robe against the framework

Module 3 asks for the doctrine, its audience, and its provenance, and Buganda returns the collection's cleanest redirect together with a refinement that revises the colonial bend's account of the reversed robe.

First, the provenance is redirect in its purest form, and it is double. Outward, the metropole's own civilising doctrine was redirected onto a native ranked "superior" — the Japanese of Africa — which converted the ordinary licence to replace the savage into a licence to rule *through* the elevated, the ideological engine of indirect rule. Inward, and more deeply, the Baganda's own sacred kingship was redirected — captured and re-dyed Christian and Protestant, its king-list re-narrated, its martyrs enthroned, its schooling of chiefs refounded — the trusted channel turned rather than replaced. The framework's category of redirect has been illustrated before by the capture of a chief or a church; Buganda shows it operating on an entire sacred monarchy and its intellectual apparatus at once.

Second, and this is the refinement, Buganda marks the exception to the rule that the colonial robe is cut for the metropole and does not take with the conquered. It does not take when it is imported — a foreign doctrine pressed on a people whose own robe it means to replace, which is why the settler-colony's robe never takes with the natives and the order runs on force. But when the redirect grafts new content onto an *existing* naturalised robe rather than importing one — when it re-dyes the conquered's own trusted authority instead of overwriting it — the robe *can* take with the conquered, though only with the elite whose authority is being redirected, and only because that elite experiences the new content as the fulfilment of the old rather than as a foreign imposition. Name the mechanism: **the robe that takes because it is the old robe re-dyed.** Its precondition is exactly the Buganda precondition — a self-running native order with an apex whose authority can be captured and re-coloured rather than broken. Where that precondition holds, the reversed robe acquires an inner lining that the metropole never sees: a version that genuinely persuades the collaborating natives, because it is made of their own conviction.

Third, whether the robe takes maps precisely onto the caste-sorted floor of Module 1. It took at the Ganda core, and so the core was cheap and lightly watched, the belief that held it being the Baganda's own re-dyed kingship rather than any foreign import. It did not take at the periphery, where it arrived as the conqueror's livery on the back of the Baganda army, and so the periphery was held by force. The framework's rule that surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took is confirmed with its map drawn in full: robe-takes, at the core, means cheap and unwatched; robe-fails, at the edge, means garrisoned and coerced. The single colony's two floors, named in Module 1, are here revealed as two robes — one redirected and worn, one imposed and resented.

Fourth, the deepest work of a robe that takes is not what the framework usually assigns to a robe. A robe is normally described as converting power into authority in the eyes of the ruled. This one did that, but its more important labour was performed on the rulers: it let the collaborating native elite not experience itself as an instrument. By fusing the elite's real faith with its collaboration, the redirected robe made the collaboration invisible to the collaborator — so that the most capable and sincere men of the conquered kingdom spent their lives extending a foreign power's reach while experiencing every act of it as devotion and patriotism. That is the most efficient robe the collection has found, because it needs no enforcement against the men who matter most: they enforce it on themselves, gladly, as the truth of who they are.

Legibility is not pardon — and here the maxim cuts in an unfamiliar direction. To name this robe as a redirect, and to say that the elite's genuine faith was also the machinery of capture, is not to convict the believers of hypocrisy; their faith was real, and that is the finding, not an exception to it. Nor is it to pardon the capture, which was real too, and which fell as hard as any in this collection on the peoples the robe did not cover. It is to describe the rarest and most economical of all the arrangements this study meets: an order held not by watching the ruled, nor even by deceiving them, but by handing the conquered's own elite a re-dyed version of its own most sacred belief, so that the men who delivered a kingdom did so certain they were

saving it — and were, in the only terms they possessed, not wrong. The furniture of reality had simply been re-upholstered, and the next generation of Baganda would grow up in a kingdom whose Christianity was not an imposition to be resented but the plain shape of the world, Kagwa's providential history their history, Namirembe their skyline, the martyrs their founders. That the robe was redirected does not make the faith beneath it false. It makes it a thing that was captured, and re-dyed, and then became genuinely their own.

A note on sources. Primary quotation is from public-domain material given as the record reproduces it. Ham Mukasa's *Uganda's Katikiro in England* (Hutchinson, 1904) is quoted directly ("amazed ... at the cleverness of the English"; the "two great English virtues" of working hard and being good), and its title-page self-descriptions (Mukasa as author of "A Luganda Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew"; Ernest Millar as translator and "Missionary of the Church Missionary Society in Uganda"; the introduction by Sir H. H. Johnston) are given as the title page and the standard scholarship on it (Simon Gikandi's edition; the review literature) report them. John Roscoe's aim to describe Ganda life "in the old days before their country, Uganda, came under the influence of Europe," the note that "war and famine had killed most of" the old informants, and the collection of his material in Kagwa's house are quoted from the preface to *The Baganda* (Macmillan, 1911). The characterisations of the Baganda as "the Japanese of the dark continent" and "the most naturally civilized ... of black people" (Harry Johnston, with Colonel Lambkin), as "probably the most civilised of any native state in Africa" (Lugard), and as standing "far above most ... in their capacity for progress towards civilization" (Theodore Roosevelt, 1909) are given as the standard record reproduces them; their exact original wording, drawn here from secondary reproduction, is flagged as such and not reconstructed. Apolo Kagwa's authorship of *Bassekabaka be Buganda* (the Kings of Buganda), *Empisa z'Abaganda* (customs), and *Engero z'Abaganda* (folklore); his leadership of the Protestant faction; his regency, knighthood, and thirty-square-mile mailo grant; the refounding of the palace-page system as King's College Budo; and Ham Mukasa's biography (page to Mutesa I, maimed in the 1886 persecution, secretary to Kagwa) rest on the standard record, including the Dictionary of African Christian Biography, from which the judgement that Kagwa was "probably as much concerned to increase Buganda's influences as to spread the Gospel" in sending teachers to the western kingdoms is paraphrased. Modern and copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited, not quoted: Simon Gikandi's introduction to the 1998 edition of Mukasa; D. A. Low, *Religion and Society in Buganda* and *Buganda in Modern History*; Michael Twaddle on Kagwa and the Protestant chiefs; Holly Hanson, *Landed Obligation*; and John Rowe on the Ganda intellectual tradition. The sharply critical comparison of Kagwa's knighthood to Francis

Drake's is presented as one modern critical reading, paraphrased and not quoted, and is set against this module's own contrary finding that Kagwa's faith was genuine. Every load-bearing quotation has been checked against a source reproducing the primary text; the formation apparatus that installed and reproduced this robe — Budo, the mission schools, and what was withheld from the majority — is the subject of Module 4.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

Patterns of Power · British Buganda — Module 4

THE SONS OF CHIEFS

Module 4 · Formation — how the redirect dissolved the settler's dilemma, so that the Baganda could be schooled lavishly without being admitted anywhere; and how the schooling was then sorted by caste, capped by doctrine, and pushed higher by the hunger of the ruled

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The dilemma the redirect dissolved

Formation is the apparatus that installs a belief and reproduces it across generations — the school, the church, the calendar, the training of the young — and it is the deepest lever any order has, because to form a person is to set, early, both what he will count as good and what he will be able to see at all. The colonial bend the framework predicts for this lever is a withholding: the settler colony does not form the native majority, because forming them would mean admitting them. In a colony whose whole order rests on a racial wall — where the boundary of the settlement is race and no African may cross into the ruling caste — to educate the native into the coloniser's competences is to manufacture a claimant on a status the wall exists to deny. So the settler colony leaves the native unformed, and the native counter-formation, the mosque or the Qur'anic school or the independent schools the people build for themselves, is left to hold the field. This collection's Kenya study bears the mark of it in its very title: the Kikuyu, denied formation by a colony that could not afford to admit them, built the schools themselves.

Buganda inverts that picture, and the inversion is the whole of this module. Here formation was not withheld but lavished; the missions built the schools and the Baganda flocked to them and demanded more; and the reason is that the redirect described in the previous modules had dissolved the settler's dilemma before it could arise. Recall the shape of this conquest: the British did not build a racial order over the Baganda but captured and re-dyed the Baganda's own order, so that the boundary of the settlement ran not between coloniser and native but within native society, between the collaborating chiefly class and everyone beneath it. In such a colony, forming the native no longer means admitting him to the ruling race, because the ladder a formed Muganda climbs does not lead to the metropole at all — it leads into the redirected native order, to a clerkship in the Protectorate, a chieftaincy in the kingdom, a pulpit in the Ganda church, a place at the Kabaka's re-dyed court. A Muganda could therefore be schooled as far as he liked and threaten nothing, because everything he was schooled for was a post inside the machine the British already controlled through its apex. The settler colony withholds formation because forming is admitting; the redirect colony can form without limit of principle, because in it forming is not admitting. That single difference is why Buganda became the most schooled society in the region while the settler colonies next door kept their majorities in the dark — and this module traces what the British did with a freedom to form that the settler never had.

The hill where kings are crowned

The emblem of that formation stands on a hill called Naggalabi, at Budo, in the county of Busiro — and the hill was chosen for a reason that states the whole logic of the redirect in a single stroke of geography. Naggalabi was the coronation hill of Buganda, the sacred ground on which, by immemorial custom, each new Kabaka was installed. On that ground, in 1906, the Church Missionary Society founded King's College Budo, a Christian boarding school for the sons of the chiefs and the royal house. The old palace-page system that Module 3 described — the apprenticeship by which bright boys

were sent to the Kabaka's court to be trained as the next generation of chiefs — was here refounded as an English public school on the pattern of the ones that formed England's own governing class, and planted, deliberately, on the kingdom's most sacred political site. The prime minister Apolo Kagwa, who secured the hill for the school, understood exactly what he was doing: a modern historian's judgement, paraphrased, is that he grasped that a new kind of education was not a threat to Buganda's identity but a shield for its future, and that in securing the coronation hill for a Christian school he married tradition and progress in a single act. The school's first headmaster, Henry Weatherhead, recorded in words reproduced in its centenary history that Kagwa was "genuinely keen on Christian education and on starting a more advanced school for the sons of chiefs and others," and that the choice of the sacred site had set them "up against the whole of Uganda" until the Katikkiro's weight carried it through.

The completeness of the fusion is best seen in a single person. Daudi Chwa, the infant Kabaka in whose name the 1900 Agreement had been signed, was the first Kabaka in the kingdom's history to receive a formal Western education, and he received it at Budo; and in 1914, come of age, he was crowned at Budo. The same hill both schooled him and enthroned him. The old sacred site that made kings now also made the Christian gentlemen who would serve them, and the two functions had become one place — the clearest possible image of a formation apparatus that was not built new over a broken order but captured from the old one and re-dyed. The school's motto, given in Luganda, is *Gakyali Mabaga* — rendered by the school itself as "so little done, so much more to do." It is the voice of a formation that understood itself as an ever-extending ladder, always promising a further rung — and, as the rest of this module will show, that promise was exactly the thing the colonial doctrine of the day was trying to cut short, and exactly the thing the Baganda would fight to keep open.

The sons of chiefs, and the sons of no one

Budo formed the sons of chiefs. That phrase, Weatherhead's own, is the key to the caste-sorting that ran through the whole of Ganda formation, for the ladder the school offered was not offered to everyone, and the field of the visible it drew was drawn differently for each rank of the society beneath it. At the top, the chief's son went to Budo, or to its Protestant fellows Mengo and Gayaza, or to the Catholic schools of the rival confession, and was formed into a literate Christian administrator fit for a clerkship, a chieftaincy, a place in the redirected order — formed, that is, to see the ladder and to climb it. Below him, the peasant, the *mukopi*, was not left wholly unformed, for the mission reached down to him too; but what reached him was the village school and the catechism and the ability to read the Luganda Scriptures, a formation calibrated to make a faithful Christian and a legible subject rather than a candidate for advancement. The peasant was formed to read the Bible, not to climb; his horizon was drawn at the edge of the parish. And below even him, at the conquered periphery — in Bunyoro, in the eastern districts the Baganda agents had subdued — formation was thinnest of all, and what there was of it arrived, at first, in the hands of the Ganda catechists and chiefs who were themselves the instrument of the sub-imperial expansion, so that the Baganda's decades-long lead in schooling hardened into a Protectorate-wide caste order with the Baganda as its literate clerks and everyone else as their juniors.

This is the same sorting the earlier modules found in land and in law, now performed on the mind: the settlement gave the chief an estate and the peasant a tax, and the school gave the chief's son a ladder and the peasant's son a catechism. Formation, the deepest setter of what a person can imagine, was rationed by rank, and the rationing installed the order more durably than any law, because a man taxed against his will knows he is taxed, while a man formed to see only the parish does not know there was a ladder he was not shown. The caste line of the settlement was thus reproduced in the horizons of the next generation, drawn early and drawn to fit — the chief's son taught to see himself as a ruler-in-waiting of the Christian kingdom, the peasant's son

taught to see himself as a soul to be saved and a subject to be counted, and neither taught to see the other arrangement as anything but the shape of the world.

Adapted education, and the hunger for book-learning

Yet even the ladder the chief's son climbed was meant to have a ceiling, and the doctrine that set the ceiling is worth naming, because it is the era's frankest statement of formation as an instrument of control. In the 1920s the colonial and missionary education of British Africa came under the influence of what was called "adapted education," a doctrine carried across the continent by the Phelps-Stokes commissions — which surveyed East Africa in 1924 — and modelled on the industrial-and-agricultural schooling devised for Black Americans at Hampton and Tuskegee. Its premise, in the paraphrase of its historians, was that African education should depart from the "literary" schooling of Europe and be "adapted" instead to what its authors took to be the African's proper sphere: the farm, the workshop, the improvement of the village. The word "adapted" is the euphemism doing the work, for what was adapted was the height of the ceiling. A literary education — the reading and writing and reckoning that led to clerkships and professions and, eventually, to the argument for self-rule — was precisely what the doctrine sought to withhold, and its critics have not been wrong to read it, as one modern account does, as a design to keep the African in a subordinate place by keeping his schooling below the rung from which advancement or emancipation could be claimed.

But in Buganda the ceiling would not hold at the height the doctrine wished, and it would not hold for a revealing reason. The Baganda wanted the literary education, and wanted it fiercely, because their position rewarded it. In a Protectorate run through Ganda clerks and Ganda chiefs, the book-learning the doctrine disparaged was the ladder to every post worth having, and the same historians who trace the "adapted" doctrine also trace the pressure that mitigated it — the African demand for academic instruction as

the key to employment, mobility, and escape from the control of the older chiefs. The benefit dial the framework speaks of was set, in the Muganda's case, by the plain logic of his position: a man whose whole avenue of advancement ran through literacy will hunger for literacy and push against anyone who offers him a hoe instead of a book. And here the redirect made itself felt a second time, for the British could afford to let the ceiling rise. In a settler colony the demand for book-learning is dangerous, because the literate native is a claimant on the white man's status; the settler must refuse it. In Buganda the literate Muganda was a claimant on a post inside the native order — a judgeship in the Kabaka's courts, a place in the Protectorate's clerical service — and threatened nothing the British held, because the apex he served was one they already controlled. So the ceiling in Buganda rose higher than the "adapted" doctrine intended, not because the British were more generous but because forming was not admitting, and a formation that fed the native order could be permitted to climb where a formation that fed a claim on the ruling race could not. The Baganda got their book-learning, and got it because the redirect had made book-learning safe.

Foreignisation

The showcase of that formation was the Kabaka himself, and it is the Kabaka himself who left the sharpest word on what it had done. In 1935 Daudi Chwa — the first Western-educated king of Buganda, the product of Budo, the very demonstration that the redirect could form a native ruler without unseating himself — published a pamphlet titled *Education, Civilization and Foreignisation in Buganda*, and the coinage in its title is the one to set beside the missionary language of uplift. The formation had been sold, to its metropolitan funders and to the Baganda alike, as Christianity and civilisation, the raising of a people; the king it had raised named its effect, in his own word, "foreignisation." His argument, paraphrased from a text this study quotes only for that coinage, was that the schooling was producing a generation that imitated Europeans superficially and was thereby being estranged from its own inheritance — that a true education would root the

young in the Ganda values he named, the filial obedience and communal courtesy and hospitality of the kingdom, rather than dissolving them in mimicry. Here is the redirect's own contradiction, spoken by its chief beneficiary. The redirected robe of Module 3 had taken; the Baganda elite wore its Christianity as its own. But the formation that installed and reproduced that robe was, the Kabaka now saw, also manufacturing a class detached from the very Ganda identity the redirected kingship claimed to embody and to protect — so that the machine built to preserve Buganda's continuity was, in the same motion, corroding the thing it preserved. That the man who said so was the crowned-and-schooled emblem of the whole arrangement is what gives the word its weight. The formation had worked exactly as designed, and its designed success was the thing the apex mourned.

The brittleness, deferred

The framework predicts that withholding formation makes an order brittle, the unformed majority held only by force with no belief to rest on. Buganda formed instead, and bought thereby a cheaper and steadier order at its core than any settler colony could manage — a native elite that governed itself, taxed itself, and believed, on the whole, in the Christian kingdom it was schooled to serve. But the brittleness the framework tracks was not abolished by forming; it was deferred and displaced, pushed forward a generation and sideways onto the seams the formation itself deepened, and it is worth marking where it would surface, because the later modules will meet it there.

It surfaced, first, along the confessional line. The formation was not one system but two, a Protestant apparatus of Budo and Mengo and Gayaza and a Catholic apparatus of the rival mission, each forming its own stream of chiefs and clerks and each carrying the factional loyalty of the religious wars into every new generation. Two formations meant two elites, and the cleavage between them — Protestant ascendancy and Catholic grievance — would harden into the party politics of the kingdom's last colonial decades. It surfaced, second, along the ethnic line, for the Baganda's schooling advantage over the rest of the Protectorate curdled, as such advantages do, into

resentment, the Ganda clerk and the Ganda agent becoming the resented face of a foreign rule for peoples who had been schooled later and less. And it surfaced, third, in the very "foreignisation" the Kabaka named — the educated class that formation produced would in time generate exactly the nationalist argument the "adapted" doctrine had feared, the claim that a people fit to be schooled to this height was fit to govern itself. The formation that made the order cheap in 1910 was laying, in the same act, the charges that would trouble it in 1950. It had drawn the horizons of a whole generation; and horizons, once drawn wide enough to see the ladder, tend to widen further, until they can see past the arrangement that drew them.

Reading formation against the framework

Module 4 asks who was formed, into what, and who was left unformed, and Buganda returns a partial refutation of the colonial bend that turns, on inspection, into a sharpening of it.

The prediction was that formation would be withheld from the majority, because forming them would mean admitting them. In Buganda it was not withheld; it was lavished, and the reason is the module's central finding: **the redirect dissolves the dilemma that makes withholding necessary.** The settler colony must withhold formation because its boundary is race and forming the native manufactures a claimant on the ruling caste. The redirect colony need not, because its boundary runs within native society, and the formed native climbs a ladder that ends inside the native order the coloniser already controls through its apex — so forming him admits him to nothing the coloniser holds. Where the settler's formula is *forming is admitting, therefore withhold*, the redirect's is *forming is not admitting, therefore form freely* — and Buganda formed more freely than any settler colony precisely because it had, at the founding, chosen the cheaper conquest that dissolved the fear.

But freedom to form is not the same as forming without design, and what the redirect actually did with that freedom was to **calibrate**. It sorted formation by caste, giving the chief's son the ladder of Budo, the peasant the catechism, and the periphery almost nothing — reproducing in the horizons

of the next generation the same caste line the settlement had drawn in land and law, and installing the order more deeply than any statute, because the peasant formed to see only the parish does not know a ladder was withheld. It capped formation by doctrine — the "adapted education" that would keep the African below the literary rung — though here the cap was contested and gave way, because the Baganda's position made them hunger for the book-learning the doctrine disparaged, and because the redirect could safely let the ceiling rise, a literate Muganda being a claimant on a native post and not on the ruling race. And it drew, through the whole apparatus, the field of the visible for a society — the chief's son formed to see himself a ruler-in-waiting of the Christian kingdom, the peasant to see himself a soul and a subject — so that whoever governed the formation governed the horizon, and the British governed it through the redirected church and school, which drew every horizon toward loyalty to the Christian Ganda order under British over-rule.

The refinement to carry forward, then, is this: **the redirect does not withhold formation; it dissolves the dilemma that forces the settler to withhold, and then calibrates — sorting formation by caste, capping it at the level the order needs, negotiating that cap against the ruled's own demand, and drawing through it the horizon of a whole society.** This buys the redirect colony a cheaper and steadier order at its core than the settler colony can achieve, which is a real advantage and part of why Buganda's core needed so little force. But it does not abolish the brittleness the framework predicts; it defers and displaces it — onto the confessional seam that two rival formations deepen, onto the ethnic seam that the schooling-advantage inflames, and into the "foreignised" educated class whose very competence becomes, in time, the argument for ending the arrangement that formed it. The formation apparatus, finally, confirms the recursion the collection insists on: it was not built new but captured and re-dyed, the palace-page system of the old kingship refounded as a Christian school on the coronation hill itself, tradition and conquest married on sacred ground.

Legibility is not pardon. To show that forming the Baganda was cheaper and safer than withholding — that the redirect could school a people lavishly because it admitted them to nothing the coloniser held — is to explain the

mechanism by which this colony bought its quiet core, not to praise the schools that did it. The same formation that gave the Baganda their literacy and their long advantage also rationed that literacy by caste, capped it where it could, deepened the confessional split that would fracture the kingdom's politics, entrenched the ethnic hierarchy that would poison the Protectorate, and manufactured the class estranged from itself that its own Kabaka mourned by name. The gift was real, and it was cut to the mechanism's measure; and its costs fell, as the costs in this study always fall, on the peasant capped at the catechism, on the periphery left unformed, and on the future coherence of a kingdom schooled to serve an order it did not choose. That the formation was generous where the settler's was miserly is not the end of the reckoning. It is the beginning of a different one.

A note on sources. Primary quotation is confined to public-domain or verifiably reproduced material, given as the record renders it. Henry Weatherhead's recollection that Apolo Kagwa was "genuinely keen on Christian education and on starting a more advanced school for the sons of chiefs and others," and that the choice of the Budo site had set the founders "up against the whole of Uganda," is quoted as reproduced from G. K. McGregor's *King's College Budo: A Centenary History, 1906–2006* in the Ugandan press, and is used as reproduced rather than reconstructed. King's College Budo's foundation (29 March 1906, on the coronation hill of Naggalabi at Budo, on land given by the Kabaka, by the Church Missionary Society under Bishop Alfred Tucker with Weatherhead as first headmaster), its purpose as a school for the sons of chiefs and the royal house, its admission of girls in 1934, and its motto *Gakyali Mabaga* ("so little done, so much more to do") follow the school's own record and the standard histories. Kabaka Daudi Chwa's status as the first Western-educated Kabaka, his coronation at Budo in 1914, and his 1935 pamphlet *Education, Civilization and Foreignisation in Buganda* are drawn from the standard record; this study quotes only his coinage "foreignisation" as verifiably his and paraphrases the pamphlet's argument (the warning against superficial imitation, the appeal to Ganda values of filial obedience, courtesy, and hospitality) rather than reconstructing its wording. The doctrine of "adapted education" and its dissemination by the Phelps-Stokes commissions (the East African survey of 1924; the Hampton-Tuskegee model; the preference for industrial and agricultural over "literary" schooling), together with the countervailing African demand for "book-learning" as the ladder to employment and mobility, are paraphrased from and credited to the modern scholarship — Kenneth King and Edward Berman on Phelps-Stokesism, and the *Paedagogica Historica* study of "book learning versus adapted education" — and quoted only for the terms of art themselves. The confessional division of the school system, the caste-rationing of formation,

and the founding of Makerere in 1922 as a technical college follow the standard histories (D. A. Low; Holly Hanson; and the general historiography of Ugandan education); the Catholic mission schools are referred to generally rather than by contestable name and date. Contested and paraphrased matters are flagged as such; the reading of "adapted education" as an instrument of subordination is given as one well-supported modern interpretation. Every load-bearing quotation has been checked against a source reproducing it. The cost this formation and this settlement together extracted, and the price the peasant paid to two masters at once, are the subject of Modules 5 and 6.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

Patterns of Power · British Buganda — Module 5

IN TURNS

Module 5 · The Cost Column — how the price of defection was set in every ledger by a chief and not a coloniser, wrung as a month of labour that wore the old name, and hidden from the reformer under the word "custom"

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The column and the ledger

This collection reads power twice — from the outside as structure, and from the inside as the decision each person makes weighing what he wants against what it would cost him — and the two readings meet at a single place, a column in a ledger. The floor of force, translated into the language of a subject's decision, simply is the entry in his cost column: the credible enforcer who prices defection too high to be worth it. An order does not hold because everyone believes in it; it holds because, for each person, the sum comes out against revolt. And where belief is strong the benefit of compliance stands high on its own, so the cost column need rarely be consulted — the enforcer is present but resting, a wall no one troubles to test. The corollary is the dark one that runs beneath every study here: where no enforcer can reach an actor and he knows it, his cost column stands empty, and the strong simply do as they please.

Buganda gives this abstraction its most instructive colonial form, because the question the module asks — who faced what cost of defection, and who kept the account against whom — returns an answer with three unusual features stacked together. The cost column in Buganda was tiered, so that the

price of defiance was near-invisible at the believing core and heavy at the unbelieving edge. It was delegated, so that the enforcer who appeared in the ordinary Muganda's ledger was not the coloniser but his own chief. And it was disguised, so that the heaviest recurring cost the peasant bore — a month of his labour every year — wore the name of his own tradition, which made it cheap to extract and, for a crucial while, impossible to abolish. This module follows those three features down, and then finds the empty column: the account no one kept against the chief, until the peasant made someone keep it.

The cheapest hold

Begin with the rulers' side of the ledger, because its lightness is the thing the rest of the module has to explain. The British held Buganda cheaply beyond the ordinary meaning of the word. A kingdom of some two million people was administered, at the level above the native government, by a handful of European officials — a resident and a scattering of district officers — because the governing itself was done by the Ganda machine the conquest had captured whole. The Kabaka's chiefs assessed the taxes, judged the disputes, called out the labour, and kept the order; the British held the apex by the contract of the 1900 Agreement, and the apex, by its own uncaptured authority, held everyone below. This is the cheapest hold a conqueror can have, and its cheapness has an exact location in the ledger. The cost of ruling was low because the cost column of the ruled was filled by someone other than the ruler — the chief, not the Crown — and because the belief the earlier modules traced kept that column mostly dormant, the Muganda complying not from a daily fear of the enforcer but from a conviction that the order was the shape of the world. Where that conviction failed, at the conquered edge, the cheapness failed with it: Bunyoro and the eastern districts had to be garrisoned and coerced, held by the expensive Baganda-manned floor of Module 1, because there the belief had never taken and the cost column had to be filled the dear way, with visible force. One colony, two ledgers: a core

held for almost nothing on borrowed conviction, an edge held at cost on rented arms.

In turns

Now the ruled's side, and its heaviest recurring entry, which was not money but time. The ordinary Muganda owed the order his labour, and the obligation came in two forms that between them took the better part of two months from his year. The first was *kasanvu*. It was not a colonial invention; in the kingdom before the conquest, *kasanvu* had been the peasant's labour-duty for the making of roads and bridges and the works of the state, each province of Buganda supplying its quota of *bakopi* to the crown's projects. The colonial administration took this existing obligation and re-pointed it at itself: from 1909 every adult man was required to work for a month each year for the government, at a wage the government set, on the roads and works of the Protectorate. The second was *luwalo*, and its very name states the mechanism. *Luwalo* means, in Luganda, "in turns" — the labour rendered by each man when his turn came round — and it too was a redirected obligation, the customary communal labour of the native state, unpaid, required of every man between roughly eighteen and forty-five, up to thirty days in the year, chiefly for the making and maintaining of roads. Beneath both lay the oldest and cruellest form of the labour cost, porterage: before the roads and the lake steamers, everything the Protectorate moved was carried on the heads of conscripted men, a burden that killed by exhaustion and disease and that the reforms of the 1920s would specifically decline to touch. The 1900 Agreement had reserved these costs in its own text, obliging the native, beside his taxes, to "military service" and "the up-keep of main roads passing through the lands on which they dwell" — and the military service was real too, the King's African Rifles and the carrier levies of the Great War drawing Ganda men into the Protectorate's wars. A month for *kasanvu*, a month for *luwalo*, the loads, the levies: this was the standing price the order took from the body of the man at the bottom, year upon year.

The chief called out the labour

The decisive fact about that price is who collected it, because it is the key to the whole cheapness. The enforcer in the peasant's cost column was not the coloniser; it was his chief. The road labour was organised by delegation down the native hierarchy: each county chief was given a stretch of road to keep, and he in turn allotted lengths to his sub-chiefs, who called out the men of their neighbourhoods to do the work. It was the chief who knew which men owed their turn, the chief who summoned them, the chief who noted the absentee, the chief who could fine him or evict him from the *mailo* on which he lived. The British official rarely entered this transaction at all; he set the policy and received the roads, but the face the peasant saw when the labour fell due was a Ganda face, the face of the man who was at once his landlord, his judge, his tax-collector, and now his labour-master. This is why a few dozen Europeans could hold two million people: the cost column of every peasant was administered by the native chief, so that the coloniser never had to appear in it. And it is why the order felt, to the man who bore it, less like a foreign conquest than like the weight of his own kingdom — because the hand that pressed on him was his own kingdom's hand, redirected. The redirect that captured the apex had captured, with it, the entire apparatus of enforcement, so that the price of defiance was set and collected, in every ledger, by the ruled's own hierarchy on the ruler's behalf.

Under the guise of tradition

The disguise did a second kind of work, subtler than the first and more consequential. Because *kasanvu* and *luwalo* wore the old names and drew on the real pre-colonial obligation, they could be presented — and were presented — not as colonial forced labour but as the peasant's customary contribution to his own native state, his turn taken, in the historians' phrase, at "doing his bit." That framing was not merely a comfort; it was a shield, and it sheltered the labour from the one force that might have ended it. In the 1920s the imperial conscience began, fitfully, to move against colonial forced labour: a dispatch from the Colonial Office under Churchill in 1921

restricted compulsory labour for government works, and the International Labour Organisation's Forced Labour Convention of 1930 pressed the empires to phase it out. Under this pressure the administration did abolish *kasanvu*, the frankly colonial form, between 1922 and 1923. But *luwalo* survived, and it survived precisely because it did not look colonial. Communal labour rendered to the native authority under its own ancient name read as tradition, not coercion, and tradition the reformers left alone — the coercive practice, in the judgement of its historian, remaining inviolate under the guise of custom while its more honest cousin was struck down. The redirect had laundered the labour into heritage, and heritage escaped the reform.

Two further features complete the picture, and both cut by caste. The obligation could be commuted for cash — a payment of about ten shillings, roughly a man's poll tax or a month's wage in Kampala, bought a man out of his turn — so that those with money escaped the labour and those without it did the work; by the mid-1930s some three-quarters of the men liable were paying the fee rather than lifting the tool, and the burden had concentrated, as such burdens do, on the poorest who could not buy free. And when *luwalo* was at last abolished, at the end of the 1930s and in practice by the early 1940s, it was not so much ended as transformed: the administration, having first troubled to calculate exactly what the free labour had been worth to it, replaced the obligation with a new tax of equivalent value. The cost did not lift; it changed its state from labour into money and stayed on the same backs. Forced labour in Buganda was never quite abolished. It was commuted, then converted, and the column it filled was never allowed to empty.

The account no one kept

There remained one cost the peasant bore for which, for a long time, no enforcer kept any account at all — and here the module meets the dark corollary head on. The chief who called out the labour was also the landlord of the *mailo* on which the peasant lived, and the peasant owed him, beyond the state's taxes and the state's labour, the dues of a tenant: *busuulu*, the rent, and *envujjo*, the tribute in produce and in further days of work. Against the

chief's exactions of these there was, at first, no limit and no appeal, because no power stood ready to keep the account against the chief. The colonial state had captured him as its instrument and had no wish to check him; the peasant had no court above him that would hear the complaint. So the strong did as the strong do where the cost column is empty: the exactions climbed, the tenant's days of tribute-labour multiplied, eviction hung over any who resisted, and the man at the bottom paid whatever the man above him chose to take. The account began to be kept only when the peasants themselves made it impossible not to. Through the 1920s their grievance organised — into the tenant agitation and the clan-based Bataka movement that later modules will follow — and it grew loud enough that the colonial state, alarmed less for the peasant's sake than for the order's stability and its own revenue base, at last intervened. The Busuulu and Envujjo Law of 1928 fixed the rent, capped the tribute-labour at sixty days in the year, forbade arbitrary eviction, and gave the tenant a security he had not had. It was a real relief, and it is worth reading precisely for what it reveals: that the account against the strong is kept not when their exploitation grows cruel but when it grows dangerous to the enforcer's own interest — that the empty column is filled, when it is filled at all, by the pressure of the weak organised, and not by the conscience of the strong.

Reading the cost column against the framework

Module 5 asks who priced defection in each ledger, and Buganda returns three findings that together refine the framework's account of the cost column and of the cheapest hold.

First, the cost column in this redirect colony was **tiered by belief**, exactly as the earlier modules would predict. At the believing core the column was full but dormant — the price of defiance real but seldom tested, because the benefit of compliance stood high on the borrowed conviction of the redirected kingship. At the unbelieving edge the column was full and active, the belief absent and the force therefore visible. The framework's rule that

surveillance and coercion are the tell of a belief that never took is confirmed with its map drawn: quiet at the core where the robe took, loud at the edge where it did not.

Second, and this is the module's contribution, the cost column was **delegated and disguised**, and the two together define a hold cheaper than belief alone would explain. The theoretical account of the cost column holds that belief keeps the column dormant so the enforcer rarely needs to appear. Buganda adds that in a redirect colony the enforcer who appears, when one must, is not the coloniser but the native intermediary — the chief who calls out the labour and holds the *mailo* — so that the coloniser is absent from the peasant's ledger even when the ledger is being enforced. And it adds that the cost itself can be **disguised as the ruled's own tradition**, which does a double service: it makes the labour cheap to extract, because the man renders it as his own custom rather than resisting it as a foreign imposition, and it makes the labour hard to abolish, because when the metropolitan conscience moves against colonial forced labour the disguised cost reads as heritage and is left standing. Name the refinement plainly: the cheapest hold is not merely the one where belief keeps the column dormant, but the one where the enforcer in the ledger is the ruled's own chief and the cost on the page wears the ruled's own name — for then the coloniser extracts the labour without appearing and escapes the accountability the metropole would otherwise impose. The redirect launders coercion into custom, and custom is both obeyed more cheaply and reformed more slowly than force.

Third, the module confirms the dark corollary and sharpens its lesson. Where no enforcer kept the account — against the chief, in his dealings with his tenant — the strong took what they pleased, and the account was opened only when the weak organised to a pitch that threatened the order itself. The 1928 law is the proof: relief came not from the conscience of the ruler but from the pressure of the ruled made dangerous, and it came in the form the ruler could accept, one that steadied the order by trimming the intermediary's excess rather than by touching the structure that had licensed it. This is the hinge the whole collection turns on, previewed here in miniature: the cost column moves when, and only when, the balance of credible force behind it

moves — and the greatest such movement, the emptying of the column that comes when the distant enforcer's will runs out, is the event the later modules are travelling toward.

Legibility is not pardon. To show that the labour was extracted cheaply because it was delegated to the chief and disguised as custom is to explain the mechanism of the cheapness, not to soften what it took. The peasant carried the loads that built the roads he would be taxed to use, gave a month and then another month of his year, and rendered it all to his own chief under the name of his own tradition — and the disguise that made the cost cheap for the coloniser was itself part of the cost, for it made the burden harder to name as coercion and slower to be lifted than an honest imposition would have been. That the hold was cheap is not a mitigation of the price. It is a description of who was made to pay it, and of how thoroughly the paying was arranged to look like something the payer had chosen.

A note on sources. This module rests largely on modern scholarship, which is paraphrased and credited rather than quoted, with the primary instruments named directly. The pre-colonial character of *kasanvu* as a labour obligation for roads, bridges, and public works, supplied by the *bakopi* of each province, follows Richard Reid, *Political Power in Pre-Colonial Buganda* (2002); its colonial form from 1909 as a month of paid compulsory labour, and its abolition under Colonial Office pressure in 1922–1923, follow Holger Bernt Hansen's study of *kasanvu* and the general record. The account of *luwalo* — its meaning of "in turns," its unpaid character, its liability for men of roughly eighteen to forty-five, its organisation by delegation to county and sub-county chiefs for road labour, its authorisation under the 1919 Native Authority Ordinance and Buganda's separate law, its commutation for a fee of about ten shillings, the rise of commutation to roughly three-quarters of those liable by the mid-1930s, its survival "under the guise of tradition" through the reforms that followed Churchill's 1921 dispatch and the 1930 Forced Labour Convention, and its eventual abolition (officially 1939, in practice by 1943) and replacement by a Native Administration Tax of equivalent value — follows Opolot Okia's work on forced labour in the Uganda Protectorate, above all his study of the "virtual abolition" of *luwalo*, together with the wider literature on forced labour and migration in British East Africa. The 1900 Agreement's reservation of "military service" and the "up-keep of main roads" is quoted from that public-domain text as established in Module 2. The Busuulu and Envujjo Law of 1928 (the fixing of rent, the sixty-day cap on tribute-labour, the bar on arbitrary eviction, and the grant of occupancy security), and its origin in the tenant and Bataka agitation of the 1920s, follow the standard histories; its detailed reading as

an instance of the peasantry forcing the account is reserved, with the movements themselves, for Modules 6 and 9. Figures — the days of labour, the ages liable, the commutation rate, the dates of abolition — are given as the sources give them and as ranges where they differ. The framework of the cost column, and the rule that the account against the strong is kept only where a credible enforcer reaches, are from this collection's paper *The Cost Column*, drawn from that text. The wealth this same order extracted — the cotton, the tax, the terms of the tenant's rent read as economics rather than as labour — is the subject of Module 6.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

Patterns of Power · British Buganda — Module 6

THE GINNER'S CUT

Module 6 · Extraction — how a colony with no settlers pumped out its surplus not by taking the peasant's land but by binding him to a crop he could not refuse, rigging the price he was paid for it, and interposing a middleman to take the visible cut and the blame

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The crop he could not refuse

Set the Buganda extraction beside its neighbour and the two invert exactly, and the inversion is the key to the whole module. In settler Kenya the defining fact of extraction was a prohibition: the African was forbidden to grow the profitable crop, coffee reserved by law for the European planter, so that the native could not compete and was driven instead onto the settler's land as cheap labour — the crop, in this collection's Kenya study, that he was not allowed to grow. In Buganda the defining fact was the opposite, a compulsion: the African was required to grow the profitable crop, cotton pressed upon him by tax and by chiefly command, so that the native produced the export the empire wanted on his own land with his own hands. The reason for the inversion runs straight back to the settlement of Module 2. Kenya's land was alienated to white settlers, who then needed the crop reserved and the labour cheap; Buganda's land was given not to settlers but to the Ganda chiefs, so that no European planter class existed to reserve the crop for or to supply with dispossessed labour. Extraction in a colony without settlers cannot run by dispossession, because the land has not been taken from the native and handed to a rival race; it must run instead through the native's

own production. And so the Baganda peasant kept his land, kept his labour, kept his subsistence — and was extracted, all the same, through a crop he could not refuse and a market he could not touch.

Cotton was that crop, and it came to Uganda in 1903, carried by the British Cotton Growing Association. From the first the compulsion was frank. The administration, in the summary of the historians, declined to favour European plantations and instead adopted a policy of forcing African producers to grow cotton and to sell it in controlled markets — a policy enforced, through the years the crop was treated as a government crop, by requiring each family to plant a set minimum, on the order of half a hectare, and backed by the tax that Module 2 laid on every hut. The tax did the deepest work, for a man who must find rupees to pay it and cannot grow rupees must grow something he can sell, and the crop the state pressed on him to sell was cotton. The chief, as ever, was the instrument: it was he who carried the order to plant into the village, he who inspected the acreage, he who reported the man who had not sown his half-hectare. The peasant grew cotton, then, for the same reason he rendered his month of labour — because his own chief told him to and his own tax demanded it — and the compulsion, like the labour of Module 5, read as the command of his own native state rather than the design of a distant empire.

Lancashire's field

The design was distant, and its purpose is worth naming plainly, because it is the reversed robe of Module 3 made economic. The British Cotton Growing Association had been formed in 1902 out of the Lancashire cotton industry with a single object: to reduce that industry's dependence on raw cotton from the United States by growing cotton, instead, across the British Empire. Uganda was to be a field for Lancashire's mills. The rhetoric of the venture, in the period's own voice, made no secret of it — one contemporary account, written in 1924 and quoted as it is reproduced, boasted that England had "rimmed the globe with cotton plantations," planting the crop "wherever cotton could be grown" by her "deep purse and far-sighted policy"; a founder

of the Association had declared as early as 1904 that "Lancashire's future salvation" lay in the cotton of the empire. The Association branded itself "semi-philanthropic," and the colonial literature dressed the whole scheme as the bringing of a cash economy and its prosperity to the Ugandan peasant. But the peasant grew a crop he could not eat, on the instruction of a state not his own, to be spun in mills he would never see, to lessen a dependence that was not his — and the surplus of his labour was designed, from the outset, to travel up a chain that ended in Lancashire. The public words spoke of the peasant's opportunity; the structure was built for the metropole's supply, and the two were not the same thing.

The ginner's cut

Between the peasant's field and Lancashire's mill lay the mechanism that did the actual extracting, and it was not a theft of land or labour but a rigging of price. Cotton as the peasant grew it was seed-cotton, worth little until it was ginned — the fibre, or lint, separated from the seed, a process that stripped away about two-thirds of the weight and nearly all of the difficulty of transport, and that turned a bulky field-crop into a compact export commodity. Ginning was where the value was made, and ginning was precisely what the peasant was kept out of. He sold his seed-cotton, raw, to a ginnery, at a price he did not set and could not negotiate; the ginnery ginned it, and sold the lint onward at the world price; and the gap between the two — a gap the economic historians find was particularly large for cotton, larger than for most colonial crops — was the surplus, captured not in the field but at the gin. The state made sure the gap stayed wide. Through the marketing regulation that governed the trade, and above all through the zoning that gave each ginnery a monopoly over the cotton grown in its district, competition among buyers was suppressed and the price offered to the grower held down, in an arrangement that served the ginneries by guaranteeing them cheap cotton and served the state by keeping the peasant tied to the crop rather than drifting to something more lucrative. The peasant was a price-taker at every point: he could not choose his buyer, could not gin his own crop, could not

reach the world price that his cotton fetched the moment it left his hands. The ginner's cut was the extraction, and it was taken with the peasant's full compliance, because the peasant had no lever with which to refuse it.

The middleman

The men who owned the gins were, overwhelmingly, neither European nor African but South Asian, and their place in the structure is the module's most distinctive finding. The first Asians had come to East Africa as labourers on the railway, brought from India by the thousand, and from among them and those who followed grew a commercial class that entered the cotton trade from the early 1910s and came to dominate its middle entirely: by 1926 there were some one hundred and seventy-seven mechanised ginneries in Uganda, and the processing and marketing of the crop had passed, in the standard account, into Indian hands, while the government kept the research and the seed and the regulation and the African kept the growing. This produced an extraction sorted into three racial tiers stacked one on another — the African who grew, the Asian who ginned and traded, the European who ruled and regulated and shipped the lint to the mills of his own country — and the middle tier did a double service to the men above it that a two-tier settler colony could never arrange.

It captured the surplus, first, efficiently and at its own risk, sparing the administration the labour and capital of the trade. But it did a second thing more valuable still: it absorbed the resentment. The peasant who was underpaid for his cotton met, at the point of sale, not the European official who had zoned the market and set the terms, but the Asian ginner who handed him the low price — and so the anger that the extraction generated fell, naturally and visibly, on the middleman who took the visible cut, and not on the ruler who had designed the cut and took, through duty and through the whole imperial arrangement, the larger and less visible share. The Asian was perfectly placed for this office because he was squeezed from both sides: he could not own the *mailo* land the chief held, could not enter the ruling caste, faced his own ceiling under the European, and depended on the

administration's licences and zones for the very monopoly that made him rich — so he captured the surplus and took the blame while remaining wholly controllable by the power above him. He was the extraction's shock-absorber. The wealth flowed up past him to the ruler and the metropole; the grievance stopped at him. That the African cotton-grower's later revolt would aim so much of its force at the Asian ginner — at exclusion from ginning, at the demand for African cooperatives, in the disturbances that the later modules will reach — is the proof of how well the buffer worked: the men who had set the terms had arranged for another to be blamed for them.

The chief's cut

One tier has been left implicit and must be named, because it completes the sorting and ties this module to the last. The Ganda chief took his cut too. He was the peasant's landlord as well as his labour-master, and the *busuulu* and *envujjo* of Module 5 — the rent and the tribute — were, read as economics, the chief's share of the peasant's cotton income, drawn off before the crop ever reached the gin. Many chiefs were themselves the largest cotton-growers of their districts, working their *mailo* with tenant and hired labour and selling their own crop; the landed oligarchy the 1900 Agreement had created lived, in no small part, off the cotton the peasantry grew. So the surplus was tapped at every level of the caste ladder at once: the chief took the rent, the ginner took the ginning gap, the state took the duty and the marketing margin, and the metropole took the cheap raw material — each tier drawing from the same crop, grown by the man at the bottom who was compelled to grow it and permitted to keep only what the tiers above him did not require. And because the chief's cut, like the compulsion to plant, was collected in the name of the native order — the customary due of a landlord, the command of the Kabaka's chief — the peasant experienced the whole extraction, once again, as the weight of his own kingdom rather than the reach of a foreign one.

Just enough

The genius of this arrangement, set against the settler model next door, was that it took the surplus without wrecking the producer. The settler economy dispossessed the African of his land and drove him to immiserating wage-labour, and paid for it in the permanent hostility of a people robbed; the peasant-production economy left the African his land, his household, his labour, and his subsistence, and took only the surplus above them — the calibrated "just enough" the framework describes, the extraction pitched to leave the producer intact and productive so that he would rise the next season and grow the crop again. The 1928 rent cap of Module 5 belongs to this logic: by fixing the chief's *busuulu* and *envujjo*, the administration protected the peasant's minimum against the landlord's appetite, not from tenderness but because a tenant squeezed past the point of survival stops planting cotton, and a colony built on the peasant's crop cannot afford to kill the peasant. The extraction was sustainable precisely because it was moderate at the base — moderate not by mercy but by design, because the whole edifice rested on the continued willingness and ability of the man at the bottom to grow the crop he could not refuse. He kept his land. He lost his surplus, every year, up a ladder of tiers each of which took its share in a language that made the taking look like something other than what it was.

Reading extraction against the framework

Module 6 asks how the surplus was pumped out and who caught it at each level, and Buganda returns a distinct extraction-form that the framework should carry beside the settler model.

First, it confirms that extraction is sorted by caste, but in a **three-tier** structure that the two-tier settler colony does not produce — African grower, Asian trader, European ruler, with the metropole beyond. This is the extraction signature of the redirect. Because the settlement gave the conquered land to the native chiefs rather than to a settler race, no European planter class arose to reserve the crop and dispossess the labour; and so the surplus had to be pumped from the peasant's own production through the

market rather than seized through the land. Name the two modes plainly: the settler colony extracts by **dispossession** — take the land, ban the crop, cheapen the labour; the redirect colony extracts by **compulsion and terms of trade** — leave the land, force the crop, rig the price. The Baganda peasant kept everything the Kikuyu lost, and was extracted all the same, because the pump was fitted to his output and not to his dispossession.

Second, the redirect colony's extraction interposes a **middleman minority**, and the framework should mark what that middleman does, because it is not merely to trade. The Asian commercial class captured the surplus at the gin and, in doing so, absorbed the resentment the extraction bred — standing at the point of sale where the ruler did not, so that the anger fell on the visible cut and not on the invisible one, on the trader who handed over the low price and not on the state that had fixed it. A minority squeezed between a resentful producer below and a capping ruler above is the perfect instrument for this: it takes the profit and the blame together and stays controllable, because it depends on the ruler for the very licences that make it rich. Call it what it is — the extraction's shock-absorber, which lets the ruler collect the wealth while a third party collects the hatred. This is a service the two-tier colony cannot buy, and its presence is one of the surest marks of the peasant-production form.

Third, the extraction was delegated and disguised exactly as the cost column was, and for the same reason. The compulsion to grow cotton and the rent drawn off the crop were both collected by the native hierarchy in the name of the native order — the chief's command, the landlord's due — so that the peasant met the extraction as the weight of his own kingdom and the coloniser stayed out of the ledger. And the whole was pitched, at the base, to leave the producer alive and productive: the "just enough" that keeps the goose laying, secured by the very rent-cap that looked like relief. The redirect extracts moderately at the bottom not from mercy but because its wealth depends on the willing continuance of the man it extracts from — a sustainability the settler model, resting on force and dispossession, could never achieve and never needed to, since its wealth lay in the land it had already taken.

Legibility is not pardon. To show that the peasant-production colony was gentler than the settler colony — that it left the African his land and his subsistence and took only his surplus — is not to call it gentle. The peasant grew the crop he could not refuse, at a price rigged against him by a market he could not enter, and watched the value of his year travel up past the chief and the ginner and the state to a mill in a country he would never see, while the resentment it earned was routed onto a middleman placed there, in part, to catch it. That the extraction spared his land is the measure of how completely it had learned to take everything else — the surplus without the uprising, the wealth without the blame, the crop without the war. It was the more durable arrangement precisely because it took less visibly and left the producer standing; and a thing that takes durably, and teaches the taken to see the taking as their own tradition and to blame a third party for its sting, is not a lesser extraction than the settler's. It is a more finished one.

A note on sources. Period quotation is given as it is reproduced in the scholarship and is drawn from public or near-public-domain sources: the boast that England "rimmed the globe with cotton plantations ... wherever cotton could be grown" by her "deep purse and far-sighted policy" is quoted as reproduced from a 1924 account (Crawford) in the economic-history literature; the declaration that "Lancashire's future salvation" lay in imperial cotton is quoted as reproduced from a 1904 statement by a founder of the British Cotton Growing Association. The formation of the BCGA in 1902 to reduce Lancashire's dependence on United States cotton, its "semi-philanthropic" self-description, and its role as financier of ginneries and selling agent follow the standard record. The introduction of cotton to Uganda in 1903, its character as a compelled peasant crop grown on the growers' own land (with the administration "forcing African producers to grow cotton and to sell it in controlled markets" rather than favouring European plantations, and a minimum planting requirement while cotton was treated as a government crop), the erection of the first ginneries in 1904, the growth to roughly 177 mechanised ginneries by 1926, the South Asian domination of ginning and marketing from the early 1910s, the division of function by which the government kept research, seed, and regulation while Indians processed and marketed and Africans grew, the price gap between grower and world market being especially large for cotton, and the suppression of buyer competition through zoning are paraphrased from and credited to the standard scholarship — Cyril Ehrlich's foundational work on the Uganda cotton economy, Richard Roberts and Torbjörn Engdahl on the colonial cotton trade, the terms-of-trade findings associated with Federico Tadei, and the reviews by John Baffes and others. The origin

of the East African Asian commercial class in railway migration, the racial ceiling that barred Asians from *mailo* land and the ruling caste, and the later channelling of African grievance against the Asian ginner (the cooperative demand and the disturbances reserved for Modules 9 and 10) follow the standard histories, including Mahmood Mamdani on the racial structure of the colonial economy. The reading of *busuulu* and *envujjo* as the chief's economic share, and the 1928 rent-cap as protection of the productive minimum, continues from Module 5. Contested figures — the price gap, the number of ginneries, the minimum acreage — are given as the sources give them and as ranges where they differ. Every reproduced quotation has been checked against a source reproducing it. How this extracting order controlled what could be known and said about it, and suppressed what it could not, is the subject of Module 7.

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Patterns of Power · British Buganda — Module 7

UNTRANSLATED

Module 7 · Information and Suppression — how a colony kept the reality it lived from the metropole that ruled it, not by silencing the grievance but by walling it behind a language the rulers had never troubled to read

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The seam, and the two distances

Every order has a seam — the join between what it says of itself and what it does, between the robe held up for the audience and the extraction and coercion the robe is laid over — and the order's steady work is to keep the two sides of that seam from meeting, so that no one who believes the robe is ever confronted with the reality beneath it. In a metropole ruling a distant colony the seam runs, above all, between the two ends of the empire: the metropole hears the robe and the colony lives the reality, and the whole task of imperial information-management is to keep the distance between them intact, so that the public and the Parliament that fund and sanction the conquest never see what the conquered actually endure. This module is about how the Buganda order kept that seam closed, and it returns a finding the framework should carry, because the seam here was held shut by two distances and not one. The first was the ordinary distance of geography, the thousands of miles between Entebbe and Westminster. The second was a distance the redirect had manufactured, and it was subtler and more effective than any censor: a distance of language. The metropole heard the robe in English; the colony spoke the reality in Luganda; and between the two ran a

WALL THAT NO DESPATCH HAD TO BUILD AND NO CENSOR HAD TO guard, because a grievance published in a tongue the rulers could not read is, for the purpose of reaching them, not a published grievance at all.

The channel captured with the robe

To see how the language wall came to stand there, begin with who owned the printed word. Literacy in Buganda was, at its origin, mission literacy: the Church Missionary Society and the White Fathers taught the Baganda to read in order that they might read the Scriptures translated into Luganda, and the printing press that made the letters was the mission's press. So the channel of the written word arrived already captured — captured, that is, by the same missions that had redirected the robe in Module 3 — and the first generation of Ugandan newspapers was mission-owned and mission-minded. The CMS produced Mengo Notes from 1900, renamed Uganda Notes, and from 1907 the Luganda paper *Ebifa mu Buganda*; the White Fathers answered with the Luganda monthly *Munno* from 1911. These papers were, in the plain judgement of the media's own historians, predominantly religious, foreign-owned, and careful; they kept away from politics, paid little attention to the grievances of the natives, and on the few occasions they strayed beyond church matters they towed the government's line — which is unsurprising, for the missions were supported by the colonial government and the religious press was, in the historians' phrase, part of the colonial manifestation itself. Above them, for the small European and Asian and educated-African readership, stood the English-language *Uganda Herald* from 1912 and the government's own *Uganda Gazette* of official notices. The whole apparatus of print, in short, belonged to the makers of the robe and the keepers of the order, and it drew the field of what a reader could know exactly as the formation of Module 4 had drawn it — toward Scripture, toward loyalty, and away from the arrangement itself.

The model colony

What travelled up the English channel to the metropole was the robe in its most flattering form, for Buganda had become the empire's favourite proof that conquest could be benign. The doctrine Lugard had stated at the founding — that the object was to rule through the native's own executive government — had by the 1920s hardened into the celebrated theory of indirect rule, set out at length in Lugard's *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* of 1922, and Buganda was its showcase: a Christian African kingdom governing itself under British protection, its chiefs administering, its peasants prospering on their cotton, its martyrs and its cathedral and its knighted Katikkiro proof that the "Japanese of Africa" of Module 3 were being raised toward civilisation rather than ground beneath it. This was the picture the official reports composed, the mission magazines circulated to their subscribers, and the metropolitan public received — a model colony, the answer to the critics of empire, the demonstration that the whole enterprise was a trust and not a theft. It was not wholly false; the self-government was real, the schooling was real, the peace at the core was real. But it was the robe, and it reached the metropole because the metropole was told it in a language the metropole spoke, by the people whose business was to tell it.

Untranslated

Beneath the robe the colony lived the reality the earlier modules have reconstructed — the crop the peasant could not refuse, the month of labour rendered to his chief, the rent and tribute drawn off his cotton, the kingship hollowed to a conditional office, the caste ladder up which his surplus climbed. And the striking fact, the one that makes this colony's seam distinctive, is that this reality was not hidden from the Baganda themselves, nor even kept out of print. It was spoken, argued, and eventually published — but in Luganda, and Luganda was a wall. The redirect had given the Baganda a vernacular literacy, and a vernacular literacy is a double-edged gift: it makes a people able to read their Scriptures, and it makes them able, in time, to write their grievances, but it writes those grievances in a tongue sealed off from the

distant power that might redress them. The peasant's complaint could be set in type and sold in the market at Mengo and still not travel to London, because between the market at Mengo and the desk at the Colonial Office lay not only five thousand miles but a language barrier the rulers had never crossed. The reality of Buganda was not, in the main, silenced. It was untranslated. And an untranslated reality is, to the metropole, a silent one — with the crucial difference that the silencing costs the order nothing, requires no censor, breaks no liberal principle, and leaves the rulers able to say, truthfully, that they suppressed nothing, while the thing they did not suppress goes unheard exactly where hearing it would matter. The language wall did the routine work of keeping the seam shut, and it did it more cheaply and more deniably than any censorship could.

The son of Ebifa

The wall, however, had a gate the missions themselves had cut, and through it came the dissent. The vernacular literacy that let a man read *Ebifa* let him also start a paper of his own, and in 1920 a group of Baganda — clerks and teachers and printers, some of them working away in Nairobi under the banner of a Baganda workers' union — did exactly that, founding *Sekanyolya*, the first African-owned and African-edited newspaper in East Africa. Its provenance is the whole story of the leaky monopoly in miniature. It was owned by S. W. Kulubya, a Muganda landowner formed at King's College Budo; its first editor, Zefania Sentongo, had learned to set type at the Budo mission press itself; and it was printed not in Buganda but in Nairobi, on a press beyond the reach of the Ganda establishment it meant to attack. The mission's own tool, in the mission's own script, learned in the mission's own school, had been carried out of the country and turned around. And *Sekanyolya* used it to say the untranslated thing: it concentrated, its historians record, on the discrimination and exploitation and oppression of the ordinary people by their own traditional leaders and by the coloniser alike, training its fire on the chiefs who sat in the Lukiiko, on the Asian traders, and on the missionaries — sparing only the Kabaka. It announced its purpose without

flinching, in words worth giving as they are reproduced: "We will not be surprised if our paper is hated since it will speak the truth, which is hard to stick to. *Sekanyolya* will continue to kill snakes even if some people are using them as food." And *Ebifa*, the CMS paper that was its unwitting parent, greeted it in February 1921 with a phrase that names the mechanism exactly — it called *Sekanyolya* "the son of *Ebifa*." The formation that made the clerks had made the journalists; the robe's own literacy had bred the voice that would contest the robe. Behind *Sekanyolya* came others through the 1920s and after — *Matalisi*, *Dobozi lya Buganda*, and a growing vernacular press — carrying the grievances of the Bataka landholders and the squeezed tenants into print, and making the reality, in Luganda, ever more loudly said.

When the seam threatened

Said in Luganda, the reality still had to breach two walls to move the order — it had to reach the metropole across the language barrier, and it had to reach a pitch at home that force could not ignore — and the establishment guarded both. Routinely, the language wall sufficed and little more was needed than a cold official shoulder; the dissent circulated among those who already lived the reality and changed nothing at the level that mattered. But the vernacular press did another kind of work that frightened the order more than any despatch to London could, for it threatened to make the *private* seam meet — to publish among the Baganda themselves what the Ganda establishment kept hidden, the corruption of the chiefs, the exactions of the landlords, the failings of the great. When, in the 1930s and 1940s, the Christian revival that swept the region began to throw open the private lives of respectable Ganda men to public confession, and the Bataka press to broadcast the elites' abuses, the terror of the exposed was real, and it was shared by the coloniser and the native establishment alike, because both were named. So the suppression, when it came, was joint. The chiefs of the Lukiiko had their own reason to silence a press that attacked them, and the colonial state had its statutes; and when the grievance at last boiled past print into the disorders of the mid- and late 1940s — the riots this study will reach in its later modules — the state

answered the way an order answers a seam about to burst, by cutting the channel: after the disturbances of 1949 the administration imposed an outright ban on three of the vernacular papers, and reached, as it had before, for the deportation and detention of the men who led the agitation. The pattern is the one the cost column disclosed in Module 5: the account against the speakers of the reality was left uncollected while the language wall held it harmless, and was collected only when the reality grew loud enough at home to threaten the order — the ban following the danger, not the offence.

Reading information and suppression against the framework

Module 7 asks how the order controlled what could be known and said, and Buganda returns two refinements to the framework's account of the seam.

First, the seam of a redirect colony is split by **language as well as distance**, and the language split is the more efficient keeper of the two. The framework holds that the colonial seam runs between a metropole that hears the robe and a colony that lives the reality, and that the order's task is to keep the two from meeting across the distance between them. Buganda shows that where the redirect has formed the native in his own tongue — given him, for the robe's own purposes, a vernacular literacy — the reality becomes fully articulate and even published in that tongue, and is thereby kept from the metropole not by silence but by untranslation. Name the mechanism plainly: **in a colony that forms the native in his own language, the seam is held less by censorship than by the absence of translation — the reality is speakable, sayable, printable, and still inaudible where it would count, walled off in a tongue the rulers never learned.** This is cheaper than censorship and cleaner: it suppresses nothing, breaks no principle, leaves the record able to say that the press was free, and keeps the grievance from the one audience whose hearing could have moved the order. The reality of Buganda was one of the best-documented in colonial Africa, argued in a lively vernacular press for decades — and for decades it did not reach the power that ruled it, because that power had never troubled to read the language of the people it ruled.

Second, the redirect's information monopoly is **captured with the robe but leaky at the seam it forms**. The channel of print was seized with the robe — mission-owned, government-aligned, drawing the field of the visible toward Scripture and loyalty — exactly as the framework's account of a captured robe would predict. But the same formation that installed the channel bred the dissent that would use it: the vernacular literacy given to read the Bible was turned to write the grievance, the mission's press schooled the editor who would attack the mission, and the dissenting paper was, in its parent's own phrase, "the son of *Ebifa*." The redirect cannot form a people to read without forming some of them to write, and so its control of the channel generates, from inside, the voice that contests it — which is why the seam of such a colony is not breached from without but split from within, by the very literacy the order installed to hold it shut. The suppression that answers is, like everything else in this colony, delegated and shared — the native establishment silencing the press that names it, the colonial state supplying the statute — and escalates, as the cost column escalates, only when the reality grows dangerous at home, the ban arriving with the riot and not with the truth.

Legibility is not pardon. To show that the reality was walled off by language rather than gagged by a censor is not to find the order gentler for it, but harder to indict and therefore worse. A censored grievance leaves a wound the record shows; an untranslated one leaves no mark at all, and lets the ruler believe, in perfect sincerity, that he suppressed nothing and heard nothing because there was nothing to hear. The peasant's complaint was spoken, and printed, and true, and it did not reach the desk that could have answered it — not because a hand struck it down but because the men at that desk had built an empire on a people whose language they never learned, and had thereby arranged, without ever deciding to, that the ruled could shout the truth in the street and remain, to the only audience that mattered, silent. That the order needed no censor to keep its seam shut is not a mark of its restraint. It is the measure of how completely the distance had been engineered, and of how much can be kept from a metropole that is content not to understand.

A note on sources. Vernacular-press quotation is given as it is reproduced in the Ugandan press and the media-history scholarship: *Sekanyolya*'s declaration that it would "speak the truth, which is hard to stick to" and would "continue to kill snakes even if some people are using them as food," and *Ebifa*'s description of it in February 1921 as "the son of *Ebifa*," are quoted as reproduced and attributed to those papers. The chronology and character of the early press — Mengo Notes (1900)/Uganda Notes (1902), *Ebifa mu Buganda* (1907, later *Ebifa mu Uganda*, 1934), *Munno* (1911), the *Uganda Herald* (1912), and the *Uganda Gazette* — its mission ownership and government alignment, and the founding of *Sekanyolya* in 1920 by Baganda in Nairobi (owned by S. W. Kulubya, edited first by Zefania Sentongo and later by Daudi Basudde), together with the later vernacular titles and the 1949 ban on three papers after the disturbances, follow the standard media histories and are paraphrased from and credited to Zie Gariyo's work on the press in Uganda's political struggles and the surveys reproduced in the Ugandan press; the training of *Sekanyolya*'s editor at the Budo mission press and the paper's printing in Nairobi follow those sources. The characterisation of the East African Revival as an agent that threw open the private lives of respectable Ganda men, and of the Bataka press as broadcaster of elite abuses, is paraphrased from and credited to Derek Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival* (2012), and the related work of Carol Summers on the Bataka and vernacular publicity. Lugard's doctrine of ruling through the native executive government is quoted from *The Rise of Our East African Empire* as established in Module 1, and the codification of indirect rule in his *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922) is referenced as the model-colony robe; the fuller history of the movements suppressed here — the Bataka, the tenants, the riots — is reserved for Modules 9 and 10. Dates that differ among sources (the appearance of *Sekanyolya* in 1920 or 1921; the exact titles banned) are given as the sources give them. Every reproduced quotation has been checked against a source reproducing it. How the elite that ran this order coordinated among itself, and defaulted to it without instruction, is the subject of Module 8.

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Patterns of Power · British Buganda — Module 8

THROUGH THE KATIKKIRO

Module 8 · Elite Coordination and the Default — how a conqueror got a self-sustaining loyalty for nothing by borrowing the one his subjects already had, and what it cost him that the loyalty he borrowed was never, at bottom, to him

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The open problem, and the cheapest answer to it

Here is the hardest question this collection asks, the one it calls the open problem. A ruler cannot govern alone; he needs a class of capable men to assess his taxes, hold his provinces, and command his force. But every such man is a potential rival, and a class of them is a standing conspiracy waiting for a reason — so the ruler's deepest difficulty is not acquiring able agents but keeping them agents, keeping the coordination among them pointed at upholding his order rather than at replacing him or carving it up. What solves this, when it is solved, is not surveillance and not reward alone but a *default*: a settled expectation, held by every member of the elite, that everyone else will go on supporting the existing order, so that defection looks lonely and doomed and loyalty looks merely sensible. The default is the focal point the whole elite silently coordinates on, and where it holds, the order runs itself, because each man upholds it not on instruction but because he assumes all the others will and cannot afford to be the one who did not. The question for any ruler is how to get a default that points his way — and the question for a *conqueror*, who arrives as a stranger with no standing

loyalty owed to him at all, is sharper still, because he must manufacture from nothing the very thing a native dynasty has spent centuries growing.

The redirect gave the British the cheapest answer to that question the corpus has yet recorded: do not manufacture a default at all — *borrow* one. Buganda already had a default, and a magnificent one. The whole naturalised loyalty of a five-century kingdom converged on the sacred person of the Kabaka and on the chiefly order beneath him; every Muganda of consequence already expected every other to uphold the kingship, and did so himself. The redirect of Module 3 had captured that kingship and re-dyed it, so that to uphold the Kabaka was now to uphold the Kabaka-under-British-over-rule — and at a stroke the entire coordinating default of the Ganda elite was pointed, without any Briton having to build it, at the colonial order. The British acquired a self-sustaining elite loyalty for nothing, by inheriting the one their subjects had made for themselves. But a borrowed thing is owned by its lender, and the whole of this module is the working-out of that fact: the default the British ran on was, and remained, a loyalty to the *Ganda* order, not to Britain — and a loyalty you have borrowed serves you only for as long as it and your own purposes point the same way.

Loyal but never subservient

Borrowing the default meant empowering the men who embodied it, and the redirect duly produced a native elite of formidable strength — none more so than the man who ran Buganda for a generation, the Katikkiro Apolo Kagwa. He had come up as a Protestant war-leader in the religious wars, been made Katikkiro when Mwanga was restored in 1890, served as the senior of the three regents through the whole of the infant Daudi Chwa's minority from 1897 to 1914, and negotiated, on the native side, the Agreement of 1900 that made him one of its largest landowners. By the standard judgement he governed the kingdom for thirty years as an extremely competent and progressive autocrat, easily dominating the chiefs of the Lukiiko — and the phrase the historians reach for to describe his relation to the British is the one

that names the whole open problem in four words: he was loyal, they say, *but never subservient*. There is the difficulty exactly. The redirect had needed a strong intermediary and had got one; but an intermediary strong enough to be worth having is strong enough to be a rival, and Kagwa had made himself so much the master of Buganda's internal government that he was less the British administration's servant than its indispensable partner — a man who had won, by his services, a privileged autonomy for his kingdom, and who ran that kingdom as very nearly a co-sovereign. The borrowed default had a keeper, and the keeper had begun to look as though he, and not the lender, might be the one it truly served.

Through the katikiro

The reckoning came, as such reckonings do, over a question that looks technical and is in fact the whole of the matter: through whom did authority run? For a quarter-century the British had ruled Buganda, in effect, through Kagwa — passing their wishes to the Katikkiro, who passed them to the chiefs, so that the chiefs were Kagwa's men executing Kagwa's instructions, and the channel between the coloniser and the native administration ran through a single Ganda hand. This is the channel on which the open problem always turns, because whoever holds the channel between the ruler and the sub-agents holds the coordination: if the chiefs take their orders through the Katikkiro, the default they coordinate on is the Katikkiro's, and the oligarchy is a semi-autonomous power with a head of its own; if the chiefs take their orders directly from the British, the default is the British administration's, and the Katikkiro is merely one official among many. In 1925 the matter came to a head on precisely this point. The dispute, in the standard account, turned on the fundamental issue of the colonial officials' right to deal directly with the Ganda chiefs rather than through the Katikkiro — and it was fundamental because it was the whole question of who owned the channel and therefore the default. Kagwa fought it as the existential matter it was, and, defeated locally, played his last and highest card: he appealed over the head of the local administration to the Secretary of State for the Colonies himself, as a loyal

British ally of thirty years' standing, invoking the whole history of his service. The appeal failed. London upheld the administrator. And in that failure Kagwa learned what every borrowed intermediary must eventually learn — that his standing was not that of an ally, whose loyalty creates a claim, but that of an agent, whose loyalty is a condition of his employment; that the "so long as" of Article 6 governed him as surely as it governed his king. He resigned, reluctantly, in 1926, under a cloud of documented charges — inefficiency, abuse of power, accounts unkept — that were true enough to serve as the decent dress for a political removal, and he died the next year. The over-mighty keeper of the default had been reduced, by the calm assertion that the chiefs could be reached without him, from a co-sovereign to a resignation.

Every balance held

Kagwa's fall was not an isolated act of discipline but the sharpest instance of a standing method, and the method was to hold every balance in the native elite at once so that no single figure or faction could ever make the borrowed default its own. The British did not, in the main, rule by orchestrating their agents directly, as a hand moves a tool; they ruled by arranging the field so that the agents' own interests kept them in place — by setting a filter rather than working a hand. Consider the balances they held. Above Kagwa sat the Kabaka, but a Kabaka deliberately kept a figurehead: Daudi Chwa came of age in 1914 wishing to free himself from the Katikkiro's control, and the British were content to let the office and its first servant check one another, an occupant with the sacred prestige and no power set against a servant with the power and none of the prestige, each a limit on the other and neither a threat to the Protectorate that balanced them. Beneath and around them the British cultivated the young against the old — the school-educated new generation, the Young Baganda Association, whose members attached themselves to the young Kabaka and whose typing and translation the district officers found far more congenial than the old autocrat's independence, so that a rising class stood ready to inherit the offices of the falling one. Across the whole ran the confessional balance built into the settlement itself, the Protestant ascendancy

of Kagwa shadowed by the Catholic counterweight of his fellow-regent Mugwanya, neither permitted to consume the other. And after the Great War a fresh influx of ex-military district commissioners, convinced that the old self-government was an obstacle to efficient government, pressed the case for direct dealing that broke Kagwa. The British had only to stand at the centre of these oppositions and let them work: the young wanted the old men's places, the Kabaka wanted freedom from his Katikkiro, the Catholics wanted parity with the Protestants, the new officials wanted control—and each of these appetites, pursued, tightened the net around any native leader who might otherwise have gathered the borrowed default into his own hands. This is coordination by filter and not by hand: the ruler need not direct the elite if he has arranged the conditions so that the elite's own rivalries select, at every turn, for the men who keep the default pointed his way and remove the men who do not.

No hidden hand

The result was an order that coordinated itself, and it is worth being precise about how, because the self-coordination is the thing that made the colony cheap. No British official sat at the centre pulling strings; there was no hidden hand orchestrating the loyalty of the Ganda elite. What there was instead was a structure in which each member of that elite found his own position wholly dependent on the continuance of the order, and therefore upheld it without being told to and while assuming all the others would do the same. The Kabaka held his throne only by British recognition, revocable under the Agreement; the chiefs held their *mailo* estates and their salaried offices only by the same instrument; the oligarchy's very autonomy was a British grant that British displeasure could withdraw; the missions held their favoured position by the government's support. Every one of these men, consulting only his own interest, arrived at the same conclusion — that his standing rose and fell with the order — and so every one defaulted to upholding it, and every one knew the others would, and the knowing made defection unthinkable and loyalty automatic. The British supplied only the focal point, the fixed centre

of over-rule around which the coordination could form, and the fixity of that centre — the credible permanence of the "so long as," backed by a metropolitan will that had just, in Kagwa's case, shown itself firm — was enough. The invisible fist of the elite's own aligned interests did the rest. This is why a few dozen officials could hold a kingdom: they were not holding it; it was holding itself, around a centre they had only to keep still.

The two defaults

And yet the borrowed default carried, from the first day, the flaw that no balancing could cure, and naming it is the module's real work. The loyalty the British had borrowed was a loyalty to the *Ganda* order — to Buganda's kingship, Buganda's autonomy, Buganda's primacy over the peoples around it — and it coincided with loyalty to the *colonial* order only for as long as the colonial order preserved those things. For decades the two pointed the same way, and their coincidence was the whole secret of the colony's ease: the British upheld the kingship and the autonomy and the primacy, and in return the Ganda default upheld the British. But they were never the same default, and where they diverged the borrowed loyalty served its true owner and not its borrower. Kagwa's fall was itself a small divergence of exactly this kind — his default was Buganda's self-government running through the Katikkiro, the British default was direct administrative control, and when the two parted the British default won only because the metropolitan will behind it was, in 1926, unshaken, and could uphold the local administrator against the loyal ally's appeal. The victory concealed the vulnerability. The British held the borrowed default in coincidence with their own by two means only: by conceding continually to it — preserving the autonomy, gilding the kingship, letting Buganda keep its special place — and by keeping the metropolitan will firm enough to win the divergences when concession ran out. Both means had limits. The concessions to Ganda autonomy would one day collide with the British project of a single, unified Uganda governed toward a common self-rule, and on that day no concession could satisfy the Ganda default without wrecking the larger design. And the metropolitan will that won in 1926

would not stay firm forever. The open problem, in Buganda, was never solved. It was borrowed against, and the debt was deferred to the day — the deportation of a Kabaka in 1953, which the next modules will reach — when the two defaults would diverge past reconciling and the loan would at last be called.

Reading elite coordination against the framework

Module 8 asks how the ruling elite coordinated and why it defaulted to the order, and Buganda returns the corpus's cheapest solution to the open problem together with the precise flaw that cheapness carries.

First, the redirect's answer to the open problem is to **borrow the native elite's existing default** rather than to build one. A conqueror ordinarily faces the open problem in its hardest form, owed no loyalty and forced to manufacture a coordinating expectation among agents who have every reason to combine against him. The redirect escapes this by inheriting a coordination already made: it captures a native order whose elite already defaults, by centuries of naturalisation, to upholding the kingship, and it re-dyes the kingship so that the existing default now points at the colonial order. This is the cheapest possible solution, and it explains the colony's astonishing economy of rule — the order coordinated itself, with no hidden hand, because the British had acquired a ready-made default instead of building one.

Second, and this is the finding to carry, **a borrowed default is owned by its lender.** The loyalty the British ran on was never loyalty to Britain; it was loyalty to the Ganda order, which the British had arranged to coincide with their own. The redirect therefore does not so much solve the open problem as convert it into a different one: not *how do I build a default?* but *how do I keep a default I do not own pointed my way?* And that problem has a definite structure. It is fought over the **channel** — over whether the sub-agents take their coordination from the native intermediary or from the coloniser, which is why the whole thirty-year question of Kagwa's power came down, in the end, to the single issue of whether officials could deal with the chiefs directly or

only through the Katikkiro. It is managed by **balance and filter** rather than command — by holding the native elites in opposition to one another, office against first-servant, young against old, confession against confession, so that no one of them can gather the borrowed default into his own hand, and by clipping the intermediary who tries. And it depends, absolutely, on two exhaustible resources: a **continual concession** to the native default that keeps it coincident with the colonial order, and a **firm metropolitan will** that can win the divergences when concession fails. Name the whole plainly: *the redirect buys elite coordination cheaply by borrowing the native default, but it thereby rules through a loyalty that is not to the ruler, and must keep that loyalty coincident with its own purposes by concession and by force of will — so that the coordination is self-sustaining only until the day the two defaults diverge past reconciling, when the borrowed loyalty reverts to its owner and turns, in the same hands that once upheld the order, against it.*

The framework's account of self-coordinating order — the default that holds with no one orchestrating it, the invisible fist of aligned interests — is confirmed here in its purest form, and its condition is exposed. The condition is that the focal point stay fixed and the interests stay aligned; and in a redirect colony the interests are aligned only by a coincidence of two defaults that the ruler must continually purchase and can never make permanent, because he does not own the loyalty he is renting. The cheapest coordination the corpus has found is thus also the most contingent: it costs nothing to run and everything to keep, and it keeps only until the bill for the deferred divergence comes due.

Legibility is not pardon. To show that the British got their order's loyalty for nothing, by borrowing the one the Baganda had grown for their own kingdom, is to explain the colony's cheapness, not to bless it. The borrowing meant governing men through their genuine devotion to their own king and country, turned without their full knowing to the service of a foreign overrule; and keeping it meant reducing the ablest of them, when his devotion to Buganda's self-government grew inconvenient, from a knighted ally of thirty years to a resignation dressed in charges — and balancing all the rest so cunningly against one another that no Muganda could ever make his

kingdom's loyalty wholly his kingdom's own again. That the coordination cost the ruler so little is the measure of how much it had quietly taken from the ruled: the sovereignty of their own default, lent out and pointed away from them, and held that way by the patient management of every rivalry among the men who might otherwise have called it home.

A note on sources. This module rests on the standard biographical and political record, paraphrased and credited rather than quoted except for characterising phrases. The account of Apolo Kagwa — his rise as a Protestant war-leader, his tenure as Katikkiro from 1890 to 1926, his regency from 1897 to 1914, his role in negotiating the 1900 Agreement, his knighthood, and his governing of Buganda as, in the standard characterisation, an "extremely competent and progressive autocrat, loyal but never subservient to the British" who "easily dominated the chiefs in the Lukiiko" and had won Buganda "a privileged position of relative autonomy" — follows the *Encyclopædia Britannica* biography and the Dictionary of African Christian Biography, from which those phrases are drawn. His downfall in 1925–1926 over the issue of colonial officials' right to deal directly with the chiefs rather than through the Katikkiro, his failed appeal to the Secretary of State "as a loyal British ally," the documented charges of inefficiency and unkept accounts, and his resignation and death (1927) follow the same sources and the standard histories. The figurehead character of Kabaka Daudi Chwa (reigned 1897–1939), his coming of age in 1914 and wish to free himself from Kagwa's control, the emergence of the Young Baganda Association and its attachment to the young Kabaka, the district commissioners' post-war preference for direct administration and for school-educated intermediaries, and the confessional balance embodied in the Catholic co-regent Stanislas Mugwanya follow the standard record (the *Britannica* and DACB biographies; the histories of the colonial period; and the study of the Ganda political generation of this period, "Elite African Political Craft in Buganda: The Kabula Generation"). Kagwa's dates are given as the sources give them (birth variously c. 1864 or c. 1869; death 1927). The 1900 Agreement's "so long as" and its reservation of recognition, succession, and ministerial appointment to the Crown are quoted from that public-domain text as established in Module 2. The framework concepts drawn on here — the *default* as the elite's self-coordinating focal point, the *invisible fist* of aligned interests coordinating an order with no hidden hand directing it, and the ruler who sets a *filter* rather than working a *hand* — are from this collection's papers on those subjects and are explained in the text rather than assumed. The divergence of the two defaults deferred here — the Kabaka crisis of 1953 and the collision of Ganda autonomy with Ugandan unity — is the subject of Modules 9 and 10. Every characterising phrase attributed to a source has been checked against a source reproducing it.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

Patterns of Power · British Buganda — Module 9

LAID DOWN IN THE 1900 AGREEMENT

Module 9 · Plurality or Foreclosure — how a colony that let its subjects speak, associate, petition, and publish more freely than any settler colony next door still left them no channel that could reach the decisions, so that the only key which fit the lock was the one the order most feared

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The liberty variable, and two kinds of plurality

The last of the structural questions this collection asks of an order is the one that most resembles a moral question and is not: does the order leave the ruled any real channel by which to change it? An order that forecloses every such channel — that admits no legitimate route from grievance to redress — must hold itself by force forever, because it has made itself the only thing that cannot be altered; an order that leaves a genuine channel open can bend without breaking, absorbing pressure through the give of its own joints. This is the liberty variable, and measuring it in Buganda requires a distinction the framework should carry away from this case, because Buganda scores oppositely on its two halves. There is plurality of *voice* — the freedom to complain, to associate, to petition, to publish, to appeal — and there is plurality of *power* — the capacity of those voices actually to move the decisions that govern one's life. The two are not the same, and an order can grant the first in abundance while foreclosing the second entirely. That is exactly what Buganda did. It was, by the standards of colonial

Africa, a remarkably talkative, associational, petition-writing society — and not one of its many voices could reach the decisions that mattered, because those decisions had been placed, at the founding, beyond the reach of any voice at all.

The thick civil society

Begin with what Buganda genuinely had, because it was real and it was more than its neighbours enjoyed. The redirect that kept the native order intact kept, with it, that order's dense internal plurality — the clans and their heads, the councils, the customary associations — and onto that inherited thickness the colonial century grafted a whole new layer of voluntary bodies. There were the *bataka*, the clan-heads dispossessed by the mailo settlement of Module 2, who organised across the 1920s and revived in the 1940s as the Bataka Party under James Miti, claiming to speak for the wronged custodians of the land and, with the slogan that every Muganda was a *mutaka*, for the whole people. There were the farmers: the cooperative impulse that had produced a growers' association in Singo as early as 1913 matured, by 1941, into Ignatius Musaazi's Uganda African Farmers' Union, demanding for the African grower a share in the ginning and selling of his own cotton. There were the wage-workers of the new economy — the Baganda Motor Drivers' Association, whose men carried the cotton from the farm to the ginnery and stood at the seam between the classes; the domestic servants of the European and Asian households. There were the young school-educated men of the associations, the churches with their rival congregations, and above all the vernacular press of Module 7, in which every one of these grievances found print. A Muganda with a complaint in 1945 had more ways to voice it, and more fellows organised to voice it with him, than a Kikuyu or an Algerian could have dreamed of. The plurality of voice was not a fiction. It was the living civil society of a people the redirect had never had to atomise, because it ruled them through their own institutions rather than over their broken ones.

Every channel a wall

And every one of those channels ran into a wall. The Lukiiko, the kingdom's council, might have been the place where voice became power — but its members were, in the main, the appointed chiefs of the oligarchy, not the elected representatives of the people, so that the body which passed the kingdom's laws was the very class whose rule was complained of. The mailo settlement that had dispossessed the *bataka* was closed; their agitation to reopen it was rebuffed for decades. The ginning and marketing of cotton that the farmers' union demanded to enter was closed to Africans by the licensing and zoning of Module 6, and the demand was refused. And behind each of these particular closures stood the single great closure from which they all descended: the 1900 Agreement, the founding settlement, which had fixed the land, the offices, the taxes, and the powers, and which was treated by everyone who held authority under it as a thing that could not be altered. When, in the crisis of 1949, a delegation of the people at last carried their demands to the one authority they still trusted — the Kabaka himself, in his palace, before a great crowd — and asked him for democracy in the Lukiiko, for sixty elected members in place of the appointed chiefs, for the dissolution of the ministers' government, and for the right to gin and sell their own cotton, the Kabaka's answer was the wall itself, spoken aloud. The matters they raised, he told them, in the words the Commission of Inquiry recorded, "are laid down in the 1900 Agreement. I, myself, have a great duty to keep the 1900 Agreement." He would consider the cotton question after taking the advice of his advisers; and for the rest — "Tell your people to return to their homes." There is the whole liberty variable of Buganda in a sentence. The channel of voice ran all the way up to the sacred apex of the kingdom, and at the apex it met the founding settlement, and the settlement was closed. The people had every freedom to ask, and the one they asked had a duty not to grant.

Their own words, as the record reproduces them, show they understood precisely what they were up against. One of the delegates, speaking for the growers, told the king that the farmers were poor because the chiefs colluded

with the Asian ginners to rob them — "these chiefs receive money from the Indians" — and that what the growers needed was their own gins: "Every Indian ginner regards his ginnery site as a royal place. We, therefore, need our own ginnery in order to help ourselves. The growers are dying from hunger." Another put the political demand in the plainest terms of cause and effect: "If your subjects were granted sixty representatives, there would be no trouble and there would be understanding between the people and rulers." A third named the principle directly — that the people required "democracy to select their own rulers, because the elected chiefs will be interested in the welfare of their people." These are not the words of men who lacked a voice. They are the words of men who had every voice and no power, who had carried a fully articulate grievance up the only channel left open to them and found, at the top of it, a king bound by a fifty-year-old treaty to send them home.

The valve, not the lever

Why, then, was the voice permitted at all, if it could not reach the power? The answer is that a voice which cannot reach the power is not a threat to it but a service to it — and here is the module's central finding, the thing the redirect's plurality actually was. The dense associational life of Buganda functioned not as a lever, by which the ruled could move the order, but as a valve, by which the pressure of grievance could be released without the order having to move at all. Every petition drafted, every article printed, every meeting held, every deputation received and heard and thanked and sent home, bled off a measure of the discontent that might otherwise have accumulated to bursting — and did so while leaving the decisions untouched. More than that: the very existence of so much voice gave the order a priceless appearance of openness, a defence against the charge of tyranny, for how could a regime that let its subjects publish and associate and petition their king be called a closed one? The plurality was the alibi of the foreclosure. And it was kept safe, as the coordination of Module 8 was kept safe, by balance: the reactionary Bataka against the progressive farmers' union, the landlords among the *bataka* against the tenants they claimed to lead, the old chiefs against the young

educated men, Protestant against Catholic — so that the many voices, set against one another, could never fuse into the single voice that might have become a power. The order did not need to silence its critics. It needed only to ensure that their channels emptied into the air and not into the machinery, and that they spent enough of their force on each other. A people talking is a people not, yet, marching.

The misreading

There was a tragedy folded inside this arrangement, and it belongs to the module because it shows what the foreclosure destroyed. The Ganda political culture that produced all this voice assumed a particular thing about power: that grievances were meant to be carried upward to a higher authority, that one could accuse one's rivals before that authority because other voices would rise to provide balance, and that the whole was held together by a web of mutual responsibility in which speaking out was a duty and a service. This was a plural political culture in the deepest sense — one that expected many voices and trusted the contest among them. And the colonial power could not read it. When the mobilisations of 1945 brought the crowd into the streets and the deputation to the palace, the Governor, Sir John Hall, looked at a plural political culture and saw a hierarchical conspiracy — imagined, in the historian's phrase, an opponent wielding a shadow of his own top-down power against him — and responded not by entering the plural contest but by foreclosing it: secret hearings, the forced resignation of one Katikkiro, the assassination of his successor the day after that successor forced an unpopular land law through the Lukiiko, the wholesale dismissal of chiefs who had not shown slavish loyalty, and the deportation of some twenty men marked as leaders. Among those broken were exactly the figures a plural order needs — men recognised as leaders precisely because they took responsibility for others; a royal prince and a long-serving chief died in detention. The order, unable to comprehend a plurality that was not a chain of command, crushed the very leadership that might have carried a peaceful change, and taught the survivors that to be known as a spokesman for one's people was to be marked for

removal. In foreclosing the power, it had also foreclosed the orderly succession of the voice — and thereby helped to manufacture the disorder it would spend the next decade dreading.

The only key that fit

For when voice is sealed off from power, one channel remains that power cannot ignore, and the order's own foreclosure drives the grievance into it. That channel is disorder, and Buganda reached it twice. In 1945 the strike of the drivers and the servants over wages and conditions became a rising that the King's African Rifles put down; in 1949 the cotton crisis and the rebuffed petition became days of burning, the houses of pro-government chiefs set alight, Asian shops sacked, the Governor declaring that formal government had broken down and the situation was out of control, a state of emergency, the rifles again in Kampala, more than a hundred arrested in the first week and, before the end, thousands, the Bataka Party and the Farmers' Union banned, their leaders barred from the country. The suppression was, in the word the historians use, draconian, and the Governor dismissed the whole affair as the work of communist agitators and rejected the reforms the rioters had demanded. And yet — this is the bitter arithmetic the whole module has been building toward — the disorder achieved what the petitions had not. The 1945 rising had ended with elected representatives seated in the Lukiiko for the first time and a promise, however long deferred, of a minimum wage; the 1949 rising produced a commission of inquiry and, in time, the constitutional reforms and the African cooperatives and the entry into cotton marketing that a generation of orderly petition had failed to win. The order conceded to the riot what it had refused to the request. It thereby taught its subjects the single most corrosive lesson a foreclosed order can teach — that the legitimate channels were ornaments and the illegitimate one was the only key that fit the lock — and it taught that lesson at the very moment, on the eve of decolonisation, when it would most need its subjects to believe the opposite. The men who had said "if your subjects were granted sixty representatives there would be no trouble" had been proved right in the worst

possible way: the trouble came because the representatives were refused, and the representatives came because of the trouble.

Reading plurality against the framework

Module 9 asks whether the order left a real channel from grievance to change, and Buganda returns a profile the framework should carry as a distinct type: **high plurality of voice, near-total foreclosure of power.**

First, the distinction itself is the finding. The redirect, by preserving the native order rather than atomising it, preserves that order's rich internal plurality — its clans, councils, and associations — and so produces a colony far more voluble and associational than any settler colony, whose racial foreclosure flattens native society into a mass. But this plurality is a plurality of *voice* only. The decisions that govern the ruled — the land, the tax, the crop, the offices, the powers — were fixed at the founding and placed beyond the reach of any native channel, so that the abundant voice can complain, publish, petition, and appeal without ever touching them. Name the type: **the redirect colony is loud and unfree, thick with voice and empty of power, its plurality real at the level of speech and foreclosed at the level of decision.**

Second, and this is the mechanism, the redirect's plurality of voice is not a flaw in its foreclosure but a *feature* of it — a valve and not a lever. The permitted voice bleeds off the pressure of grievance without moving the machinery, and its very abundance supplies the order an alibi of openness against the charge of tyranny; and the many voices, held in balance against one another by the methods of Module 8, are prevented from fusing into the single voice that could become a power. The order does not suppress speech; it arranges that speech shall empty into the air. **A colony can be freer in its voice precisely because it is more foreclosed in its power — the two are not in tension but in collusion, the openness of the one purchasing the safety of the other.** This is why the liberty variable must be read in two registers: an order high on voice and low on power is not a half-free order but a specific and stable kind of unfree one, and the settler colony's flat

foreclosure and the redirect colony's loud foreclosure are two forms of the same thing wearing very different faces.

Third, the foreclosure is written at the founding and enforced through the apex. The wall the 1949 petition struck was the 1900 Agreement, invoked by the Kabaka himself — the focal point of the borrowed default of Module 8 — as a duty he could not break. The settlement of Module 2 forecloses the future by placing the founding division beyond amendment, and the redirected apex, bound by that settlement, becomes the instrument of foreclosure against his own people, sending them home in the name of a treaty signed before most of them were born. Here the strain in the borrowed default first shows in the open: the Kabaka, appealed to as a king by his subjects and bound as an agent by the Agreement, chose the Agreement — and the choice, made in 1949, is the shadow of the opposite choice he would make in 1953, when the modules to come will find him breaking with the British at last, on a question where the two defaults could no longer both be served.

Fourth, foreclosure manufactures the disorder it fears. By sealing voice off from power, the order left only the illegitimate channel able to reach the decisions, and then conceded to that channel what it had denied to every legitimate one — teaching its subjects that petition was theatre and riot was policy. And by misreading its subjects' plural political culture as a hierarchical conspiracy, it destroyed in the crisis of 1945 the very responsible leadership that might have made peaceful change possible, deporting the men a coming nation would need. An order that forecloses power does not merely risk disorder; it trains its subjects in it, and removes the leaders who might have offered the alternative.

Legibility is not pardon. To find that Buganda's subjects had more voice than their neighbours is not to find them freer, and the whole burden of this module is to refuse that comfortable conclusion. Their voice was real and it was permitted precisely because it was powerless; it could ask anything and change nothing; and when it pressed hardest, at the palace in 1949, it met the founding treaty in the mouth of its own king and was told to go home. The plurality that looked like liberty was the mechanism of the foreclosure, not an

exception to it — and the order that granted the voice and withheld the power taught its people, in the end, that the only thing which moved the decisions was the thing it would then punish them for doing. That is not a milder unfreedom than the settler's. It is a subtler one, which lets its subjects speak so that it need never listen, and calls the speaking freedom.

A note on sources. Quotation of the 1949 petitioners and of the Kabaka is given as it is reproduced from the *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in Uganda during April 1949* (the Kingdon Report, Entebbe, 1950) and in the Ugandan press and the documentary record: Kabaka Mutesa II's reply that the matters "are laid down in the 1900 Agreement. I, myself, have a great duty to keep the 1900 Agreement," and his instruction to "tell your people to return to their homes"; the growers' delegate's statement that "every Indian ginner regards his ginnery site as a royal place... we need our own ginnery... the growers are dying from hunger" and that "these chiefs receive money from the Indians"; the plea that "if your subjects were granted sixty representatives there would be no trouble"; and the principle that the people required "democracy to select their own rulers." Semakula Mulumba's 1949 telegram ("the powers conferred on either the Kabaka or the governor have certain limits") and his recollection that democracy would let "the sons of the bakopi enter the Lukiiko, which was then the preserve of sons of chiefs" are quoted as reproduced. The character and demands of the Bataka Party under James Miti, the Uganda African Farmers' Union under Ignatius Musaazi (registered 1941), the earlier cooperative association in Singo (1913), the Baganda Motor Drivers' Association and the domestic servants as the sparks of 1945, the eminent-domain land law for Makerere, the forced resignation of Katikiro Wamala and the assassination of Katikiro Nsibirwa in September 1945, the installation of Kawalya Kaggwa, and the 1945 and 1949 suppressions (the King's African Rifles, the state of emergency, the deportations, the banning of the Bataka Party and the Farmers' Union) follow the standard record and are paraphrased from and credited to Mahmood Mamdani's analysis of the disturbances as class politics (including his figure that the marketing board retained on the order of 38 per cent of Uganda's cotton earnings, given as his estimate), Carol Summers's "The Moral Economy of the Ugandan Crowd in 1945," D. A. Low's *The Mind of Buganda*, and the Kingdon Report. The report attributed to the *Daily Worker* of May 1949 describing the shootings is noted as the claim of a partisan source and is not relied on for figures; casualty and arrest numbers are given as the sources give them and as ranges where they differ. The framework concepts of plurality and foreclosure, and of the ruled's channels as valve or lever, are from this collection and are explained in the text. The choice the Kabaka foreshadowed here — to keep the Agreement against his people in 1949, and to break it with the British in 1953 — is the hinge of Module 10. Every reproduced quotation has been checked against a source reproducing it.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

Patterns of Power · British Buganda — Module 10

KABAKA YEKKA

Module 10 · Change and Collapse — how the order fell not to the floor its subjects could not beat but to the emptying of a distant will, when the loyalty the conqueror had borrowed to rule reverted to its owner and became, around the same throne, the force that ended him

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

How the order actually fell

The framework predicts that a colonial order does not, in the main, fall because the ruled beat down its floor. The floor is built too well and manned too cheaply for that; the risings of Module 9 were put down by the King's African Rifles, and would have gone on being put down. What ends such an order is the emptying of the will that holds it — the moment the distant metropole, counting the cost of holding against the shrinking benefit, ceases to want the colony enough to pay for it. The collapse comes from the top of the chain and not the bottom, from the lender of the force and not the objects of it. Buganda confirms this exactly, and adds to it the particular fault line the redirect had built into the order at its founding. For the collapse here did not merely follow the emptying of the imperial will; it ran along the seam between the two defaults of Module 8 — the loyalty to the Ganda order the British had borrowed, and the colonial order that had borrowed it — and when the will that had kept those two things coincident finally gave way, the borrowed loyalty reverted to its owner and turned, around the very throne the conqueror had captured, into the instrument of

his defeat. The whole of this module is the working-out of one sentence from Module 8: the redirect rules on a loan, and the loan is callable by the lender.

The loan called

The collision that called it came, as the framework said it would, at the point where the British project could no longer be reconciled with the Ganda default by any further concession. After the Second World War the metropolitan purpose in East Africa had shifted from holding colonies to composing them into self-governing successor states, and the shape Britain favoured for its East African territories was consolidation — a single Uganda governed toward a common independence, and, in the air after a Colonial Secretary's London speech of June 1953, the alarming possibility of a wider East African federation binding Uganda to settler Kenya. To the Kabaka Mutesa II this was the one thing the whole Ganda default could not accept. Federation raised the spectre of Kenyan settlers reaching for Buganda's land — the dispossession the redirect had spared the Baganda now threatening to arrive by the back door — and consolidation into a unitary Uganda meant dissolving the separate, privileged, autonomous Buganda that was the entire content of the loyalty the British had been running on. Mutesa demanded, therefore, the opposite: that Buganda's affairs be separated from the rest, that a timetable be set for Buganda's own independence, that his kingdom not be melted into a Uganda it had never consented to join. And he made the demand effective in the only currency that mattered, instructing the Lukiiko to refuse to nominate Buganda's members to the central Legislative Council, so that the machinery of consolidation seized.

Governor Sir Andrew Cohen answered with the instrument the settlement had provided for exactly this contingency, and its provenance is the whole point. He reached for Article 6 of the 1900 Agreement — the clause of Module 2, the "so long as" that made recognition of the Kabaka conditional on his cooperating loyally with the protecting power — declared that Mutesa had ceased to cooperate and forfeited his recognition, and on 30 November

1953 deported him to England. This was the loan called in the ordinary way, the way it had been called on Apolo Kagwa in 1926: the over-mighty native intermediary who had begun to serve his own default rather than the coloniser's was to be removed by the calm invocation of the conditional clause, and a more tractable figure installed in his place. In 1926 it had worked, because the metropolitan will behind it was firm and Kagwa's appeal to London had been dismissed. Cohen, reaching for the same lever twenty-seven years later, expected the same result. The lever broke in his hands.

It broke in their hands

It broke because the thing it was supposed to move — the borrowed default — did not belong to the man pulling it, and at the crucial moment reverted to its owner. The deportation of the Kabaka did not cow Buganda; it united it. The loyalty to the sacred kingship that had, for sixty years, quietly upheld the colonial order because the colonial order upheld the kingship, now discovered that the colonial order had turned on the kingship — and it swung, entire and instantaneous, against the colonial order. Almost the whole of the Ganda people rallied to their exiled king; the district councils across the Protectorate condemned the deportation; the strength of the reaction, which the historians note took Cohen wholly by surprise, was not the personal popularity of one man but the reversion of a whole people's default to its true object. And the redirect's own mechanism failed at the seam it had always depended on. The way the British had ruled Buganda was to rule through collaborating Baganda who bore the borrowed default; but now, with the default reverted, there were no collaborators to be had — Cohen, in the flat words of the record, could find no one among the Baganda willing and able to mobilise support for his schemes. The attempt to install a new Kabaka through a regency collapsed for want of a single Muganda who would take the throne against the exiled king; the Lukiiko would name no successor; the country fell into a non-cooperation that twice forced the declaration of a state of emergency. A legal challenge to the deportation failed in the courts, but the political defeat was total, and it was total for a structural reason: an order that rules by borrowing a loyalty

cannot govern once that loyalty is withdrawn, because it has kept no independent means of ruling in reserve. The British had made themselves so dependent on the Ganda default that when the default turned they had nothing left to hold Buganda with but force they were no longer willing, in the decolonising 1950s, to spend. The will had emptied; the loan was called; and the lender held every card.

The triumphant return

So the borrower gave the loan back, and dressed the surrender as a reform. A conference at Namirembe through 1954, mediated by the Commonwealth historian Sir Keith Hancock and negotiated with a constitutional committee the Lukiiko itself had chosen, produced the terms; they were enacted as the Buganda Agreement of 1955, amending the settlement of 1900; and in October 1955 Mutesa II came home to a triumph, restored to a throne the British had sworn he would never occupy again. Cohen salvaged from the wreck the substance of his reforms — the Kabaka returned as a constitutional monarch without executive power, Buganda confirmed as a province within a single Uganda, the Lukiiko reformed toward representation, a ministerial government installed — and extracted from the Kabaka a solemn engagement that he and his successors would be bound by the Agreement. On paper the Governor had won his constitutional points. In substance he had been comprehensively beaten: he had tried to remove a Kabaka and had been forced, by the reversion of the borrowed default and the emptiness of the will behind him, to bring that same Kabaka back in glory and rule through him after all. The deportation, meant to demonstrate that the apex served at the Crown's pleasure, had demonstrated the reverse — that the Crown now served at the apex's sufferance, because the Crown could no longer govern the kingdom without the loyalty only the apex could command. The hollow office of Module 2 had, in the crisis, filled with the whole force of a people's reclaimed devotion, and the man the 1900 Agreement had reduced to a salaried figurehead walked back into his palace as the living emblem of Buganda itself.

The apex reversed

Watch what the crisis did to the apex, because it is the exact reversal of what the redirect had done to it, and it closes the arc the earlier modules opened. The redirect had made the Kabaka the focal point of the order's loyalty — the still centre around which the borrowed default coordinated, the sacred person whose upholding was the upholding of the colonial order. The crisis made the same Kabaka the focal point of the order's overthrow — the still centre around which the reclaimed default now coordinated against the colonial order. The throne did not change; the loyalty ran the other way through it. And the reversal healed, in a stroke, the internal division the whole of Module 9 had traced. The Baganda who had rioted in 1949 had rioted against their own chiefly government and its foreclosures, a people divided against its own elite; four years later the same people fused behind the same throne, because an external threat to the kingship gave the foreclosed plurality the single common object it had always lacked. The 1949 crowd had gone to the palace to demand that the Kabaka side with them against his government and had been sent home; the 1953 crisis put the Kabaka on their side by putting him in exile, and a divided people became one. Note, too, the Kabaka's own arc across those four years, for it is the two defaults choosing, in a single man, which way to fall. In 1949 Mutesa had foreclosed his people's demands by invoking the 1900 Agreement, choosing the colonial default and sending the petitioners home; in 1953 he broke the Agreement in the name of Buganda and was deported for it, choosing the Ganda default at last. The pull that had held him to the coloniser in the year of the riots had, by the year of the federation scare, become the pull that threw him against the coloniser — the same man, the same two loyalties, the balance tipped by the one thing that had changed, which was that the British had finally asked him to choose. The party that would carry the reclaimed default into the politics of independence took, when it formed in 1961, the only name that fitted what 1953 had revealed: Kabaka Yekka, the Kabaka Alone.

The debt inherited

But "the Kabaka Alone" names a triumph and a doom in the same breath, and the doom is the module's last finding, because the collapse of the colonial order did not resolve the two defaults — it bequeathed them, unresolved, to the nation that inherited the wreck. Independence, when it came, was shaped entirely by the fault line the redirect had built. Buganda's reclaimed default was now a defensive sub-nationalism, determined to preserve within an independent Uganda the autonomy and primacy it had preserved through the colonial era; the wider Ugandan nationalism wanted the single, unitary state the British had tried and failed to build. The 1961 settlement papered the gap with a federal compromise — Buganda to keep a federal relationship under its Kabaka within the new state — and the 1962 election was won by an alliance between Kabaka Yekka and Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress that was, in the plain judgement of the record, a mere expedient, a marriage of a traditional monarchism and a modernising centralism that opposed everything the monarchism stood for, held together only until one partner no longer needed the other. Uganda took its independence in October 1962; Mutesa II became its first President in 1963; and the contradiction the redirect had installed at the country's heart waited four years to detonate. In 1966 the Prime Minister Obote sent the army, under a commander named Idi Amin, against the Kabaka's palace; Mutesa fled into an exile from which he would not return, dying in a London flat in 1969; the kingdoms were abolished in 1967. The redirect had bought its cheap conquest, sixty years before, by borrowing and preserving the Ganda default — and the bill for that cheapness came due not to the coloniser who had incurred it but to the independent nation that inherited it, and to the kingship itself, which the colonial order had carried intact across seven decades only to see it destroyed in the first four years of the freedom that colonial order's collapse had produced. The loan was called in 1953; the interest was paid in 1966; and it was paid by the Baganda, whose throne survived the conqueror and did not survive the nation the conqueror left behind.

Reading change and collapse against the framework

Module 10 asks how the order changed and fell, and Buganda confirms the colonial bend's prediction and completes the arc of the redirect's specific logic.

First, the collapse was driven, as predicted, by the **emptying of the metropolitan will and not by the ruled beating the floor.** The floor held to the end; the risings were suppressed; no peasant army broke the order from below. What broke it was that the distant power, in the changed calculus of the post-war decade, no longer wished to pay the cost of holding — and the proof is in the contrast the case itself supplies. The identical instrument, Article 6's conditional clause, was pulled against an over-mighty apex twice: in 1926 against Kagwa, when the will was firm, and it worked; in 1953 against Mutesa, when the will had emptied, and it broke. Nothing about the clause changed between the two. What changed was the will behind it, and that is the whole of the framework's claim about how such orders fall.

Second, the redirect's collapse runs through the **reversion of the borrowed default**, and this is the finding to carry. An order that solved its coordination problem cheaply by borrowing the native elite's existing loyalty (Module 8) holds that loyalty only as a loan, coincident with the coloniser's purpose so long as the coloniser preserves what the loyalty is loyal to. At the collapse — when the metropolitan will can no longer force the coincidence and the coloniser's project finally demands what the native default cannot give — the loan is called, and it is called *by the lender*. The very loyalty that had upheld the order reverts to its true object and becomes, around the same apex, the force that ends the order; and because the coloniser had ruled *through* that loyalty and kept no independent means of rule in reserve, he cannot govern once it is withdrawn, and finds, as Cohen found, that there is no collaborator left to be had. Name it plainly as the counterpart to Module 8's finding: **the redirect that borrows the native default to rule cheaply must give it back when the will empties, and gives it back armed — for the reclaimed**

loyalty flows straight to the apex the redirect itself made central, and turns the order's own focal point into the focal point of its overthrow.

Third, the redirect's debt is **inherited, not discharged.** The settler colony's collapse leaves a defeated settler class and a dispossessed people to contend over the land; the redirect colony's collapse leaves something more durable and more dangerous — a preserved and empowered native default that was never loyalty to the nation the coloniser drew, but to the sub-national order the coloniser ruled through. That default does not die with the colonial state. It passes to the successor, which inherits at its heart a region whose loyalty is to itself, drawn into a unity that requires that loyalty to yield — and the collision the coloniser deferred by concession and force of will is bequeathed to a successor that possesses neither the concessions nor, often, the restraint. The redirect's cheapness at the founding is thus a loan against a future that is not the coloniser's to spend, and the reckoning falls on the nation and on the very institution the redirect preserved.

Legibility is not pardon. To show that the order fell to the emptying of a distant will rather than to its subjects' revolt, and that the loyalty the conqueror borrowed became the weapon that unmade him, is to describe a mechanism, not to award a verdict — and the verdict, in any case, is not the coloniser's to receive alone. The redirect took the conquest gently, as this study has shown at every turn, sparing the Baganda the dispossession and the naked force the settler colonies inflicted, and leaving their kingdom standing. But it took the conquest gently by borrowing the Baganda's devotion to that kingdom and pointing it, for sixty years, at a foreign over-rule; and when the over-rule departed it left behind a kingdom whose devotion had been made the axis of a nation it could not accept, and a nation that could not survive with that axis in it. The gentleness was real, and it was a loan; and the loan came due, after the gentle conquerors had gone, in the destruction of the throne they had been careful to preserve. That the Baganda kept their king through the whole of the colonial century is the measure of how gently they were taken. That they lost him in the fourth year of their freedom is the measure of what the gentleness had cost.

A note on sources. This module rests on the well-established record of the Kabaka crisis and the road to Ugandan independence, paraphrased and credited, with the founding clause quoted from the primary text. The 1900 Agreement's Article 6, on which the deportation turned — recognition of the Kabaka conditional on his conforming to the laws and cooperating loyally with the protecting power — is quoted from the public-domain text as established in Module 2. The narrative of the crisis — the post-war shift toward consolidation, the June 1953 raising of the East African federation question by the Colonial Secretary, Mutesa II's demand for Buganda's separation and his blocking of the Legislative Council nominations, Governor Sir Andrew Cohen's withdrawal of recognition under Article 6 and the deportation of 30 November 1953, the states of emergency, the failure of the regency and of any attempt to find collaborating Baganda, the failed legal challenge, the well-received delegation to London, the Namirembe Conference of 1954 under Sir Keith Hancock, the Buganda Agreement of 1955 with its "solemn engagement," and Mutesa's return as a constitutional monarch in October 1955 — follows the standard accounts, including Richard Reid, *A History of Modern Uganda*; D. A. Low's studies of Buganda and of the crisis; and the documentary record. That Cohen "could find no one among the Baganda willing and able to mobilise support for his schemes," and that the reaction took him by surprise, are given as the record reports them. The road to independence — the founding of Kabaka Yekka ("the Kabaka Alone") in 1961, the 1961 federal settlement, the Kabaka Yekka–UPC alliance and its expedient character, independence in October 1962, Mutesa II's presidency from 1963, the 1966 assault on the palace by the army under Idi Amin, Mutesa's exile and death in London in 1969, and the abolition of the kingdoms in 1967 — follows the standard histories; Mutesa's own account appears in his memoir *The Desecration of My Kingdom* (1967), referenced here but not quoted. The framework concepts of the collapse driven by the emptying of the metropolitan will, and of the borrowed default reverting to its lender, are from this collection and are carried forward from Module 8. Dates that differ slightly among sources (Mutesa's return given variously as 7 or 17 October 1955) are noted as such. The full accounting of what this order took and gave, weighed together, is the subject of Module 11.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

Patterns of Power · British Buganda — Module ii

THE SCHOOL AND THE SLEEPING SICKNESS

Module 11 · The Grim Accounting — weighing the fullest credit column in this collection against the catastrophe the same page leaves out, and finding that the gentlest conquest costs not less but elsewhere: earlier, lower, and later than the beneficiary looks

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The task, and the temptation

This module weighs the whole ledger — what the order took set against what it built — and it must be done with a particular discipline, because the accounting is where the two easy errors wait. One is flattery: to let the credit column stand for the whole, to say that the colony brought schools and peace and a cash economy and leave it there. The other is demonisation: to let the debit column stand for the whole, to say that the colony was theft and death and leave it there. Both are refusals to do the arithmetic, and the arithmetic is the only honest thing. But Buganda tempts the first error more than any case in this collection, because it presents the fullest credit column of any — the gentlest conquest, the one that spared its subjects the dispossession and the naked force that fell on Kenya and Algeria, that left them their land and their king and their language and gave them, besides, more schooling and more self-government than any comparable African people possessed. And the temptation is sharpened by the fact that the order's own record agrees: the providential history the Ganda elite wrote of itself, the reputation Buganda enjoyed in the metropole as the model

colony, the memory the Baganda themselves have often kept of the colonial period as a time of advance — all of these record the credit, and record it truly. The task of this module is therefore not to deny the credit, which is real, but to widen the frame the credit is shown in. For the gentle-conquest ledger is favourable only when read at one place and one time — at the collaborating core, in the middle decades — and the whole of the accounting is what appears when the frame is widened across the castes it excludes and across the years it crops.

The credit, fully stated

Begin, then, with the credit column, and state it without stint, because a grim accounting that scanted the good would be as false as one that scanted the harm. The Baganda kept their kingdom. Where the settler colony atomised its natives and the direct-rule colony dissolved their institutions, the redirect preserved the Ganda order whole — the Kabakaship, the Lukiiko, the chiefly hierarchy, the clans, the language, the sense of a distinct and continuous nation — so that the Baganda entered the twentieth century as a self-governing people with a state of their own, administering their own affairs through their own institutions under a light imperial hand. They gained a literacy and a schooling unmatched in the region: the mission schools and King's College Budo and, from 1922, the college at Makerere made the Baganda the best-educated Africans of eastern Africa, and the literacy the missions planted to spread the Gospel became the foundation of a written vernacular culture, of Kagwa's histories and a lively press and a reading public. They gained a cash economy where none had been, the cotton and later the coffee putting money into the hands of a peasantry that had known only subsistence and tribute, and private property in land where none had existed, the mailo creating a class of proprietors who could buy, sell, inherit, and invest. They gained, for a long stretch of the middle century, a peace their own nineteenth century had not known — the religious wars ended, the succession stabilised, the raiding closed off. None of this is fiction, and none of it should be waved away by a reflexive anti-colonialism that cannot admit an

achievement. A Muganda of the 1940s lived in a more literate, more peaceful, more monetised, and more self-governing society than his grandfather of the 1880s, and he lived in it as a member of a nation that had kept its crown. That is the credit column, and it is full.

The founding catastrophe

Now widen the frame in time, backward, to the decades in which that middle-century order was made, and the credit column acquires the shadow it is usually shown without. The gentle Buganda of the 1940s stood on a founding that had been, for two decades, a demographic catastrophe. The religious wars the British armed and decided had killed and scattered; the conquest of Bunyoro, traced in Module 1, had reduced a kingdom to near-depopulation, its cattle herds collapsed from thousands to hundreds, its people dead of the famine and disease that a scorched-earth war leaves behind. And across the whole northern shore of the lake, in the first years of the Protectorate, came a killer larger than any war. Sleeping sickness, carried by the tsetse fly along the lakeshore and the drainage rivers, broke over Buganda and neighbouring Busoga from about 1900, peaked around 1910, and before it subsided near 1920 had killed, by the estimates the sources give and which are given here as a range, something between two hundred thousand and a quarter of a million people — in southern Busoga, by one colonial reckoning, some two hundred thousand of a population of three hundred thousand, two in every three. It is not a simple colonial crime; the fly and the trypanosome were not imported by Britain. But neither was it innocent of the conquest, for the epidemiologists and historians who have studied it tie its explosive spread to exactly the dislocations the conquest brought — the surge of trade and movement, the vast cattle-migrations that followed the rinderpest pandemic and the setting-up of the Protectorate, the ecological churn of a region being remade — and the colonial response to it, the forced relocation of perhaps half a million people some twenty-four kilometres back from the lake they lived on, the compulsory testing, the isolation camps, was itself a second dislocation laid over the first. And the toll was not confined to the fly. The

population of Buganda itself, by the estimates of its economic historians — estimates contested, resting on shaky nineteenth-century figures, and given here as the range they are — may have fallen from something well over a million in the late 1880s to around six hundred and fifty thousand by 1920, its death rate running above its birth rate for years, driven down not by the fly alone but by the coerced labour and the diminished food production that the new cotton-and-tax economy imposed on a body already sick. "Cotton could devour peasants," one historian writes of the neighbouring region, and the phrase holds for the core as well. The gentlest conquest in this collection opened with the near-halving of the very people it is remembered for treating gently.

The displaced cost

Widen the frame now in caste, downward and outward, and the middle-century credit reveals whose it was and at whose expense. The schooling that made the Baganda the best-educated Africans of the region was, as Module 4 showed, rationed by rank — the ladder of Budo for the chief's son, the catechism for the peasant, and, for the conquered peripheries, almost nothing; the credit was drawn disproportionately by the class that had collaborated. The private property in land enriched the thousand chiefs of the mailo settlement and made the peasant their tenant, owing rent and tribute above his colonial tax — the triple burden a historian describes as combining the oppressions of the old feudal order with the contractual squeeze of the new capitalist one and the fresh demands of the colonial state, all three pressing at once on the man at the bottom. The cash economy that put money in the peasant's hand rigged the price it paid him and skimmed the surplus up the caste ladder to the ginner, the chief, the state, and the mills of Lancashire. And the whole of it stood on the destruction of Bunyoro, whose lands had paid the victors and whose people had been floored so that the Baganda need not be. The credit column, read at the collaborating Ganda core, is full; read at the peasant beneath that core, it thins to a hard subsistence bought with a devoured body; read at the conquered periphery, it turns wholly to debit. The

gentleness was real and it was local — a gentleness enjoyed by a caste, in a place, purchased by the un-gentleness visited on the castes and places the model-colony frame did not photograph.

The end catastrophe

And widen the frame one last time, forward, to what became of the credit's own crown jewel. The single greatest entry in Buganda's credit column was the thing the redirect had preserved and no settler colony preserved: the kingdom itself, carried whole across seven decades, the Kabakaship and the Lukiiko and the nation intact into the age of independence. Module 10 has already told how that entry was cancelled. The two defaults the redirect had installed at the founding — the loyalty to Buganda it had borrowed, and the unitary Uganda it had failed to build — could not both be served in the independent state, and in 1966 the contradiction detonated: the army stormed the Kabaka's palace, the king fled into an exile that ended in a London death, and the kingdoms were abolished the following year. The institution the colonial order had most prized itself on preserving survived the colonial order by four years. This is the grimmest single line in the whole accounting, because it is the credit column consuming itself: the very achievement the gentle conquest is remembered for — you kept your king — was undone by the very structure the gentle conquest required — a preserved sub-national loyalty inside a nation that could not contain it. The kingdom that the conquest spared was destroyed by the independence the conquest's collapse produced, and the bill for the gentleness of 1900 was paid, in 1966, in the ruin of the thing the gentleness had saved.

The frame widened

Set the four framings together and the gentle-conquest ledger resolves into something truer and harder than either flattery or demonisation would allow. The Buganda order was not simply gentle. It was a catastrophic founding, in which war and epidemic and coerced labour may have killed a third or more of the people of the lake region and near-halved the population of Buganda

itself; a genuinely beneficial middle, in which a collaborating core gained schooling, property, peace, and self-government real enough that its own memory records them with gratitude; and a catastrophic end, in which the preserved kingdom that was the order's proudest achievement was destroyed by the contradiction the order had built into it. The gentleness belongs to the middle and to the core, and it is real there; the catastrophe belongs to the ends and to the base and the periphery, and it is real there; and the honest ledger is not an average of the two but the holding of both at once, with a clear eye for which persons, in which places, at which times, received the credit, and which received the debit. To say the conquest was gentle is true of a Ganda chief in 1945 and false of a Busoga peasant in 1910 and false of a Munyoro in 1899 and false of the Kabaka in 1966; and an accounting that cannot say all four things at once has not widened its frame enough.

Reading the accounting against the framework

Module 11 asks that the ledger be weighed whole, and Buganda yields a finding about the accounting of gentle conquests that the framework should carry.

First, **the gentle conquest does not cost less; it costs elsewhere in the frame — earlier, lower, and later than the beneficiary looks.** The redirect's whole logic, traced through this study, is displacement: the floor displaced onto the periphery (Module 1), the extraction displaced onto the peasant and the middleman (Module 6), the coercion displaced onto the native chief and disguised as custom (Module 5), the coordination borrowed and its reckoning deferred (Module 8), the collapse's debt bequeathed to the successor nation (Module 10). The accounting is where all these displacements come to rest, and it shows that they did not reduce the cost of the conquest but relocated it — out of the collaborating core and into the periphery, out of the elite and into the peasant, out of the colonial present and into the independent future. The gentleness the core enjoyed was not a smaller total cost; it was the same or greater cost, moved to where the core would not have to see it. A conquest

that leaves its beneficiary caste better off has not necessarily done less harm; it has more skilfully chosen who bears the harm and when.

Second, **the gentle conquest writes its own favourable accounting, and that is precisely why it needs the widened frame most.** Because its credit is real and accrues to the very core whose members write the histories and keep the memory, and because its cost is displaced to peripheries that leave fewer records and deferred to a future that the colonial account does not reach, the gentle conquest produces a documentary record biased toward the credit — the model-colony reputation, the collaborator's providential history, the grateful memory of the schooled elite. This is not usually a lie; it is a cropped truth, a frame drawn around the credit with the catastrophe just outside it. The settler colony, brutal and visible, is easy to indict and hard to defend; the gentle conquest, beneficial to its core and catastrophic only at the edges of the frame, is hard to indict and easy to defend, and is therefore the more durable in reputation and the more in need of the historian who will photograph what the frame left out — the fly and the famine, the devoured peasant, the ruined rival kingdom, and the destroyed crown.

Third, the accounting confirms the collection's refusal of both flattery and demonisation by showing why both fail here specifically. Flattery fails because the credit, however real, was local in caste and time and was purchased and deferred; the model colony was a demographic catastrophe at its founding and a political catastrophe at its end, and no amount of middle-period schooling erases the two hundred thousand dead of the fly or the king dead in the London flat. Demonisation fails because the credit was real and the Baganda's gratitude for it is not false consciousness but honest testimony to a genuine, if unevenly distributed, good; a peasantry given a cash crop and a literacy, an elite given property and self-government, a nation allowed to keep its crown for a century, received things worth having, and to deny it is to patronise the people who remember receiving them. The truth is the arithmetic, and the arithmetic is grim in the precise sense that its two full columns do not cancel to a comfortable verdict but stand side by side, each true, demanding to be held together.

Legibility is not pardon. To state Buganda's credit column in full — the kept kingdom, the schooling, the property, the peace — is not to pardon the order but to refuse the lazy demonisation that would let us dismiss it unweighed; and to widen the frame to the epidemic dead and the coerced peasant and the ruined Bunyoro and the palace stormed in 1966 is not to demonise but to refuse the equally lazy flattery that would let the model-colony frame stand as the whole picture. What the honest ledger shows is that the gentlest conquest in this collection was gentle to some, in some places, for a while, and that its gentleness was bought with a founding catastrophe and a displaced extraction and repaid with an ending one — so that the final entry, the destruction in 1966 of the very kingdom the gentleness had preserved, reads less like an accident of independence than like the last instalment of a bill first run up in 1900. The order took a kingdom gently and gave it much, and the much it gave was drawn from the people it did not photograph and secured against a future it would not have to pay in; and when the future came, it fell hardest on the one possession the gentleness had most carefully saved. That is the accounting, and it is grim not because it is all debit but because it is both columns, full, and will not resolve.

A note on sources. Figures throughout are given as ranges and flagged where contested, and rest on the standard scholarship, paraphrased and credited. The sleeping-sickness epidemic of roughly 1900–1920 (its concentration along the Lake Victoria shore through Buganda and Busoga, its peak around 1910, and a death toll variously estimated at more than two hundred thousand and up to a quarter of a million, including the colonial estimate of some two hundred thousand deaths among a population of three hundred thousand in southern Busoga), its linkage to the trade, migration, and cattle-movement dislocations of the early Protectorate, and the colonial response of compulsory relocation of populations back from the lakeshore, testing, and isolation camps, follow the medical-historical literature, including Kirk Arden Hoppe, *Lords of the Fly*, Mari K. Webel, *The Politics of Disease Control*, and the epidemiological reanalyses in *Emerging Infectious Diseases* and related journals; the resettlement distance and toll are given as those sources report them. The estimate that Buganda's own population fell from well over a million in the late 1880s to around 650,000 by 1920, with the death rate exceeding the birth rate, and the observation that coerced labour and diminished food production compounded disease, are drawn from the economic-historical literature on colonial Uganda (Jan Jørgensen, *Uganda: A Modern History*, and related work), and are

flagged as resting on unreliable nineteenth-century population estimates and given as a contested range; the phrase "cotton could devour peasants" is quoted as reproduced from that literature. The devastation of Bunyoro, including Kabalega's cattle reduced from thousands to hundreds by the time of his capture, continues from Module 1 and Shane Doyle's work. The credit-side facts — the preservation of the Ganda kingdom and its institutions, the schooling advantage and the founding of Makerere in 1922, the mailo property regime, the cash-crop economy, and the mid-century peace — are established in Modules 2, 4, and 6 and follow the standard record. The destruction of the kingdom in 1966 and the abolition of the kingdoms in 1967 continue from Module 10. This module states the credit column in full deliberately, as the accounting requires, and widens the frame in time and caste to set the displaced and deferred debit beside it; the reading offered is the study's own and is held, per the collection's discipline, short of both flattery and demonisation. Every reproduced phrase has been checked against a source reproducing it. What Buganda shares with, and how it diverges from, the other conquests in this collection — and the strongest case its defenders can make, answered without flinching — is the subject of Module 12.

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Patterns of Power · British Buganda — Module 12

THE GENTLEST TAKING

Module 12 · Convergence and Divergence — where Buganda falls among the conquests that co-opt rather than crush, why its own position handed the British the gentlest method, and the strongest defence of that gentleness, stated in full and answered without flinching

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The comparative frame

The last module places Buganda among the others and asks what its likeness to them, and its difference from them, reveals. The collection's governing claim is that rulers in like positions converge on like solutions without copying one another, because a position poses a definite problem and the problem has only a few good answers, so that the patterns which recur across conquests that never touched are the fingerprints of structure and not of borrowing. Buganda is a test of that claim, and it passes it twice — once by converging, with conquests it had no knowledge of, on a solution its own position demanded, and once by diverging, from conquests within its own empire, exactly where its position differed from theirs. The convergence shows the structure; the divergence shows the position selecting among the structure's options. Together they let us say, at the end, what kind of thing the Buganda order was — and then to meet, on that ground, the strongest case its defenders can make, which is stronger here than for any other conquest in this study.

The convergence

Begin with what Buganda shares, because it is deep and it was arrived at blind. When Lugard and Johnston captured a self-running kingdom and chose to rule through it rather than to dismantle it, they did what conquerors have done, again and again, across every continent and age, on meeting an order that already worked: they kept the clerks and redirected the priests. The Arab armies that took Sasanian Persia kept the Persian tax-gentry and folded the Zoroastrian priesthood into the tolerated category of the Book; the Manchus who took Ming China kept the Confucian scholar-bureaucracy and clothed themselves in the Mandate of Heaven; the Spanish who took the Nahua kept the native lords as tribute-intermediaries while breaking the old priesthood; and the British who took Buganda kept the *bakungu* chiefs and re-dyed the sacred kingship Christian. None of these conquerors was reading the others. The British commissioner drafting an agreement with the Ganda regents was not consulting a manual of Sasanian administration; he was solving, from where he stood, the problem every conqueror of a working order faces — govern this cheaply — and reaching, as they had reached, for the answer the problem contains: do not build a loyalty, borrow the one that is already here; do not replace the machine, capture it running. That the British arrived at this independently is the whole force of the convergence, for it rules out imitation and leaves only the position. Buganda is not a peculiarly British achievement or a peculiarly African tragedy; it is one more instance of the oldest move in the government of the conquered, found again because the position that demands it recurs.

The divergence

Now what Buganda does not share, and why. Set it beside the two conquests this collection studies within the same empire, and it diverges from both at the point where its position diverged from theirs. Kenya's Kikuyu were acephalous — a people without an apex, without a king or a court or a chiefly bureaucracy to capture — and so the British there could not borrow a default that did not exist; they had to forge one, manufacturing chiefs where none

had been, an expensive and brittle invention. Algeria's order was fragmented and, fatally, a settler population wanted the land, so France dispossessed rather than redirected, took the country for its own colonists and held it by force against a people robbed. Buganda offered the British neither an absence to fill nor a land its own settlers craved; it offered a centralised kingdom with an apex, a court, a chiefly service, and a naturalised loyalty ready to be captured whole — and so the British did the cheapest thing the position allowed, which was to redirect. Same empire, same decade, three different methods — forge, dispossess, redirect — and the difference among them is not a difference of British character or intention but of the material each position presented. The position chose the method. And within the redirect itself, Buganda's particular form was set the same way: because the Ganda legitimacy sat in a re-usable political vessel, the sacred kingship, that could be kept and re-coloured rather than a rival altar that had to be pulled down, the British could re-dye where the Arabs in Persia could only subordinate and the Spanish in Mexico could only destroy. The kingship was the thing that made Buganda the gentlest, because it was the thing that could be captured without being broken.

The door Rome did not open

There is one further comparison the collection has taught us to make, and it draws the deepest line of all — the line between redirecting a conquered order and dissolving it. Rome, in the end, assimilated: it opened its citizenship to the conquered, drew them upward into a single imperial identity, and by the third and fourth generation the Gaul was simply a Roman, the conquered nation gone not by massacre but by absorption, its descendants inside the thing that had taken it. The British redirect did the opposite. It preserved. It kept the Baganda Baganda — their kingship, their language, their law, their sense of a nation apart — and ruled them as a distinct people through their own distinct institutions, and never for a moment sought to dissolve them into Britishness or even into a common Ugandan identity. And here is the finding that closes the arc of this whole study: the preservation that was the

redirect's gentleness was the non-integration that became its catastrophe. Rome's assimilation was crueller to the conquered identity — it ended it — and kinder to the conquered's future, for it left no separate nation to be stranded inside a later state. The redirect's preservation was kinder to the identity — it saved it — and crueller to the future, for it left, at the heart of the Uganda the British drew, a Buganda whose loyalty was to itself and could not be melted into the nation without the melting that the redirect had spent seventy years preventing. Rome opened a door that led the conquered in. The redirect built its conquered a room, beautifully preserved, with no door into the nation at all — and when independence came, the room could neither be entered nor left, and in 1966 it was burned down. The gentlest thing the British did, keeping the kingdom whole, was the thing that doomed the kingdom, because a whole and separate kingdom is precisely what a unitary nation cannot contain.

The strongest case

Now the counter-position, and it must be stated at its full strength, because for Buganda it is the strongest in the collection and it is largely true. A defender of the Buganda order — and there are many, among historians and among the Baganda themselves — would say something like this. Of all the ways the European conquest of Africa was done, Buganda's was among the most humane and the most successful, and it is perverse to spend twelve modules indicting it. The British did not massacre the Baganda, did not steal their land for settlers, did not dissolve their nation or break their king. They ended the religious civil wars that were tearing the kingdom apart; they preserved the Kabakaship and the Lukiiko and the Ganda nation intact across the whole colonial century; they gave the Baganda literacy, schools, a university, a written literature, a cash economy, private property, medicine, and a peace their own nineteenth century had never known; and they left the Baganda, at independence, the most educated, most developed, most self-governing African people in the region. This was not exploitation but partnership: the British got cheap and orderly governance, and the Baganda

got protection, modernisation, and the preservation of everything they most valued. The Baganda knew it, chose it, and remember it with gratitude, and to call their considered collaboration false consciousness is to patronise them. Compare Buganda to what happened where the choice went otherwise — to Bunyoro, which resisted and was ruined; to settler Kenya; to Leopold's Congo — and Buganda stands as the proof that colonialism could be done well, that the redirect was the humane alternative, that gentleness was possible and was, here, chosen. And as for the catastrophe of 1966 — that was the crime of Milton Obote and Idi Amin, of the independent Ugandan state, not of the British, who had in fact preserved the very kingdom that independent Uganda destroyed. Credit the colonial order with the good it plainly did, and lay the later ruin at the door of those who actually ordered the tanks.

Answered without flinching

Much of that is true, and the truth in it must be granted before the rest is answered, because an answer that denied the credit would deserve to lose. The redirect was gentler than the settler model, incomparably; the Baganda were spared what the Kikuyu and the Algerians and the Congolese suffered; the schooling and the property and the preserved kingdom and the mid-century peace were real goods, really received; and the gratitude of the Baganda is honest testimony to a genuine, if unevenly shared, benefit, not a delusion to be explained away. Where a conqueror will come regardless, the redirect is better for the conquered than dispossession, and to pretend otherwise would be a lie the people who lived it would rightly reject. All of this is conceded, fully and without reservation. And then the self-justification folded inside the truth must be refused, on three points, without flinching.

It was not a partnership, because a partnership is between parties who have both consented to the same thing, and the Baganda consented to an arrangement whose real nature was hidden inside their own re-dyed robe. The loyalty the redirect ran on was not loyalty to Britain freely given; it was the naturalised loyalty of the Ganda to their own kingship, captured and pointed at a foreign over-rule that the collaborating elite served in the sincere belief

that it served Buganda and God. That the belief was sincere does not make the arrangement a partnership; it makes it the most complete form of the taking, one in which the taken supply the loyalty that holds them and mistake their capture for their triumph. And the "partnership" reached, in any case, only the collaborating core. The peasant taxed twice and made to grow a crop he could not eat, the clan-head dispossessed by the mailo, the half-million driven back from the lakeshore, the two hundred thousand dead of the fly, the Munyoro floored so that the Muganda need not be — these were not partners. They were the people the partnership was paid with.

The comparison to Bunyoro does not exonerate the order; it convicts it. For Bunyoro was not ruined by some other, harsher colonialism against which Buganda's gentleness shines; Bunyoro was ruined by the *same* order, in the same years, by an army of Baganda that order had armed and pointed west. The gentleness shown to Buganda and the devastation visited on Bunyoro were not two policies but one — the redirect's single logic of buying the collaborating kingdom's ease with the resisting kingdom's destruction. To hold up Bunyoro as the foil that makes Buganda look humane is to hold up the redirect's own bill and call it a testimonial. The order did both; it did the one in order to afford the other; and it cannot be credited with the gentleness while the brutality that paid for the gentleness is charged to someone else.

And 1966 cannot be severed from the colonial order and laid wholly at the successor's door, because the successor inherited the contradiction fully formed. Obote ordered the tanks; that is true and it is his. But the reason there was a kingdom that could only be dealt with by tanks — a Buganda whose loyalty was to itself, entrenched, armed with a federal special status, incapable of being integrated into the nation and incapable of being left outside it — was the redirect, which had spent seventy years preserving and empowering exactly that separateness. The colonial order does not get to claim the credit for preserving the kingdom and disclaim the debit for making it unintegrable, because the preservation and the unintegrability were the same act. You cannot keep a kingdom whole inside a nation and also produce a nation that can contain it; the redirect chose the first and thereby foreclosed the second,

and the choice was made in 1900 and paid for in 1966. The tanks were Obote's. The trap was the redirect's.

So the honest verdict grants the counter-position its every true fact and refuses its conclusion. Yes, the order was gentle, and gave real goods, and was better than dispossession, and is remembered with a gratitude that is not false. And the gentleness was local to a caste and a span of years, purchased by a founding catastrophe and a ruined rival and a doubly-taxed peasant, and deferred onto a future that paid the whole deferred sum at once when the preserved and unintegrable kingdom burned. The credit is real and the credit cannot be cashed clean of the cost, because the same mechanism produced both — the redirect that gave the Baganda their kingdom and their schools and their peace is the redirect that displaced the cost onto Bunyoro and the peasant and bequeathed the contradiction that destroyed the kingdom it had given. To credit the achievement without swallowing the self-justification is to say precisely this: that the gentlest conquest in this collection was a real gift and a real conquest at once, and that its gentleness was not the opposite of its taking but the most refined technique of it.

Reading Buganda against the framework

Module 12 asks where Buganda falls among the patterns, and the answer is the whole of the study compressed. It is the collection's cleanest **redirect**: the case in which a conqueror, meeting a self-running kingdom with an apex, borrows the native default rather than building one, captures the machine rather than replacing it, re-dyes the robe rather than imposing a new one, delegates and disguises the coercion as native custom, displaces the floor onto the periphery and the extraction onto the base, and defers the reckoning onto the successor nation. Every one of those moves the collection has named elsewhere; Buganda shows them working together, in their purest and gentlest combination, and thereby teaches the framework the redirect's signature. That signature is this: **the redirect is the cheapest conquest and the one whose costs are most thoroughly displaced and deferred — so it presents the most favourable ledger to its beneficiary core, earns the most durable**

good name, and requires the widest frame to see whole; its gentleness is not less cost but relocated cost, and its deepest divergence from the assimilating conquest is that it preserves the conquered identity and thereby, in the age of nations, bequeaths a separateness that the successor state cannot survive. The redirect is gentler than the settler model in the present and more dangerous than the assimilating model in the future, and both facts flow from the single thing it does: it keeps the conquered order whole, and points it.

The convergence confirms the collection's foundation: the British reached the redirect independently, as the Arabs and the Manchus and the Spanish reached it, because the position that demands it recurs and the mind reaches, from that position, for the answer the position contains. The divergence confirms the collection's method: hold the position constant and the method follows, so that the difference between forging chiefs in Kenya and redirecting a king in Buganda is read not from the conquerors' souls but from the material their positions handed them. And the accounting confirms the collection's discipline, which is to refuse both the flattery that would let the model colony stand as a model and the demonisation that would deny the goods it really gave — to hold the two full columns side by side and let the reader do the arithmetic that the order itself, writing its own history at its own grateful core, was built never to have to do.

Legibility is not pardon, and here at the end the maxim carries the weight of the whole. To understand the redirect — to see how cheaply it conquers, how gently it can hold, how genuinely it can benefit the core it rules through, how completely it can displace its costs onto the silent periphery and defer them onto the unborn nation — is not to pardon it but to see, more clearly than the brutal conquests ever allow, what conquest most deeply is. The settler colony teaches that conquest is theft and force, which is true and shallow. Buganda teaches the deeper and harder thing: that conquest can wear the face of partnership, can give real gifts, can be met with real gratitude, can preserve what it takes and be thanked for the preserving — and be, in all of that, still a conquest, and never more entirely a conquest than when it is gentle. The Baganda kept their kingdom for a century because they were

taken so well. That is the achievement, and that is the cost, and they are the same sentence. The gentlest taking is still a taking. It is only harder to see, and it asks, therefore, to be seen the most clearly of all.

A note on sources. This closing module is synthetic and argumentative rather than evidentiary, and it rests on the findings established, with their sources, in the preceding modules of this study, to which the reader is referred: the founding conquest and the destruction of Bunyoro (Module 1); the 1900 Agreement and the mailo settlement (Module 2); the redirected robe (Module 3); formation and its caste-sorting (Module 4); the delegated and disguised labour cost (Module 5); the three-tier cotton extraction (Module 6); the seam and the vernacular press (Module 7); the borrowed default and the clipping of Kagwa (Module 8); the plurality of voice and foreclosure of power (Module 9); the Kabaka crisis, the reversion of the default, and the destruction of the kingdom in 1966 (Module 10); and the demographic and economic accounting, including the sleeping-sickness toll and the population figures given there as contested ranges (Module 11). The comparative cases are drawn from this collection's other studies and papers: British Kenya and French Algeria within the series, and the convergence of unconnected conquests — Sasanian Persia under the Arabs, Ming China under the Manchus, and Nahua Mexico under the Spanish — set out, with their sources, in this collection's paper *The Clerk and the Priest*. The framework concepts invoked — position-logic and convergence, the borrowed default, the redirect as against the forge and the settler-dispossession, and the contrast between redirecting and assimilating a conquered order — are from this collection and are carried forward from the earlier modules and papers. The counter-position stated in this module is composed as the strongest good-faith case a defender of the Buganda order would make, drawing on the genuinely favourable strands of the historical and popular record; it is answered, per the collection's discipline, by granting its true facts in full and refusing the self-justification folded within them, crediting the achievement without denying the cost and naming the cost without denying the achievement. No new primary claims are made here that were not sourced in the modules above.

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